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INTRODUCTION 
On April 15, 1599, Sir Robert Devereux, Second Earl 
of Essex, arrived in Dublin to assume his new position as 
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, having been charged by Eli-
zabeth I with the task o~ subduing that restless island 
once and for all. Outwardly confident, bolstered by the 
popular acclaim which followed his triumphant expedition 
to Cadiz in 1596, and leading the largest force hitherto 
maintained in Ireland, the Earl was determined to subdue 
the Gaelic rebels thoroughly and, above all, quickly. 
Five months later he was back in England, having left 
behind an army decimated by disease, exhausted by diffi-
cult marches across the treacherous Irish countryside, and 
morally crushed by fear and despair. His own illustrious 
military reputation was shattered, and shortly after his 
return to England he was imprisoned, officially charged 
with disobedience to orders and unofficially suspected of 
treason. 
Castigation of Essex began while his campaign was 
still in progress and has continued to the present day. 
Letters from Elizabeth to the Earl in Ireland contain 
scathing denunciations of his inefficiency, disobedience, 
lack of resolution, and, most seriously, the assertion 
that Essex had no excuse for failure, because, as the 
l 
Queen wrote, "you had your asking, you had choice of 
times, you had power and authority more ample than ever 
any had, or ever shall have. 111 Succeeding historians 
have echoed Elizabeth's charges and continued to place 
the blame solely on Essex. 
2 
Cyril Falls, author.of Elizabeth's Irish Wars and 
Mountjoy states that Essex "began with every advantage, 112 
and "no army ever established in Ireland had better pros-
pects of being adequately maintained."3 Regarding the 
Earl's strategy, Falls writes that Essex, rather than 
striking at Ulster, the root of the rebellion, "chose the 
easier course" and moved south, where he wore out his best 
troops while accomplishing nothing.4 The author of The 
Second Cecil, Phyllis M. Handover, attributes failure to 
the defeatism of Essex and to the fact that the Earl found 
guerrilla warfare "so contemptible according to his stan-
dards that he had not bothered to devise a means of coun-
tering the insidious etiolation of his army."5 Ewan Butler, 
in hisJ:>ook The Cecils, curtly dismisses the campaign by 
1c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 152. 
2cyril Falls, Mountjoy (London: Odhams Press Unlimi-
ted, 1955), 108. 
3cyril Fallst Elizabeth's Irish Wars (London: Methuen 
and Company, 1950;, 232. 
4Ibid., 231 •. 
5Phyllis M. Handover, The Second Cecil (London: Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1959), 19 • 
saying that Essex "seemed unable to come to grips with 
Tyrone. 116 
The Earl of Essex always maintained that the expedi-
tion was sabotaged by his numerous enemies in England, but 
his protestations were dismissed in 1599 and are largely 
discounted now. Handovez: states that "with nothing to dis-
tract him except his own failure, the mind of Essex became 
infected and impoisoned, 11 ? while Butler concludes that 
Essex's "consciousness of failure" began to "disturb his 
never very well-balanced mind. 118 
Articles by Reverend David Hicks (1955) and L. w. 
Henry (1959) suggested a need to reevaluate the Essex cam-
paign; however their suggestions have been generally ig-
nored. In the most recent (1971) biography of the Lord 
Lieutenant, Robert, Earl of Essex by Robert Lacey, the 
author states that "He could not complain at the strength 
or condition of the troops given him for the task";9 and 
then simplistically condemns the "aimlessness"lO of Es-
sex's movements in Ireland, without even considering the 
crucial problems of logistical support on which the 
6Ewan Butler, The Cecils (London: Frederick Muller 
Limited, 1964), 113. 
?Handover, The Second Cecil, 194. 
8Butler, The Cecils, 113. 
9Robert Lacey, Robert, Earl of Essex (New York: 
Atheneum, 1971), 224. 
lOibid., 222. 
4 
campaign depended •. Finally, Lacey chides Essex and his 
subordinates for complaining that they were misunderstood 
in England ~nd poorly supported by men of ill-will,11 when 
in fact the evidence supports the Earl's complaints. 
To date, the campaign of Essex in Ireland has not 
been studied or analyzed.in any great detail, most authors 
preferring to dismiss the campaign briefly, and it is 
this void in Tudor history which the author hopes to fill. 
In order to place the events of 1599 in proper historical 
perspective and to familiarize the reader with the Irish 
situation which Essex would confront, it would be profit-
. able to begin by examining the catalyst which would even-
tually bring Essex to Ireland: the great rebellion of 1595. 
11ill_<!., 233. 
CHAPrER I 
TYRONE'S REBELLION 
On June 28, 1595, Queen Elizabeth I issued a royal 
proclamation declaring the Irish Lord, Hugh O'Neill, Earl 
. 
of Tyrone, a traitor and rebel. 1 This action marked the 
beginning of an eight-year conflict which drained the 
English treasury and devastated the Irish provinces in the 
last years of Elizabeth's reign. The war began in Ulster 
and remained localized, with intermittent truces, for· ~he 
first few years. Then in August, 1598, the main English 
Army, under Lord Marshal Sir Henry Bagenal, was ambushed 
and destroyed at the Yellow Ford while attempting an inva-
sion of Ulster. 2 This defeat signalled a general uprising 
throughout Ireland, as the indigenous population made a 
determined and savage effort to drive their English over-
lords into the sea. 
As with other major conflicts, the causes of the re-
bellion of 1595 were numerous and complex, involving deep-
seated hostilities building up over a period of years, and 
immediate provocations and precipitous incidents. The 
immediate causes centered around the personality of Hugh 
1Robert Lacey, Robert, Earl of Essex (New York: Athen-
eum, 19?1), 224. 
2 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 228. 
5 
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O'Neill, whose personal ambitions and diplomatic duplicity 
provided the spark which set off the uprising. The long~ 
range causes can be attributed to the nature of English 
rule in Ireland and to the attempts made to subvert Gaelic 
institutions. 
Sixteenth-century !Deland was a forbidding land of 
mountains, forests and bogs which, despite its proximity 
and historical ties to England, was surprisingly uncivil-
ized. English writers in the 1500's used the Irish as the 
standard of savage behavior against which they compared 
others. As late as 1640 Englishmen who went to America 
constantly compared Irish customs, manners, dress and even 
hair styles to those of the American Indians whom they 
encountered.3 
The inhabitants met by the New English settlers of 
the Tudor age were usually a mixture of native Irish and 
the descendants of Norman conquerors who had settled in 
Ireland during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The 
Normans had generally established themselves in the east-
ern province of Leinster, in the section known as the Pale; 
however, great baronial families such as the de Burghs and 
the Fitzgeralds had moved into the western province of 
... 
· Connaught and the southern province of Munster. 4 
3David Beer Quinn, The Elizabethans and the Irish 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 23-26. 
4John C. Beckett, A Short History of Ireland (New 
York: Hutchinson's University Library, 1952), 19-24. 
6 
The Norman descendants, or Old English, kept up a 
limited connection with England, chiefly through shipping 
between Dublin and the southeastern ports of Ireland, and 
the English ports of Bristol, Milford and Chester. How-
ever, this uncertain contact was not enough to preserve 
the Norman identity in a.Gaelic environment, and by the 
sixteenth century the Normans had lost virtually all 
traces of their ancestry.5 By the 1500's the Old English 
families had adopted Irish customs, institutions and lan-
guage to the point where there seemed to be no difference 
between the two groups. 6 Additionally, the Old .English 
solidified their position by ties of marriage and friend-
ship with the local Irish chiefs.? With the exception of 
the northern province of Ulster, where the native Irish 
were still supreme, all the Irish chieftains of importance 
who opposed the English were descendants of the early Nor-
man invaders. 8 
The Irish eociety of the sixteenth century was a 
primitive, feudalistic society in which the local chiefs 
ruled a depressed class of serfs. The nucleus of the 
society was centered around large households of men whose 
5Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 143. 
6Ibid., 160. 
?William z. Renwick (ed.), A View of the Present State 
of Ireland by Edmund Spencer (London: Eric Partridge Ltd., 
1934)' 229. 
8cyril Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars (London: Methuen 
and Company, 1950), 23-24. 
? 
main occupation was fighting.9 Additionally, there pre-
vailed an elaborate military hierarchy of horsemen, light 
infantry and most importantly, Scots heavy infantry. The 
presence of Scots, known as Gallowglasses and Redshanks, 
added to the instability of the Irish situation. The Gal-
lowglasses had entered t~e country in the mid-thirteenth 
century as mercenaries to the Irish and Apglo-Irish Lords, 
and had remained their hereditary allies. Settling all 
over Ireland they fought as heavy infantry and soon be-
came the backbone of the rebel Irish armies. Under the 
Tudors, a new wave of Scots mercenaries, the Redshanks, 
began to enter Ireland on a seasonal basis. Crossing from 
the peninsula of Cantyre, separated from the north Irish 
coast by a mere twelve miles, the Redshanks fought for 
brief periods or a campaign, and then returned to Scot-
land. lo 
The local chiefs were linked to the more powerful 
Irish lords by bonds of .fealty and tribute. The Lord had 
the right to levy feudal dues which obliged the local 
populace to feed the lord and his retinue whenever they 
visited. In war, a more encompassing levy, the "bonaght", 
was used to gather "victuals" and money to support any 
venture. 11 Throughout the sixteenth century, therefore, 
9Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 15, 39. 
lOGerard A. Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces in 
Ireland (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1937), 13-23. 
llQuinn, Elizabethans· and Irish, 34-35, 52. 
8 
acy chieftain in revolt had a legal source of support at 
his disposal. 
One of the most troublesome aspects of sixteenth-
century Ireland was the system of succession, known as 
tanistry. Whereas the English had the system of primo-
geniture, by which the eldest son inherited an estate, 
the Irish and Old English families handed down authority 
and land not from father to eldest son, but from the head 
of a family group to the next strongest personality. The 
successor, or tanist, was usually chosen in the ruler's 
lifetime, and was always an adult, since this turbulent 
society could not afford to have minors as chieftains. 
However, if there were no appointed successor, the dispute 
was settled by election or force of arms. 12 The system of 
succession, the presence of mercenaries from Scotland, and 
the martial orientation of the ruling classes, kept Ireland 
in a state of continuous warfare and instability. 
The legal system of Ireland did nothing to bring 
order to the island. Theoretically, Ireland was under the 
English law, but in fact legal jurisdiction was ineffec-
tive outside of those areas occ~pied by the New English 
settlers.13 The native Irish and Old English relied on 
the Brehon I.aw, a system based on Irish tradition and 
12Renwick, ~' 232. 
13George B. O'Connor, Elizabethan Ireland (Dublin: 
Sealy, Bryers and Walker, 1940), 9?. 
9 
custom. The Brehons were a professional class of heredi-
tary jurists who used archaic texts and commentaries as a 
basis for law. The system did not uphold the power of 
the state and was extremely unstructured. For instance 
it provided no machinery for putting law into motion against 
criminals, but left it to the aggrieved person to press 
charges. Additionally the entire system provided no pun-
ishment greater than fines for any offense, including 
murder. 14 Contemporary English observers like Edmund 
Spenser, Secretary to Lord Deputy Grey, noted that the sys-
tem invited corruption in that the Brehons could be intim-
idated or easily bribed by powerful Lords. In fact the 
Brehons actually made a business of gathering exorbitant 
rewards in return for favorable decisions, a situation 
which increased the financial position of the Brehons, 
while allowing local lords to violate the law with im-
punity.15 
Finally, the entire economic system of Ireland made 
it difficult to establish an orderly and manageable soci-
ety.' The basis of Irish society was pastoral, cattle 
being the chief source of wealth. 16 Most Irish were forced 
to move with their herds on a regular basis, going to the 
14Ibid., 99. 
l5Renwick, View, 18 • 
. -
16nenry Morley (ed.), Ireland Under Elizabeth and 
James the First, Described by Edmund Spencer, by Sir John 
Davies and by Fynes Moryson (London: 1890), 418-421. 
10 
mountain pastures in summer, and back to the lowlands in 
winter. Consequently, Irish settlements tended to be ir-
regular rural units rather than towns and large villages. 17 
This constant movement away from the towns at regular 
intervals attracted all sorts of vagabonds, thieves and 
wandering minstrels, who .attached themselves to the mi-
grating parties. Additionally, the process of moving .from 
town to mountain wilderness. involved a more primitive 
existence with its concomitant decivilizing social impli-
cations.18 The whole setup of Irish society, therefore, 
hindered the establishment of an orthodox civilization on 
the Continental standard. 
Ireland had been virtually ignored by most English 
kings, and little effort had been exerted to bring it un-
der control. Sir John Davies, Attorney-General for Ire-
land in 1606, observed that prior to Elizabeth's reign the 
Crown of England had never sent over enough men or treasure 
to defend the small territory of the Pale, let alone insure 
the conquest of the whole island. However, Henry VIII, 
although he sent few troops, did establish a new admini-
strative organization in an effort to make the island 
more manageable. 19 
In 1534, Henry VIII set up a governing system centered 
l?Renwick, View, 64-65. 
18~.' 98-99. 
l9Morley, Ireland Under Elizabeth, 245-246. 
11 
in Dublin. At the head was the Viceroy, bearing the title 
of Lord Deputy, or in exceptional cases, the higher title 
of Lord Lieutenant?0 The Lord Deputy was responsible for 
all of Ireland, with direct responsibility for the ad.mini-
stration of Leinster and the Pale, while the Provinces of 
Connaught and Munster were ad.ministered by a President and 
Council appointed by the Lord Deputy. The northern prov-
ince of Ulster remained virtually independent, being ruled 
by various feuding tribal chieftains who maintained a 
sporadic alliance with the English, communicating directly 
with the Lord Deputy. 21 
The Lord Deputy was assisted by an Irish Council in-
cluding a Lord Chancellor, Chief Justice, Treasurer at 
Wars and Marshal of the Army. Most of these positions, 
particularly that of the Lord Deputy, were filled by men 
chosen in England, although Old English nobles at times 
were able to hold the lesser offices. 22 The Irish Parlia-
ment was theoretically to function as the government of 
Ireland, but its independence had long since been under-
mined. In 1494 Sir Edward Poyning, sent by Henry VII to 
bring order to Ireland, passed laws which provided that 
all acts which the Irish Parliament wished to consider had 
to be first certified in England and approved by the King 
2
°Falls, Irish Wars, 20. 
21Renwick, View, 225-226. 
22Ibid. , 228. 
12 
and his Council. 23 
The Irish Parliament was dominated by the Lord Depu-
' 
ty, who found little use for it, since English administra-
tion was subsidized almost completely by England. Since 
the Parliament was not needed for revenue, it was only 
called for some special purpose, such as to restore the 
Protestant religion or to extinguish the title of some 
recalcitrant noble. 24 During Elizabeth's reign the Irish 
Parliament·· s most significant action was to pass several 
acts of attainder against the Desmond clan on April 26, 
1585, confiscating their lands as penalty for rebellion. 
After this, the Irish Parliament did not meet again for 
the rest of Elizabeth's reign. 25 
In addition to reorganizing the administration in 
Ireland, Henry VIII sought to assert English authority by 
inaugurating the policy of "Surrender and Regrant." From 
1541 to 1543 a procession of Irish Lords came to England 
and submitted to the king. Through this method the Irish 
chieftains showed their good faith by surrendering their 
lands to the Crown, which gave the lands back to the chiefs 
under royal patent letters. It was stipulated that the 
lands would be forfeit if the chieftains were disloya1. 26 
23Morley, Ireland Under Elizabeth, 399. 
24 Falls, Irish Wars, 21. 
25Ibid., 15?. 
26Ibid., 30. 
13 
Furthermore the Irish Lords promised to serve the king, 
give up Irish dress, and use the English language. In 
return the Lords were promised English protection and were 
given English titles. Of all the Irish who came. to Eng-
land during this period, the most important was Con O'Neill, 
head of the most powerfu~ clan in Ulster, who was awarded 
the title Earl of Tyrone. 2? 
By the above methods Henry VIII had hoped to bring 
the Irish under control. However the new administration, 
along with the policies of Surrender and Regrant, were 
neglected by succeeding monarchs, Edward VI and nary r. 28 
In 1558 Elizabeth came to the throne, and after solving 
her immediate problems of succession at home, turned her 
attention to the restless island across St. George's 
channel. 
The official English position toward Ireland was ex-
pressed by Queen Elizabeth in her Proclamation for Ireland 
on January 25, 1598. In this she maintained that trouble 
in Ireland was caused by "the cunning of seditious priests 
and seminaries" from "foreign parts," who stirred up the 
people by telling them that the English wished to conquer 
them. 29 Elizabeth maintained that:. 
27 Quinn , ~lizabethans and Irish, 145. 
28Falls, Irish Wars, 30. 
29 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 468. 
l 
the very name of conquest seemeth so ridiculous 
to us, as we cannot imagine upon what ground it 
could enter into any man's conceit, that our 
actions, tending only to reduce a simple and 
barbarous rabble of misguided rebels, should 
need any such title of conquest ••• 30 
14 
Despite this vehement denial of conquering designs 
the English reasoned that Ireland could never be properly 
administered until it was organized in English fashion, 
with appointed representatives of state controlling a 
stable population, unhindered by the destructive effects 
of clan warfare.31 Therefore the English wished to estab-
lish a loyal landowning class which could have no special 
privileges as did the Irish Chieftains of Ulster. Fur-
thermore, stability would be insured by a central ad.mini-
stration assisted by garrison troops and uniform systems 
of taxation and legal jurisdiction. Finally, cohesion 
would be attained by creating a church whose clergy would 
support the state, and by establishing English as the sole 
official language.32 Conquest, therefore, would be the 
only feasible means of facilitating the English objectives. 
Under Elizabeth's rule the government increasingly 
looked on colonization by New English settlers as the best 
method of solving the Irish question. Queen Mary I had 
endeavored to establish New English colonies in King's and 
30ibid. , 469. 
31Renwick, ~' 233. 
32Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 10. 
15 
Queen• s counties in· an e.f.fort to secure t;hE:~ border of the 
Pale; however, these attempts were only halfheartedly sup-
ported.33 Likewise, Elizabeth, ever conscious of finan-
ces, would never agree to complete subsidization of a new 
colonial settlement, but encouraged several wealthy nobles 
to carve out estates for.themselves on the promise that 
the government would pay half the expenses. As land be-
came available several nobles attempted to take advantage 
of this new opportunity.34 
Making land available was no serious problem since the 
policy of Surrender and Regrant provided the legal means 
of confiscating ter~itory of rebel chieftains. Elizabeth 
had reinstituted this policy by 1562 and many chieftains, 
including Shane O'Neill of the Ulster clan, made their 
submission to the Queen.35 Shane O'Neill revolted shortly 
thereafter but was subdued in 1566. The new Lord Deputy, 
Sir Philip Sidney, decided that lasting peace would only 
be assured if the O'Neill lands were parceled out to enter-
prising colonists. Elizabeth supported thj.s concept when 
the Lord Deputy pointed out that New English settlements 
in northeastern Ulster would prevent the Scots from coming 
across the channel .from their Highlands on periodic raids}6 
33rbid., 106. 
34c.s.P. Ireland, 1574-85, 406. 
35Falls, Irish \.Jars, 89. 
36 . C.S.P. Ireland, 1509-73, 318. 
16 
The attempted settlement under Sir Thomas Smith was furi-
ously contested by the Irish, who realized that they would 
be thrust down to a class of depressed peasants under a 
New English aristocracy. The Smith venture, suffering 
from Irish hostility and the usual skimpy financial sup-
port, collapsed altogether when Sir Thomas was killed in 
1569.37 
At the same time new efforts were made further south 
as New English settlers under William St. Leger attempted 
to confiscate the territory of the Old English Earl of 
Desmond, who had assisted the rebellious Shane O'Neill. 
The Earl of Desmond was arrested and sent to London, but 
his cousin, James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald, took over leader-
ship of the Desmond clan and led a serious revolt in 1569. 
The bloody rebellion was not settled until 15?3, .and only 
after Elizabeth had sent many troops and spent much trea-
sure. 38 
Still not discouraged, Elizabeth immediately suppor-
ted new colonization attempts in both north and south Ire-
land after the Fitzmaurice rebellion. In 1573 Elizabeth 
sent Walter Devereux, first Earl of Essex, to settle the 
peninsula of Antrim in the extreme northeast corner of 
Ulster, in order to stop Scots• assistance. The expedition 
37Ibid., 424. 
38 c C.S.P. Simancas, 1568-79, 694. 
failed in that bleak country and most settlers returned 
home when the Earl of Essex died in 1575.39 
17 
The southern venture was more successful as many am·-
bitious nobles, led by Sir Walter Raleigh, seized great 
tracts of Munster territory which had been confiscated 
after the suppression of .Desmond's rebellion. 40 New Eng-
lish colonists poured into this area, and by 1589 over 
l,000 New English were settled. The colony continuously 
expanded in strength up to the time of the great Irish up-
rising of .1598, whereupon the settlement was quickly and 
completely destroyed.41 The New English settlers con-
sciously sought to expel the native Irish from their ter-
ritory rather than integrate with them, and soon found 
their colonies bordered by hordes of sullen Irish refugees. 
Even those Irish not directly injured by the policy of 
confiscations viewed the English policies with mistrust 
and apprehension. 
The manner in which the English conducted military 
operations and handled resistance did much to alienate the 
Irish population as a whole. Back in England sentiments 
were expressed by high-ranking officials on the importance 
of building a bridge between the two societies.42 However, 
39c.S.P. Ireland, 1274-85, 89, 99. 
4oibid., 406. 
41 . 
C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 290-292. 
42Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 125. 
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in the grim realities of guerrilla warfare, such high-
minded sentiments were lost on the local commanders 
charged with keeping order. 
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The exasperation invariably felt by the English offi-
cials in attempting to combat the Irish guerilla tactics, 
led them to resort to famine as one sure method of dealing 
with an enemy that found support among the indigenous 
population. From the beginning to the end of Elizabeth's 
reign the Lord Deputies would ultimately rely on starva-
tion to bring the rebel Irish into line. E'ven normally 
humane personalities, like Henry Harvey, Secretary to Lord 
Lieutenant Essex in 1599, ultimately came to the conclu-
sion that the rebellious Irish were "savage beasts," "rats 
and similar vermin" to be rooted out and slain.43 The sur-
est method of dealing with them was famine; "famine which 
eats up, not the fighting men alone, but the women and the 
children too, till there be not one of them left." The 
justification, as Henry Harvey expressed it, was that "they 
be one and all either rebels themselves or kin to rebels ••• 
they seem to have deserved no less. 1144 
The policy of starving the population into submission 
was perfected during the Desmond uprising of 1579-1583. 
Not being able to come to grips with the Irish force, the 
43 . Dnily Lawless (ed.), With Essex in Ireland (London: 
Methuen and Company, 1902), 1?9. 
44Ibid., 243. 
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English attacked their source of supply by destroying any 
food and beef they could find, regardless of the conse-
quences to the civilians. The end result of this policy 
of despoliation was described by Edmund Spencer, who 
visited Munster at the conclusion of the rebellion and 
noted the condition of the people: 
they were brought to such wretchedness, as that 
any stony hearts would have rewed the same, out 
of ,every Corner of the woods and glens they came 
creeping forth upon their hands, for their legs 
could not bear them, they looked Anatomies of 
death, they spake like ghosts crying out of their 
graves, they did eat of the dead Carrions, they 
spared not to scrape out of their graves, and if 
they found a plot of water cresses or shamrocks, 
there they flocked as to a feast ••• in short space 
there was none almost left and a most populous and 
plentiful Country suddenly left void of man or 
beast, yet sure in all that war there perished 
not many by the sword, but all by the extremit~ 
of famine, which they themselves had wrought.45 
Colonization and conquest were to be followed by a 
complete transformation of Gaelic society. Richard Stany-
hurst, a contemporary official observer, noted that a 
successful conquest had to insure the incorporation of 
three basic elements: law, apparel and language.46 Eng-
lish legislation in the occupied areas therefore sought 
to regulate these three elements of Gaelic life. While 
the new rules on legal ju.Tisdiction and apparel were 
treated with indifference by the Irish, the rules pertain-
ing to language were opposed with open hostility. Language 
4 5Renwick, View, 135. 
46Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 57. 
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is probably the most basic manifestation of group identity, 
and probably the most difficult characteristic to attempt 
to regulate. A contemporary English observer noted: "For 
language, they do so despise ours, as they think themselves 
the worst when they hear it. 1147 The Irish stubbornly re-
sisted these attempts to ~hange their life, particularly 
in Ulster, where Con O'Neill, upon his deathbed, "left 
his curse to any of his posterity, that would either learn 
English, sow wheat, or.make any building in Ulster. 1148 
One particular class singled out for destruction by 
English legislation was the Irish poet or "bard." The 
poets formed a privileged class which either wandered 
through the countryside or secured a position at an Irish 
court. In a society with such a low literacy rate, the 
bard preserved Irish tradition and folk lore. They glori-
fied in song and rhyme the Irish lords to whom they were 
attached, going so far as to assert that some Lords were 
descendants of Caesar, Alexander or Darius.49 The bards 
were the most vocal critics of English interference and 
the most uncompromising advocates of preserving Irish 
identity. They particularly lauded the martial spirit of 
the old Irish and incited younger Irishmen to go on rob-
bing and cattle rustling forays in emulation of their 
47 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 440. 
48Ibid. 
-49Renwick, View, 94. 
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ancestors. The Irish revered the bards as a source of 
tradition and pride, while the Irish Lord welcomed their 
praise and adulation. To the English, however, the bard 
was a disruptive influence and the Lord Deputies took 
drastic measures, including execution, to eliminate the 
influence of these hostil~ poets.50 
Another method by which the English sought to subdue 
the Irish was to take advantage of the many factions and 
rivalries in Ireland, and thereby use the Irish to defeat 
themselves. The most intense Irish rivalry which the 
English exploited was the long-standing feud between the 
Earls of Desmond and Ormonde. The Desmonds, descendants 
of the Norman Fitzgeralds, were the acknowledged leaders 
of large areas in Leinster and Munster and as the spokes-
man for Catholicism and independence, were the chief tar-
gets of English repression. 
The Ormondes, located in and around the Pale area, 
were their chief rivalSt and throughout all of Elizabeth's 
reign they were led.by Thomas Butler, tenth Earl of Or-
monde. Butler was brought up as a Protestant, the first 
of his lineage, although he conformed as was necessary 
under the harsh Catholic reaction of Queen Mary I. In 
1562 and again in 1565 the Earl of Ormonde came to Eng-
land to protest outrages committed by the Desmonds, and 
50 C.S.P. Ireland, 1509-73, 514, 535. 
22 
made a fine impression on the Queen.51 
Thomas Butler, known as "Black Thomas" from his dark 
hair and complexion, was a charming personality and stayed 
around Elizabeth's court for long periods of time. He 
and the youthful Queen Elizabeth, who were about the same 
age, developed a deep affection for each other--some said 
it was love52--which lasted throughout Elizabeth's reign. 
With the Queen so firmly on his side Ormonde secured a 
leading position in Irish politics, rallied the Protestant 
Irish to the English cause, and brought in many former 
rebels to fight on the Queen's side. Throughout the long 
wars, while English viceroys came and left, and even in 
the lowest ebbs of English fortune, Ormonde's loyalty and 
support was something on which Elizabeth could always 
count; and in the end it did make a difference. 
Of all the sources of conflict between English and 
Irish the most significant area of disagreement was in 
matters of religion. Before the English attempted to im-
pose the Reformation on Ireland, religion in that country 
was treated with a mixture of superstition and indiffer-
ence. The Catholicism of the native Irish and the· Old 
English settlers, though firmly entrenched, had gradually 
been allowed to lapse to the point where religion was prac-
ticed in name only. The New English Bishop of Cork, 
51Falls, Irish Wars, 101-102. 
52:i:bid., 102. 
charged with ensuring the success of the Reformation in 
his area, wrote despairingly: 
I am persuaded, and do partly know the same by 
experience, that a great part of this kingdom 
are no better than mere infidels, having but a 
bare name of Christians, without any knowledge 
of Christ or light of his truth, that I myself 
have examined divers of them, being sixty years 
of age or upwards, a,nd have found them not able 
to say the Lord's Prayer, or the articles of the 
Christian faith, neither in English, Latin, nor 
Irish, neither have they ever been taught the same 
or examined by the priest whether they could say 
the same or not.53 
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Additionally, the English were appalled at the moral tur-
pitude of the native Irish. Contemporary writers abhorred 
certain practices, particularly those relating to marriage, 
while the New English not~d that illegitimacy and incest 
were widespread. Probationary marriages for a year and a 
day were common, and divorce was easily obtained, since 
the Brehons supervised the proceedings.54 
Under Henry VIII the first efforts were made to spread 
the Reformation to Ireland, as the king dissolved the mon-
asteries and forced the heads of the O'Neill and O'Donnell 
clans to abjure the Pope.55 Under Edward VI, the begin-
nings of a religious rift became evident as England turned 
to Protestantism and the Irish and Old. English clung to 
the traditional faith. However any slight progress made 
53 C.S.P. Ireland, 1596-9?, 16. 
54Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 80-81. 
55Falls, Irish Wars, 18. 
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under Henry VIII and Edward VI was reversed forever under 
the reaction of Mary I. When Elizabeth came to the throne 
in 1558 t~e Bishops in Ireland made statements of adher-
ence to the Reformed Church in the Irish Parliament of 
1560, but still celebrated Latin masses. However, those 
bishops under the North Irish chieftains did not even 
attend the Parliament. Although Elizabeth had left the 
question of doctrine rather vague to avoid confrontation, 
she vigorously pursued the establishment of a church which 
outwardly seemed to be united to the state. The Englistl, 
therefore, took over Church property, installed obedient 
clergy and gave away monastic property to their own offi-
cials. 56 
Around Dublin the process seemed to be successful, 
as even the Archbishops of Dublin went over to Protestan-
tism without reservation. The farther one proceeded from 
Dublin the more tenuous was the hold of the Reformed 
Church, until it was lost altogether in the wilds of 
Ulster and Connaught. There, the native Irish and Old 
English rejected any aspect of the new forms of service 
or articles of faith which could be identified with the 
Anglicizing process.5? 
The impetus to resist was given by vigorous efforts 
56.Myles v. Ronan, The Reformation in Ireland (London: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1930), 6-24. 
5?Ibid. 
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of the Catholic Counter-Reformation in general, and in 
particular.by the efforts of James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald. 
Fitzmaurice was the first Irish layman who attempted to 
connect politico-religious strings. After taking over 
leadership of the Desmond clan and leading a revolt in 
1568, he sent the Archbishop of Cashel, Ma.urice Fitzgibbon, 
to the courts of Philip II of Spain and the Pope in a 
fervent appeal for aid.58 In the next year he sent a let-
ter to Philip II in which he stated that the Irish wished 
to have a Catholic king, na.Ilely Don Juan of A~stria, ap-
pointed over them in an effort to unite the country and 
save them from the damning effects of Protestantism. Fur-
thermore, Fitzmaurice asserted that if the king offered 
no aid, the rebels would have to make peace with the Eng-
lish.59 Despite his efforts no significant aid was forth-
coming, and with the collapse of the rebellion Fitzmaurice 
went into exile on the Continent. 60 
In 1572, Fitzmaurice went to France, and after stay-
ing two years, journeyed to Rome where the Pope gave him 
a warm reception. Equipped with a ship, 100 men, and a 
Papal proclamation depriving Elizabeth I of her possessions, 
Fitzmaurice set sail for Ireland and landed at Dingle Bay 
58Falls, Irish Wars, 126. 
59 C.S.P. Simancas, 1568~79, 521. 
6
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on July 17, i579. 61 The small force was immediately 
crushed and their leader killed; however, Fitzmaurice had 
set many precedents which would be later used by the Earl 
of Tyrone, particularly in his diplomatic dealings with 
the Spanish. Additionally, the travels of Fitzmaurice 
aroused renewed interest ,in Ireland, and from 1580 onward 
Ireland was deluged by an ever-increasing number of trav-
eling friars and missionaries, particularly Jesuits, edu-
cated in England during Mary's reign and later on in Flan-
ders and Spain. The new, well-educated arrivals placed 
themselves at the sides of the great lords, becoming 
scribes and advisors, using their influence to exhort ever 
greater resistance to Protestantism and Anglicization. 62 
The end result was that by the 1590's it was plain 
that the Reformation had failed. Cyril Falls, author of 
Elizabeth's Irish Wars, considers the failure of the Refor-
mation the most significant event in Irish history and 
concludes that if the Reformation had succeeded Ireland 
might have become as closely united with England as Scot-
land and \.lales. 63 The attempts at reformation caused reli-
gion to become such an emotional subject, with such sym-
bolic significance, that it soon became the one universal 
cause in Ireland and the rallying point for Irish nation-
61rbid., 126. 
62
.!lli., 19. 
63Ibid., 18. 
l 
27 
alism and resistance. 
In a letter to the King of Spain in 1570 James Fitz-
maurice lamented the fact that Ireland had no king or 
natural leader, and therefore was weakened and divided 
before the English. 64 From time to time leaders had 
emerged for brief periods, but always they had been short-
sighted individuals oriented to their own local areas 
rather than towards the problems of Ireland as a whole. 
To harness the national anti-English sentiment a potential 
leader had to be a man of some prestige, who possessed 
some background in military and diplomatic skills, and 
the vision to manipulate a national strategy. In previous 
revolts the leaders had always lacked one or more 01· the 
requisite qualities; however, in the last decade of the 
sixteenth century the long-sought leader emerged in the 
person of Hugh, Earl of Tyrone, known to the native Irish 
as "the O'Neill." 
The future leader of Ireland got off to a rather in-
auspicious start in his career, becoming an early victim 
of the Irish system of succession. The O'Neill clan had 
been under the leadership of Con O'Neill until his death 
in 1559. At his demise the province of Ulster was plunged 
into chaos by a contest for succession to the English 
title "Earl of Tyrone," and the more prestigious Irish 
64 C.S.P. Simancas, 1568-79, 521. 
r . 28 
title "the O'Neill." According to English law the legal 
heir was Con's eldest son, the Baron of Dungannon. How-
ever, Shane O'Neill, a more forceful and ruthless person-
ality, was elected tanist by the O'Neill clan, according , 
to Celtic law. The matter was settled when Shane murdered 
the Baron of Dungannon, ~nd then wisely submitted to Eli-
zabeth in 1562.65 In order not to provoke further vio-
lence the English took charge of the next legal heir, Hugh 
O'Neill, son of the murdered Baron of Dungannon, and re-
moved him to England out of harm's way. Hugh O'Neill, 
therefore, spent the next six years in England living the 
life of a young noble attached to the household of the 
Earl of Leicester.66 
While Hugh was in England Shane O'Neill rebelled and 
was killed in 1567, and the tanist Turlogh Luinach was 
elected chieftain of the O'Neills. At the age of twenty-
eight, therefore, Hugh O'Neill came back to Ireland, and 
although he could not take over as head of the clan while 
the new tanist lived, he immediately sought to ingratiate 
himself with the English. In 1573 he supported the attempt 
of the first Earl of Essex to establish the ill-fated 
Antrim colony in Ulster. As Baron of Dungannon he accom-
panied Walter Devereux, raising Irish troops and personally 
65 C.S.P. Ireland, 1509-73, 198, 209. 
66Lacey, Essex, 223. 
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securing Belfast Castle. 67 The Earl was so impressed with 
this tmiquely cultured Irishman that he wrote to the Privy 
Council that Hugh_ O'Neill was the only man to be trusted 
in Ulster and that his position should be advanced. 68 
With the endorsement of Essex, and with the help of 
a natural charm which endeared him to the English, Hugh 
O'Neill persuaded Elizabeth and her advisors to give him 
ever-increasing support over the next twenty years. From 
1574 to 1594, undoubtedly certain that O'Neill could be a 
great asset to them, the English assisted all his attempts 
to consolidate his rule in Ulster against the rival clans. 
O'Neill's professions of loyalty were so convincing that 
Elizabeth, normally adverse to bestowing any great titles, 
confirmed O'Neill's title to the Earldom of Tyrone in 
1587. 69 
While Hugh O'Neill courted the English, he also sought 
the deal with the many rival clans of Ulster, the most 
prominent of which were the O'Donnells and the Maguires, 
both distrusted by the English. The friendship of the 
O'Donnells was secured by the marriage of Hugh O'Neill to 
an 0' Donnell woman, a.nd by the marriage of O'Neill' s 
daughter, by his first wife, to the clan leader Hugh Roe 
O'Donnell, the "Prince of Donegal." The I"Iaguires proved 
67c.s.P. Ireland, 127L~-85, 403. 
68 C.S.P. Ireland, 1509-73, 525-526. 
69Lacey, Essex, 224. 
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more hostile to Hugh O'Neill's pretensions, and the Earl 
of Tyrone began to look for an opportunity to eliminate 
the rival leader,. Hugh Maguire. In 1593 the Maguires 
revolted and Tyrone joined forces with the English Mar-
shal, Sir Henry Bagenal, and together they quickly des-
troyed the power of that.clan.?O 
Although O'Neill was a master of diplomatic balancing 
between EngJish officials and anti-English clansmen, his 
duplicity could not endure forever, and the basic Anglo-
Irish ri.valry eventually began to affect his position. In 
1587, his son-in-law,· Hugh O'Donnell, was imprisoned in 
London on suspicion of treason. In 1591 the Prince of Don-
egal escaped and returned to join Tyrone, whereupon he was 
forced into the indelicate position of having to choose be-
tween his son-in-law at home and the Queen in England. Al-
though he managed to delay the Queen's wrath until June, 
1595, the presence of the "traitor" O'Donnell in his camp 
made relations with England increasingly strained.71 
After 158?, O'Neill found that his formerly good rela-
tions with English officials were deteriorating, particu-
larly because of his marital diffi.cul ties. In order to 
establish his position Tyrone had contracted three mar-
riages. His first wife was divorced; the second wife was 
an O'Donnell who died; and the third marriage was to an 
70 C.S.P. Ireland 2 1292-96, 330. 
71Lacey, Essex, 224. 
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.English woman, Mabel Bagenal, sister of the English Mar-
shal, ·Sir Henry Bagenal. Mabel had left her s.ister' s 
house in the Pale, in August, 1591, and had eloped with 
Tyrone, much to the chagrin of her brother, who deplored 
the fact that his house should be mixed with the blood of 
an Irishman, cultured or ,not.72 
Although Sir Henry Bagenal cooperated with Tyrone in 
crushing the Maguires two years later, the growing hostil-
ity can be seen from the fact that in the official report 
following the Maguire revolt Bagenal omitted any tribute 
to Tyrone for the latter's assistance.73 Shortly there-
after, Mabel, no longer able to tolerate Tyrone's propen-
sity for mistresses, returned broken-hearted to her bro-
ther's house, where she died in 1596.74 After her treat-
ment at Tyrone's hands, Sir Henry Bagenal, one of the most 
influential Englishmen in Ireland, was O'Neill's implacable 
enemy. Sir Henry's hostility probably had some influence 
on the attitude of the English Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 
who became increasingly more suspicious of Tyrone's inten-
tions following the Maguire revolt.75 
Another factor which adversely affected relations 
between Tyrone and the English was the renewed attempt 
72 C.S.P. Ireland 2 1288-92, 409. 
73 C.S.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 528. 
74Falls, Irish Wars, 173· 
75 c.s.P. Ireland 2 1292-96, 210. 
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of the latter to tighten their hold on Ireland in the last 
years of the sixteenth century. From 1585 onward, England 
was at war with Spain, and the position of Ireland achieved 
a new importance. Like the Low Countries, Ireland of-
fered a friendly area in which a Spanish army could be 
prepared to invade across the channels to England. Be-
cause of strategic considerations the English could not 
afford to have a hostile and unsubdued Ireland at their 
back. 
The English fears were well-grounded. Although the 
Great Armada was defeated in 1588, merchants from Contin-
ental ports constantly brought word of new preparations. 
Indeed a Spanish invasion force, organized in 1596, was 
forestalled by an English raid on the port of Cadiz, while 
a second force was turned back by stormsin 159?.76 Rumors 
of a great Spanish invasion panicked the English popula-
tion in the summer of 1599, while an invasion force did 
manage to land over 4,000 Spanish troops at Kinsale in 
1601.?? 
Beginning with the Fitzmaurice wars of the late 
1560's, Irish rebels had besought the King of Spain for 
support, though with little success. After the outbreak 
of the English-Spanish conflict in 1585 the Irish leaders 
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began to plead for aid and alliance. Tyrone himself, for 
all his protestations of loyalty, may have been in contact 
with Spain as early as 1588, shortly after he had been made 
an Earl by Elizabeth. In October of that year, Lord Dep-
uty Fitzwilliam and one of his generals, Sir Richard Bing-
ham, both sent a series of letters expressing their dis-
trust of Tyrone and his possible involvement with Spain.78 
The crisis of 1588 passed, however, and Tyrone was 
soon praised again in reports sent back to Ehgland.?9 
However, in 1592 there was renewed fear of Spanish inter-
vention and of Tyrone's hostility, and the Archbishop of 
Cashel cautioned Queen Elizabeth about the discontented 
state of Ireland and the possibility that many Irish, in-
cluding Tyrone, would join the Spanish if they landed.BO 
For the next two years events moved inexorably toward 
conflict as Tyrone became more independent and the Anglo-
Irish sources of conflict intensified. In July, 1592, 
Queen Elizabeth sent a letter of admonition to Tyrone, 
condemning both his relationship with O'Donnell and the 
fact that the Earl had not prevented his sons from raiding 
and committing other "riotous acts. 1181 In 1593, Tyrone 
gave evidence of greater ambition. His cousin Turlogh, 
?8c.s.P. Ireland, 1588-92, 53-55. 
79Ibid., 337~ 
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who had been elected head of the O'Neill clan while Tyrone 
was in exile, withdrew from his position as "the O'Neill." 
By the law of tanistry, Hugh O'Neill was elected to suc-
ceed him. Thus, without the approval of the Queen, Tyrone 
h d d . t . f . d t. 82 a assume a posi ion o unique power an pres ige. 
By July, 1594 English observers concluded that Tyrone 
was "now standing on doubtful terms." Furthermore, as the 
Earl of Desmond had previously been "seduced" by Jesuits, 
so the Earl of Tyrone had fallen under the influence of a 
Spanish Cardinal who constantly urged rebellion while 
promising Spanish. aid. 83 At the same time Hugh O'Donnell! 
Tyrone's son-in-law, had openly revolted against the .Eng-
lish and had inflicted a series of minor but humiliating 
defeats. 84 
Attempts at negotiation proved useless, although given 
the hostility of the chief English officials, Lord Deputy 
Fitzwilliam and Sir Henry Bagenal, it is doubtful whether 
such talks ever had reasonable chance of success. Eliza-
beth apparently lost all patience, for on January ?, 1595 
a letter, written by Lord Burghley on behalf of the Queen, 
was sent to the Lord Deputy urging him to call Tyrone to 
Dublin on pretext of negotiating and then to cast him into 
82Lacey, Essex, 224. 
83MSs. Salisbury, vol. 5, 564. 
84Falls, Irish Wars, 182. 
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prison as soon as he arrived. 85 
The crafty Earl never arrived, but stayed in Ulster 
strengthening his army. The final break came in May, 1595 
when Sir Henry Bagenal marched north with 1,500 men to 
bring Tyrone to submission. A brief clash occurred on 
May 27 in which the Engl~sh were ambushed by Tyrone's 
army, and suffered serious casualties.86 At the same 
time, Elizabeth received word from Thomas Richardson, a 
Scot who had been in Ulster, that the King of Spain had 
sent an Irish bishop back to Tyrone with word that the 
Earl could expect an army of 3,000 to 4,000 Spanish sol-
diers in the near future, to assist in ousting the Eng-
lish. 87 Elizabeth could dally no longer with Tyrone. The 
time for negotiations had passed; the matter would be set-
tled by force of arms. 
In summary, the Irish Rebellion of 1595 was based on 
a foundation of ever-increasing hostility and mistrust 
throughout the Tudor period. The basic problem centered 
around the English attempts to make Ireland a stable and 
manageable society on the English model. This process of 
Anglicization threatened the very core of Gaelic life, 
affecting language, dress, law, economic structure and 
85Mss. Salisbury, vol. 5, 80-81. 
86Falls, Irish Wars, 188. 
87~1SS. SalisburJ, vol. 5, 186. 
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most importantly, religion. 
The methods used by the English did much to provoke 
the Irish to rebellion. .Enterprising and ruthless New 
English colonists moved into Irish areas and contemptu-
ously ejected native Irish and Old English alike. In the 
sections under New Engli&h control, Anglicization was 
forced down the Irish throats. If the Irish resisted or 
rebelled they were savagely dealt with by English officials 
who resorted to any means, including mass starvation, to 
subdue them. Invariably, the rebel lands would be con-
fiscated and the process of expansion and consolidation 
continued. Weakened and divided, without an effective 
leader, the Irish were usually unable to put up effective 
resistance. 
In the last decade of the sixteenth century the Irish 
finally found a leader in Hugh O'Neill, who possessed the 
diplomatic skill which the situation demanded. Realizing 
that conflict was inevitable Tyrone sought to balance be-
tween the English, Spanish and Irish leaders until he was 
ready. While the English authorities vacillated in their 
policy toward Tyrone, he trained his men, reversed the 
traditional O'Neill policy of feuding with neighbors, 
gathered the clans of Ulster under his leadership, and 
gained touch with the discontented and adventurous all 
over Ireland. As "the O'Neill," with all the prestige 
that his title implied, Tyrone's cause had national appeal. 
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The Irish chieftains, fearing the loss of their status 
by the English policy of encroachment, flocked to Tyrone's 
standards. 
r 
i. 
CHAPTER II 
WARFARE IN IRELAND 
For the English, a campaign to Ireland involved cer-
tain monumental tasks, not the least of which was to re-
cruit an army and deliver it to the Gaelic bogs. Unlike 
France and Spain, England did not maintain a professional 
standing army. Her only full-time soldiers consisted of 
a few hundred Yeoman of the Guard, and scattered garrisons 
along the Scottish border and in Ireland which, until 
Tyrone's rebellion, rarely numbered more than a few thou-
sand men. 1 This disparity between English and Continental 
armies occurred primarily because there was no incentive 
to keep a large standing army, the English Channel pre-
senting a formidable barrier to invasions. Furthermore the 
economy would not easily support a large standing Army. 
An army meant truces, and taxes involved calling a Parlia-
ment, something which the monarchs preferred not to do. 
For economic considerations the forces needed for any 
campaign were collected directly for the purpose and de-
mobilized upon the conclusion of hostilities. Since the 
defense of England relied heavily on the small number of 
trained men available to the Tudors, the government was 
1Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 92-110; Cruickshank, 
Elizabeth's Arm~, 1. 
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reluctant to send these troops abroad. The Irish campaign, 
and other foreign ventures, had to rely mainly on untrained 
volunteers or conscripts called into service. 
Despite the haphazard state of military affairs 
throughout the Tudor reign, by 1598 the organizational 
structure and ranking system of the Engl.ish Army had 
evolved along Continental lines. By the latter part of 
the sixteenth century the English expeditionary forces, 
which usually numbered from 5,000 to 20,000 men, were or-
ganized into regimental units. The regiments were com-
. 2 
posed of 750 to 1,000 men, organized into six or seven 
companies, each composed of 150 men; the companies were 
composed of sections numbering about 20 men.3 
Regarding the chain of command it should be noted 
that, as in most armies of the time, the key officers in-
variably came from the nobility. This practice was a 
hold-over from the l"Iiddle Ages, by which the army and the 
Church were reserved as the two honorable professions in 
which the younger sons of the nobles could, and should, 
engage. At the top of the command structure was the 
general, who, during the Tudor age, was a political ap-
pointee from the highest ranks of the nobility--usually 
a man of great name whose loyalty to the crown was un-
questioned.. The second-in-command was the Marshal of the 
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Army, whose ch:i.ef function was to supervise the management 
of the· camp, and the administration of justice and discip-
line. The Marshal was assisted by the Provost Marshal, 
who was well-versed in military law and handled the day-to 
-day administration of justice.4 
In a large army there was usually a General of the 
Infantry and a General of the Horse to lead the respective 
arms in action. For overall support the most responsible 
position was the Master of Ordnance, who issued weapons, 
ammunition and supplies to the troops, and supervised most 
of the supporting agencies such as the armorers, smiths 
and carpenters. To command the regiments were the Colonels, 
. 
who led the regiment in a~tion and who usually formed a 
Council of War to advise the General. The colonels and 
the regimental system had only recently (1580) appeared 
in the Elizabethan armies and thus the chief administra-
tive and tactical position was still the Captain, the com-
pany commander.5 
The Captains were the heart of the system, forming 
the administrative and tactical link between the high com-
mand and the private in the field. The captain was respon-
sible for arming, clothing, feeding, and paying his men, 
as well as leading them into battle. To take care of his 
men the Captain was given a sum of money from the Privy 
4Ibi£., 45-4?. 
5Ibid., 54. 
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Com1cil and the Treasurer at Wars, based on the number of 
men iri his company. The primitive state of the Tudor Ad-
ministrative system, and the limitations imposed by com-
munications difficulties in the 16th century made it 
possible for the captains overseas to defraud the govern-
ment and their own men w~th impunity. 6 
The Calendars of State Papers for Ireland are rife 
with reports of alleged fraud on the part of the captains 
throughout this period. In one particularly detailed 
series of charges in July 1598 the author accused the cap-
tains of the following crimes: substituting Irish (who ac-
cepted less pay) for English soldiers whom they encouraged 
to run away; making·arrangements with merchants and ship-
pers to defraud their men; and allowing their companies to 
degenerate into a horde of poorly clothed, underfed pau-
pers, concerned more with surviving from day to day than 
with searching out and destroying their enemies.? 
The Privy Council found it difficult to pin down these 
charges, and even more difficult to rectify the situation. 
In 1596 the Privy Council, which normally appointed all 
captains, gave authority for appointment of captains to 
the commander-in-chief in Ireland, subject to final appro-
val by the Privy Council.8 The appointment of captains 
6Ibid., 55. 
7 c.s.P. Ireland 2 i:z9a-99, 205-210. 
8 C.S.P. Ireland 2 1,296-97, 59. 
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was now the direct responsibility of the commander in 
Ireland, and it was his responsibility to appoint men of 
substance and character who could adapt to the unconven-
tional conditions of Gaelic warfare. This measure, how-
ever, proved ineffective and the English armies were con-
tinuously plagued by dishonest captains. 
The captain, in addition to his other responsibili-
ties,, also appointed other important individuals who made 
up his company structure, namely: a lieutenant, an ensign-
bearer, two sergeants, two drummers, a preacher, a cannon-
eer, a surgeon and about six corporals. The lieutenant 
performed the duties of a modern company executive officer, 
ready to take over any time the captain was absent or in-
capacitated. The ensign-bearer was the equivalent of the 
modern-day second lieutenant, who carried the company col-
ors and was to be the source of inspiration to the company 
in combat. Drawn from the ranks of the gentle classes, 
the ensignbearer was required to take over if the lieuten-
ant and captain were absent.9 
Regarding the other key personnel, the two sergeants 
were responsible for, among other things, drilling and 
marching the company properly. The corporals were in 
' charge of their 20-man sections and watched after all 
facets of their men's lives. Two drummers were assigned 
to beat time on the march, call assembly and sound 
9c~uickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 57. 
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commands on the battlefield. Throughout most of the 
Irish ·wars a cannoneer was assigned to each company, al-
though in 1600 the cannoneer in Ireland was deleted from 
the organization, since his services were so seldom re-
quired. lo In the guerilla-type warfare of Ireland the 
appointment of one preac~er and one surgeon to each com-
pany was an ideal which was seldom attained. 
At the bottom of the command and administrative sys-
tem was the private, who in 1598 assumed one of three 
tactical roles. If he were a tall and husky individual 
he was assigned as a pikeman to be at the front of a 
company formation to keep the enem.Y from closing in on 
the musketeers. If the private were snall and nimble 
he would be made a caliverman or musketeer, in which 
capacity he acted as a skinmisher or protected the flanks 
of the company .formation~ dropping back behind the pike-
man if the enemy threatened to reach him before he could 
reload. Finally the halberdier, of medium build, was sta-
tioned in the center of the company .formation around the 
ensign-bearer, to eliminate any enemy soldiers who pene-
trated the company ranks. 11 
The cavalry formed a distinct element composed of the 
sons of the wealthier gentry and led by the highest nobil-
ity in England. Armed with curates, open head pieces, 
10 9.s.P. Ireland, 1600, 275. 
11cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 60. 
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long pistols, swords and sometimes lances, 12 they were the 
most formidable shock unit of the English armies, and 
would often save the infantry from disaster in their en-
counters with the rebels. 
In Tudor England the administrative unit :for military 
affairs was the county. ,All able-bodied men between the 
ages of' 16 and 60 were liable :for service. The Queen and 
the Privy Council decided which counties were to supply 
troops and how those troops were to be armed. Detailed 
instructions were sent to the county Lord Lieutenant, or 
to Justices of the Peace who sometlmes acted as the com-
missioners of' musters. On paper the system seemed sound, 
but in reality the caliber of individuals called to the 
colors was often less than desirable. Although the law 
stipulated that all men were liable for service, special 
arrangements or cash substitutes were made for Lords of 
Parliament, their servants, the clergy and other privi-
leged groups. 13 
The county officials sometimes met their quota by 
pulling ordinary workers and farmers away from home and 
family; but more often they levied unemployed vagabonds 
whom the local authorities were only too happy to be rid 
of. The poor quality o_f these "rogues and ploughmen" was 
a constant source of complaint by the officials in 
12nss. Salisbury, vol. 9, vii 
13cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 23-24. 
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Ireland.14 The Gaelic wars rarely attracted volunteers 
since ·service in that "moist, rotten" country was the most 
unpopular assignment an English soldier could have in the 
sixteenth century. 15 An impoverished and backward land by 
Continental standards, Ireland offered little possibility 
for. loot and profit as d~d campaigns in the rich Nether-
lands or expeditions against Spanish cities and ships. 
Ireland offered only sickness, misery, and death. 
Since Ireland was a fate to be avoided at all costs, 
men on orders deserted at every opportunity. In March 
1598, for example, 900 conscripts were mustered to go to 
Ireland as reinforcements. Only 612 reached their destina-
tion, the rest having disappeared enroute. 16 The most 
critical time was in the port of embarkation where a de-
lay in shipping would give the rank and file an opportun-
ity to abscond in droves.17 Despite all the Crown's ef-
fort, desertion remained a constant problem in the six-
teenth century, particularly when service to Ireland was 
involved. 
Absence without leave was almost as common among of-
ficers in Ireland as it was among the privates. Captains 
were leaving their companies with such regularity that in 
14 . C.S.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 386. 
15 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, l. 
16 C.S.P. Ireland, 1596-9?, 86. 
l?cruickshank.;. Elizabe.th's Armi, 6?. 
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1592 Elizabeth herself had to order that all Captains ab-
sent from their companies in Ireland should return imm:edi-
ately .18 Her warning, and subsequent threats of discharge 
did little to solve the problem, and throughout the cam-
paigns, captains continued to remain in England, collect-
ing pay which their subo~dinates sent, while their compan-
ies plundered the Irish countryside. 19 On one occasion 
some captains were so reluctant to return to Ireland that 
when they were brought before the Privy Council they swore 
that they had never commanded a company in Ireland. How-
ever all those whom the Council could prove had served in 
Ireland were sent back. 20 
By the same token it was always difficult to gather 
replacements or reinforcements for Ireland, and sometimes 
the government reluctantly drafted from their garrisons 
on the Scot border or occasionally brought companies of 
veterans from the Low Countries. 21 More often, the inex-
pensive expedient relied on was to fill the depleted ranks 
of the English from the friendly Protestant Irish in the 
Pale. This practice became so widespread that by 1597 
Barnaby Rich in his New Description of Ir.eland could 
18 A.P.C., XXII, 480. 
19c.S.P. Ire~anqi 1599-1600, 192-3; C.S.P. Ireland 
1600, 2?2, 322, ZPf:'2, :;,05. 
20c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 255. 
21MDS. Salisbury;, vol. 9, vi-ix. 
assert that it was a "special:' and choice company" that 
2'> did no·t have three Irish for every Englishman. c There 
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was always a danger regarding these companies that they 
would go over to the enemy--which they often did--and take 
their arms and English training with them. 23 The Privy 
Council became so alarme4 by this proportion of Irishmen 
that in May 1598 the Council instructed the Irish officials 
to take no more Irish into the ranks. 24 
Additionally, the captains of the companies often 
falsified the rolls so that they could collect and keep 
the pay of dead men and deserters, or part of the pay for 
Irishmen who were glad to serve in the Army for less pay 
than an English soldier. This practice, known as "dead 
pays," existed in nearly every company, and although it 
was well known to the Privy Council, 25 the inefficient com-
munications and record-keeping system made it difficult to 
pin down offenders and stop the practice. As a result of 
the problems in recruiting, the English armies were invar-
iably of poor quality and significantly below the list 
strength which the Queen and Council had authorized. In 
March 159?, for example, the Queen was paying for an army 
22Barnaby Rich, A New Description of Ireland (London, 
1587), 109. 
23 C.S.P. Ireland 2 1:299-1600, 34·9. 
24c.S.P. Ireland 2 1598-99, 156. 
25 C.S.P. Ireland 2 1596-97, 190-91. 
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of 2,000 men in Connaught, while the actual number present 
was little more than half the list figures. 26 
Once a force had been recruited, and those not lucky 
enough to escape had been delivered to Ireland, the next 
problem was to.keep it supplied. Unlike the Netherlands 
or France, where the fer~ility of the land kept forces 
well supplied, Ireland was a relatively barren land con-
stantly threatened with famine. While the Irish could sur-
vive well on beef, warm milk and butter from the cattle 
they raised, the English were accustomed to a more diver-
sified diet. ~'ven a garrison of a few thousand men could 
be sustained only by importing stores from England. In 
1595 because of TYTone's initial rebellion the English 
garrison was raised from 4,000 to 7 ,OOO men. This in·-
crease created a supply crisis in which Sir Henry Wallop, 
Treasurer at \.Jars,and the officials responsible for sup-
plying the troops in Ireland told the Privy Council that 
the Army desperately required stores of meal, biscuit, 
wheat, cheese, salt meat and herring to see it through the 
winter. 27 The next year, Lord Deputy Sir William Russell 
warned the Privy Council that the food shortage might 
force him to withdraw his troops from the field. 28 
The rations of the English soldiers primarily corIBis°OOd 
26Ibid., 252. 
27 C.S.P. Ireland 2 1592-96; 398-400. 
28 C.S.P. Ireland 2 1596-97, 165-66. 
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of bread, butter, cheese and beer. This diet was usually 
supplemented with oatmeal, peas, beans, dried codfish, 
: ling and herring, whenever they could be obtained. By 
1598 a typical daily ration consisted of a pound of 
bread, three ounces of butter, six ounces of cheese, 
three quarters of a pint.of oatmeal, 29 An.other variety 
of a week's rationing in 1598 consisted of a pound of 
bread daily, a half pound of butter on three days, a 
pound of cheese on three days, and on the seventh day, 
two pounds of salt beef, or two and a half pounds of fresh 
beef .30 Accompanying either variety of rationing was beer 
and whiskey, an essential item, since the water was too 
unhealthy. The liquid ration in Ireland was a quart of 
beer daily, a half pint of whiskey daily, and a quarter 
of a pint of aquavitae every second day.31 
Of the foods available, bread and cheese had the great 
advantage of not having to be ,cooked and thus could be 
easily taken on a long march. Fish on the other hand was 
not very popular and one official asked the Privy Council 
to send "little or no fish, for it neither keepeth well, 
nor pleaseth the soldier, who by such victual hath so much 
to provoke his thirst and no provision to quench it. 11 32 
29 A.P.C., XXIX, 272. 
30ibid., 383 . 
3libid., 70. 
32 C.S.P. Ireland, 1299-1600, 31. 
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The daily ration cost the private soldier half his daily 
wage of 8d. just for the food, while the soldier still 
·had to buy his own drink.33 The English food allowance 
would be adequate if it arrived in the quantity or vari-
ety specified. However, the amount of food ordered from 
England was based on.the.planned daily rations. Thus if 
food were lost or was below the quantity authorized the 
soldiers would immediately suffer. 
The English apparently were reluctant to order great 
extra quantities of food because of the difficulty in 
keeping such foodstuff from spoiling. In the rj_cher 
Netherlands and France the 'food problem for the Army was 
solved by establishing permanent stores for wheat, cheese, 
butter and beer. These stores were replaced at regular 
intervals to keep them from spoiling, and the excess food-
stuffs were sold to private citizens, thus saving the 
C;own money.34 Because of the damp Irish climate, which 
made it impossible to store provisions for any length of 
time, and because of the general scarcity of food, this 
system was not introduced into Ireland until after the 
turn of the century. 
The mechanics of sending supplies from England to Ire-
land was as difficult as the. process of sending recruits. 
Throughout Elizabeth's reign there was a gradual change 
33 A.P.C., XXIX, 272. 
34c.s.P. Domestic, 1591-94, 4, 574-75. 
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from an inefficient freelance "victualling" by private 
merchants, to a fairly well-organized Crown-contracting 
system by the end of Elizabeth's reign.35 However, it is 
with the supply situation in existence at the time of Es-
sex's campaign that we are primarily concerned. During 
the 1590's the Crown struck a bargain with some well-
established private merchants who agreed to provide a 
certain quantity of food by a certain date. The merchant 
was responsible for buying the food in England, shipping 
it to Ireland, and placing it in the hands of the Queen's 
representative in Ireland. The Crown, for its part, would 
assist the contractors in the buying of food, arrangment 
of shipping, and the provisioning of other accessories 
such as salt, casks for beer, horses and carts. 36 
A contract signed in November 1598 illustrates how 
the provisioning system worked. In this instance a mer-
chant agreed to deliver sixty tons of bread or biscuits, 
ten tons of butter, and eight tons of cheese and oatmeal. 
The provisions were to pe sent from Chester and Bristol to 
Cork in Munster and delivered to the Army. As a guarantee 
that the merchant would meet his part of the contract, the 
Crown demanded a bond of ~3000. The Crown agreed to pay 
~2000 for the supplies, and gave the merchants half the 
sum to use as capital as soon as these merchants had 
35cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 90. 
36A.P.c., xxrx, 458-60. 
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signed the contract and posted their bonds. When the 
mayors of Bristol and Chester informed the Crown that 
supplies had been dispatched, the merchant would receive 
the other half of the ~2000 payment. Finally when the 
supplies arrived in Ireland and were turned over to the 
authorities, agents of t9e merchants in Ireland were 
given receipts, which were turned in to the Crown, where-
upon the merchant was given back the ~3000 posted as good 
faith.37 
On the surface the system seemed adequate; however, 
certain provisions in the contract and failings in the 
administrative chain left the system open to gross abuses. 
Once the provisions were· delivered to Ireland, the keeping 
and issuing of the provisions was the responsibility of 
the "commissaries of victuals," officials in charge of re-
ceiving and distributing food shipments.38 Thus if the 
distribution were unsatisfactory it would be the fault of 
the "victualling commissaries," and the merchants would 
be cleared. Also, in case the supplies were lost by 
shipwreck or captured ~Y enemy ships the Crown bore the 
total cost of the loss.39 Therefore it was possible for 
dishonest merchants to bribe inspecting officials in 
either the ports of embarkation or the ports of arrival 
3?Ibid., 273. 
3Bibid. , 518. 
39~. t 458-60. 
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and arrange for either "lost" cargoes or false certifica-
tion of the quality of existing shipments. 
While food was the greatest single problem of sup-
plies, uniforms and clothing also presented certain diffi-
culties. Each county was given an allowance from the 
Queen to outfit the new levies. 40 The initial clothing 
ideally consisted of caps, cassocks, doublets, breeches, 
netherstocks, shoes and shirts,41 and was designed to be 
/ 
sufficient to get the troops from the county to the over-
seas assignment. The full uniform was not issued in Eng-
land for fear that the levies would sell parts of it before 
they went abroad. While the troops were overseas, uni-
forms, both a summer and.winter outfit, were issued and 
exchanged as appropriate. A typical winter uniform for a 
private consisted of a cassock, a doublet, cloth breeches, 
a hat, two shirts, three pair of stockings and three pair 
of shoes.42 
The English army of 1599 still had no official uni-
form, although Essex's levies of infantry were instructed 
to have well-lined coats of a blue color, while the cav.;. 
alry dressed in "long horseman's coats of strong cloth 
of orange-tawny color with white lace and white lining 
throughout. 1143 Officers, of course, were more elaborately 
40A.P.C., XXI, 306-07. 
41Mss. Salisburi, vol. 9, 474. 
42 A.P.C., XX, 37. 
43Mss. Salisburi, vol. 9, vii. 
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dressed in the finest armor, in silk and lace, and all the 
other trappings which their station could afford.44 
Ireland presented a special clothing problem because 
of the climate and terrain, and the fact that decent bil-
lets were in short supply. Commanders wrote to the Privy 
Council that shoes and clothing sent over quickly became 
"unserviceable," and that they "shrink upon any wet, and 
our poor men do wade in their marches at least twice or 
thrice a day. 1145 The soldier often found himself standing 
night guard in a damp uniform or sleeping in the open on 
wet ground, and in these circumstances soon fell prey to 
sickness. 
In an overseas c~mpaign in the sixteenth century the 
I English troops could expect to take frightful casualties. 
From 1591 to 1597 the English sent almost 20,000 men on a 
series of campaigns to France, which was one of the most 
healthy places to campaign. Yet almost half the troops 
sent to France died· on active service, mostly from sick-
ness. 46 Ireland took an even greater toll. In Shane 
O'Neill's rebellion from 1562 to 156?, the entire English 
garrison in Ireland never numbered more than 1500 at any 
one time; 47 yet the rebellion took 3500 English lives from 
44 g.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 3?6. 
45Ibid., 93. 
46
cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 15. 
47Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 47. 
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enemy action and sicY-..ness, and the replacements barely 
4-8 kept pace with the casualties. Losses were heavier in 
the Desmond war of 1579-81, while all the previous totals 
were dwarfed by Tyrone's war of 1595-1603.49 For the 
Essex campaign the Queen agreed to send 2000 reinforce-
ments every three months.to fill out the ranks.50 Battle 
casualties would not be expected to account for anything 
close to 2000 men every three months, but disease would 
more than make up the difference. 
The chief cause of death in Ireland was the "Irish 
ague" and the "flix," which apparently were forms of dys-
entary and marsh fever arising from the damp climate, un-
clean water, and the generally unhealthy and weak physi-
cal condition of the poorly nourished troops.51 An offi-
cial writing from Dublin in July 1598 stated that after 
only two months in Ireland, an infantry company would be-
gin losing men to the inevitable sicknesses, and that by 
the third month the disintegration of the company was 
usually well advanced.52 
The disease itself was dangerous enough; however, the 
primitive state of medicine and of the medical services 
48
cruickshank, Elizabeth's Armz, 16. 
49Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 47. 
5°c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 28. 
51 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 251. 
52Ibid., 200. 
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resulted in untold numbers of unnecessary deaths. Medicine 
was just emerging from the Middle Ages, and many dreadful 
practices were still employed by surgeons. There was much 
disagreement as to what was a viable cure, and surgeons 
experimented with their own ideas, making potions composed 
of such bizarre ingredients as boiled dog and earthworms 
purified in white wine. Others recommended that gunshot 
wounds might be cauterized with boiling oil.53 With such 
a mentality on the part of medical officers a wounded or 
ill private was sometimes more ·fortunate if he were left 
alone. 
The medical service in the English Army had risen from 
having only one surgeon for an .Army in 1346 to a point 
where there was, in theory, a surgeon and an assistant for 
each company of 100 men in the Elizabethan armies of 
1594.54 The term "surgeon" can be misleading since the 
physicians of this time came from the Company of Barber-
Surgeons of London, a liaison which would seem to indicate 
something about the level of expertise in both professions. 
Like other Englishmen, surgeons hated to be drafted to Ire-
land and used every opportunity to buy their way out by 
bribing the company Captains, or by having themselves re-
placed by a fairly unskilled substitute.55 
53cruickshank, Elizabeth's Armi, 177. 
54Ibid., 174. 
55Ibid., 175· 
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What made the medical situation particularly bad in 
Ireland was the total lack of medical facilities. In the 
Netherlands or France, where the country had many spacious 
and well-built private homes, the Army made certain owners 
responsible for looking after a number of ill men. In 
Ireland, however, the facilities were not available in 
anywhere near the numbers required.56 Thus Captain John 
Baynard, veteran of two years in Ireland, wrote to the 
Privy Council • 
••• there is no provision extraordinary for sick 
and hurt soldiers, but that either .he dieth, or 
seeketh in his misery to get away, or else con-
tinueth in the country long sick; and so gener-
ally, they are kept so weak and out of heart, 
that they are not able to stand up against the 
rebels, which to perform that country service, 
do consist only upon strength of body. For I 
myself have seen such lamentable spectacles both 
of sick and hurt soldiers, that have died in open 
streets, merely, for want of some succor.57 
The captain went on to state that soldiers who survived 
one attack of dysentery were worth three raw recruits. 
For this reason alone it would be profitable to convert 
churches and abbeys into hospitals and set up independent 
institutions to meet the medical needs of the Army. He 
ended with the same observation that the wars in Ireland 
would be ended sooner by using a few "well kept, clothed 
and victualled" troops, rather than a large ill-supplied 
army.58 What was needed in Ireland was a massive government 
56ill.£., 180. 
57c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 350. 
58c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 350. 
r 
" ~, ..•. 
·' 
I t 
I 
~ ~1· .. 
' 
' .. 
l 
58 
effort to provide hospital facilities. But since this 
would.involve great expenses, in a war which was already 
financially disastrous, the English continued to solve 
their casualty problem by sending home any sick men who 
were lucky enough to reach Dublin, while allowing the 
unfortunate casualties i~ the outlying provinces to fend 
for themselves. 
Another technical aspect of sixteenth-century warfare 
in Ireland which deserves consideration is the subject ·of 
weaponry. By the time of Tyrone's rebellion, the tradi-
tional English longbow, which was still part of the stan-
dard company organization as late as 1589, had been com-
pletely replaced by firearms, halberds and pikes. When 
the Privy Council deliberated on the new tactical organi-
zation of the company it was concluded that the ideal 
company should consist of 60 firearms, 30 pikes and 10 
halberds.59 This proportion was generally kept throughout 
the subsequent Irish campaign. 
During Tyrone's war the guns used by both sides were 
matchlock calivers and muskets. The caliver was a light 
weapon weighing twelve pounds, which fired a one-ounce 
ball for an effective range of about 80 yards. The mus-
ket was a twenty-pound weapon which fired a two-ounce ball 
for a range of 150 yards. The musket had to be fired from 
a rest and was a ~airly cumbersome weapon for the guerilla 
59cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 114-15. 
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warfare of Ireland, while the lighter caliver was more 
ideally suited for the Irish area. Consequently both sides 
maintained a proportion of calivers over muskets which 
sometimes approached a ratio of 5 to 1. 60 The weapons 
were slow in loading and of uncertain dependability , but 
these firearms had revolutionized warfare and made their 
possession a necessity for any army of that time. 
Ammunition, however, remained a particular problem 
because of the strange and troublesome practice of having 
the soldiers pay for powder and ammunition out of their 
own meager wage. Since the men had to pay for each round 
they fired they were understandably reluctant to shoot up 
their subsistance allowance, particularly since the Cap-
tain often cheated them out of their daily wage. The 
result was that men went to the field with very little 
powder and were loath to fire it at the enemy unless they 
were in imminent danger. This practice was reputed to be 
responsible for several English defeats in Ireland. 61 
Weaponry, like everything else, was subject to the 
general corruption and lack of tight supervision preva-
lent in Ireland. When a man died or deserted his weapons 
disappeared and invariably went into the hands of the 
rebels. In fact on several occasions the captain reported 
that the men had sold their weapons outright to 
60G. A. Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster, 1593-1601," 
Ir. Sword, 1 (1951), 114. 
61c.S.Po Ireland, 1598-99, 251-53. 
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Irishmen. 62 The captains, however, excused this behavior 
by telling the Privy Council that this was the only way 
the men could get money for food. 63 
As the reader may have inferred, the discipline in 
the Queen's armies of this period was haphazard at best. 
The English had not yet developed that deep-seated feel-
ing of devotion to the national state or to regimental 
tradition which would later characterize the British sol-
dier. Instead the short-term draftees were kept on the 
line, sometimes by personal loyalty to their commander, 
but more often by fear. Whenever the threat from the enemy 
became more immediate than the threat of some not-so-
immediate court martial, and when the officers and ser-
geants did not exhibit a dynamic and inspired kind of 
leadership, the units were inclined to panic and break 
in combat. 
A campaign in Ireland was made especially challenging 
by the problems encountered in marching and transporting 
troops and supplies over the Irish-terrain. The sixteenth-
century army moved slowly as it was, normally ten miles a 
day, and seldom as much as fifteen a day. The cavalry 
could move more quickly, but the bulk of the army moved 
at a walking pace. Such carts as were available were used 
to carry stores, equipment, and the wounded. The progress 
62Ibid., 138. 
G3Ibid., 148. 
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necessarily depended upon the roads available, and in Ire-
land the English found a situation in marked contrast to 
the well-developed communications of France and the Neth-
erlands. 
If we are to believe sixteenth-century writers it 
would seem that almost the whole surface of Ireland out-
side the Pale was bog or wood. Actually, the provinces of 
Leinster and Munster were fairly wealthy and well-developed, 
dotted with castles and towns linked by a passable road 
network, 64 although local tradition at the time insisted 
that a squirrel could have hopped from Killarney to Cork 
by leaping from bough to bough. 65 The terrain, however, 
seemed to be fairly open.and adaptable to the English 
methods of warfare. Consequently rebellions:in Leinster 
and Munster were traditionally crushed by English armies 
systematically making towns and castles submit, and crush-
ing any Irish force which dared to meet them on the field. 
In the Midlands area and Connaught across the Shan-
non River the country became more difficult. Sean 
O'Domhnaill estimates that perhaps one-fourth of the total 
area was virgin bog, while the remainder was largely marsh, 
woods and mountains. 66 There were developed areas at 
64G. A. Hayes-McCoy, "Strategy and Tactics in Irish 
Warfare, 1593-1601," in I.H.S., 11 (1941), 267. 
65Margaret MacCurtain, Tudor and Stuart Ireland 
(Dublin: Gill and MacMillan tTD., 1972), 92. 
66sean O'Domh.naill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century 
Ireland," in I.H.S., V (1946), 40. 
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Galway, Sligo, Tulsk and Limerick which could be used as 
operational bases for campaigning in Connaught, although 
the actual movement was difficult. 
Ulster, on the other hand, was a veritable wilder-
ness, a maze of bog, woods and bush, practically devoid 
of roads in the normal sense. Ulster was virtually 
sealed off from the rest of Ireland by a line formed by 
the Erne River, Lock Erne, the mountains of Slieve Gul-
lion, and a bog area stretching toward the east coast. 
So formidable and restrictive was this geographical bar-
rier that the eastern portion of Ulster, Tyrone's area, 
could be invaded only by an army coming through Mowry Pass 
on the one road from Dundalk to Newry! Even the Mowry 
Pass was only a broken causeway, with bogs on either side, 
and with thorned thickets lining both entrances. 67 The 
western portion of Ulster, controlled by the O'Donnalls, 
could only be invaded by an army which forded the Erne 
on the short stretch of river between Balleyshannon and 
Lock :Erne. 68 Even when the English forced one of the 
entrances into Ulster they had no industrial area or cri-
tical stationary objective at which to focus their cam-
paign. Instead, they were reduced to the frustrating pat-
tern of plowing through the bush trying to force the elus-
ive Irish to stand and fight. The effect of the bogs was 
67MacCurtain, Ireland, 98. 
68o'Domhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-Century Ireland," 
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to nullify the advantage of the Engiish cavalry whose 
heavier horses could not negotiate the marshy areas. 
English cannon and wheeled vehicles could operate with 
only the greatest difficulty, while pursuit of the enemy 
force was impossible for conventional troops ladened with 
baggage and carts. 
The poorly developed dirt roads and tracks, which 
became almost impossible mud bogs with the rain, presen-
ted the English with a further difficulty in the use of 
horses. The lighter type of horse, called garrons, which 
were found in Ireland, were not strong enough to pull the 
carts and wagons of the period over any poor roads. In-
stead the English were dependent on the powerful English-
type carriage horses, of which only a few were available· 
in Ireland, being owned by some Palesmen. 69 Therefore in 
any sizable campaign, particularly to Ulster, the English 
would have to gather and transport carriage horses to Ire- · 
land. Without these powerful animals no army of any size 
could march and sustain itself. 
The terrain in Connacht and Ulster also made it im-
possible to ease the supply situation by establishing 
garrisons and magazines at critical points. The :English 
periodically attempted to plant garrisons in Ulster, not-
ably at the Blackwater River beyond the Mowry Pass, at 
Sligo and by sea at Derry; however these garrisons soon 
69Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," in Insti-
tute of Historical Research, Bulletin, XXXII (1959), ? • 
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became a liability. The country was too poor for the gar-
risons to sustain themselves, while the lines of communi-
cations were not sufficiently developed to bring up sup-
plies easily.70 In fact, because of the terrain and Ty-
rone's army it would often take the Queen's entire mobile 
army to escort supplies to the isolated garrison on the 
Blackwater. It was on one of these resupply missions in 
1598 that the English relief .force was ambushed and des-
troyed. Even the sea communications were uncertain and 
in 1567, for example, Colonel Randol.f's garrison of 1000 
men at Derry in Lough Foyle, after seven months of suffer-
ing and considerable loss of life, had to be evacuated 
because shipping could not be sent through the seas with 
any regularity.71 , 
Added to all the above difficulties, which had existed 
for every Irish campaign, the task of Essex and his sue-
cessor Lord Mountjoy, was made even more difficult because 
Tyrone had brought the rebel armies to a peak of efficiency 
never previously attained. Before Tyrone, the Irish arm-
ies were a ragtag conglomeration of Irish cavalry, Irish 
light infantry and Scots mercenaries. Although the Irish 
cavalry were traditionally the elite of the community, 
composed exclusively of the ruling classes, they were not 
?OO'Domhnaill, 11 \./arfare in Sixteenth-century Ireland," 
?lFalls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 96-97. 
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t a particularly effective part of the Irish Army. They 
were useful, it is true, for reconnaissance and foraging, 
but because of their equipment they were never able to 
stand up to the English horse. The Irish horseman of the 
sixteenth century rode without stirrups and his saddle 
was merely a large pilliqn secured to the horse by a sur-
cingle and straps around the animal's breast and hind-
quarters. Consequently the Irish horseman carried his 
spear aloft and sought to strike the enemy with overarm 
motions. The English however, rode with stirrups and 
orthodox saddle, with their lances couched in knightly 
fashion, thereby providing the maximum shock effect. 
Since the Irish cavalry were never able to stand up to a 
well-seated English charge, the Irish horse were limited 
to harassing tactics which never proved decisive.72 
The Scots Gallowglasses and Redshanks were heavy 
infantry mercenaries, described as "picked men of great 
and mightie bodies" who wore shirts of mail, usually chain 
mail, and a helmet. Their favorite weapon was a two-
handed battle axe, six feet long.73· Towards the end of 
the sixteenth century some of the Gallowglasses began to 
adopt the pike, a weapon extreme:;Ly popular on the Cantin-
ent; however, their main weapon remained the axe. The 
72G. A. Hayes-McCoy, "Irish Cavalry in the Sixteenth-
century," in Ir. Sword, l (1953), 316-17. 
73John Dymm.ok, "A Treatise of Ireland," in Tracts 
Relating to Ireland, 11 (London: 1889), 7. 
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Scots therefore were the only element of the Irish armies 
before Tyrone who could meet the English on open ground 
and still give a good account of themselves. 
The Irish light infantry, or "Kerne," were free pea-
sants, so poor that they were armed with only a bow or 
three darts made of wood·and tipped with iron, or a sword 
and a shield of wood.?4 Unlike the Scots, the Irish kerne 
had no armor, but simply wore the same outfit whether 
fighting or herding cattle. The Kerne were unable to meet 
the English on open ground with any prospect of success. 
However, they were well-suited to Irish warfare because 
they could operate on terrain where other troops dared not 
venture.75 
Because of the existing social system the Irish lords 
were not able to make the maximum use of their manpower 
resources. In the Irish communities there was a clear 
distinction between those who were free and those who 
were unfree. The latter were those peasants who tilled 
the lands of the lords and who owned no land of their 
own.76 These unfree peasants and poor workers comprised 
a substantial, perhaps a majority, of the population.?? 
74Ibid. , 7-8. 
75Henry fforely (ed.), Ireland Under Elizabeth and 
James the First (London, 1840), 92-96. 
760 1 Domhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century Ireland," 
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??Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster," 108. 
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Since tradition forbade the unfree from carrying arms, an 
important source of manpower was lost to the Irish lords. 
The Irish leaders were so reluctant to tamper with the 
social system, that before Tyrone's reorganization only 
one chieftain, Shane O'Neill, dared to defy custom by 
arming the unfree peasants.78 Becaune of social restric-
tions, Irish armies throughout most of the sixteenth cen-
tury were rarely very large, and the Irish writers refer 
to an army of 1000 men as "a very large host."?9 Of 
course, English officials and deputies invariably exag-
gerated the number of Irish rebels facing them, and even 
the Irish themselves exaggerated their own numbers when 
seeking to impress foreign princes whom they asked for 
aid. However, contemporary research has shown that before 
Tyrone, Irish ar~ies rarely numbered more than a few thou-
sand men. 80 
The prosecution of a war on the scale envisaged by 
Tyrone required a great increase in the strength of the 
army. The Scots mercenaries were incapable of expansion 
on a very great scale. Additionally, the Scots were reluc-
tant to adapt themselves to the changing conditions of 
warfare, notably the increased use of firearms by the 
78o•nomhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century Ireland," 
31-34. 
79Ibid., 32, 
BOibid., 32-36. 
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years.81 Furthermore, the new Scot mercenaries, who 
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crossed into Ireland on a seasonal basis, could not neces-
sarily be counted on for extended support in a long war. 
King James I of Scotland, who had acquiesced in allowing 
his Scots subjects to crQss into Ireland to fight the 
English, was becoming increasingly more concerned with 
securing the throne of England when Elizabeth died. 
Therefore, in his efforts to solidify good relations with 
the aging Elizabeth, James I, despite his sympathy for 
Tyrone, was in a position at any time to attempt to re-
strict the flow of mercenaries to Tyrone. For all these 
reasons, Tyrone turned away from dependence on Scottish 
mercenaries, and sought to build a national army primarily 
with the native Irish material available. 
The problem of securing the needed numbers was solved 
by following Shane O''Neill' s example and enlisting the 
unfree peasants and workers into his army to such a degree 1 
that Dr. Hayes-McCoy refers to O'Neill's army as the first 
representatives of a national militia in Ireland. 82 Ty-
rone's most significant achievement in the reorganization 
of the Irish armies was to introduce a formidable new 
element in Gaelic warfare, the Irish mercenaries. Men at 
arms had been maintained by various lords to serve for pay 
81Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster," 108-09. 
82Ibid., 109. 
69 
and. maintenance under a system known as "coyne and liv-
ery. 1183 Tyrone modernized this medieval right of a lord 
to billet fighting men, and indulged in a wholesale re-
cruitment of men from all classes to enlist in his army 
for pay and maintenance. 84 Thus in February or March of 
each year Tyrone's recru±·t;ers went to the churches and 
other public places, announcing rates of pay and other 
terms of service. In this way soldiers were gathered for 
the coming campaigning season. 85 By 1598, therefore, most 
of the men of military age within Tyrone's confederacy 
were soldiers. The social gulf between the fighting 
classes and those formerly forbidden to bear arms was 
correspondingly eliminated as even churls, horseboys and 
the working classes were trained in the use of weapons. 86 
One of the immediate problems Tyrone faced was how to 
train this new army to be able to adopt the new weapons of 
warfare and to meet the Queen's army on equal footing. To 
solve the training requirements Tyrone initially relied on 
the Queen's own officers! During the time of his seeming 
loyalty to the English, up to the year 1594, he secured 
the services of six English captains to train six 100-man 
21, 
83.Morley, Ireland Under Elizabeth, 70. 
84Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster, 11 109-110. 
85 C.S.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 215; C.S.P. Ireland, 1596-
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86 C.S.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 308-19. 
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rotated men through his companies as rapidly as possible, 
so that far more than the envisaged six hundred men were 
trained in arms by the time of his rebellion. 87· The Eng-
lish influence was so pronounced that when Tyrone took 
the field in 1595 and fought his first major battle at 
Clantibret, his army was divided like the English into 
b tt 1 · · d t . BB Th En. 1 . h L d a a J.ons, companies an sec ions. e g is or 
Deputy wrote back to Lord Burghley in shocked amazement 
that Tyrone even had 300 musketeers dressed in red coats 
like the Queen's soldiers.89 
In addition to the six captains assigned to Tyrone's 
army by Queen Elizabeth the Earl also received aid from 
trained men who periodically deserted from the Queen's 
army.90 The queen had consistently used Irish soldiers to 
supplement her English armies to such an extent that usu-
ally mo~e than half the Queen's army was composed of 
"friendly" Irish.9l Whenever the Queen attempted to re-
duce the stze of her army in Ireland by disbanding friendly 
87Ibid., 322. 
88!£~~. ' 319-20. 
8 9Ibid .• , 322-23. 
90Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster," 112. 
9l0'Domhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century Ire-
land," 50. 
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Irish companies, the English commanders invariably pro-
tested that the newly unanployed Irish soldiers would simply 
join the Irish rebels.92 
Another source of trained recruits was The Netherlands, 
which in the latter part of the sixteenth century witnessed 
the most intensive warfa?e in Europe as the Spanish tried 
to crush the Dutch Republic. An Englishman, Sir William 
Stanley, had raised an Irish regiment in 1586 to fight on 
the Protestant Dutch side against the Spanish. However, 
Stanley was a Catholic from Catholic Lancashire, and in 
1587 he deserted with the majority of his regiment to join 
forces with the Spanish Commander, the Duke of Parma. 
Thus, from 1587 until 1610 there was an Irish regiment in 
Flanders, fighting on the side of the Catholic Spanish.93 
These Irish veterans from the Lowlands exerted a healthy 
influence on Tyrone's forces.94 Finally, Tyrone was assis-
ted by Spanish officers from the Lowlands and by survivors 
of the Spanish Armada, part of which was wrecked on the 
Irish coast. The Spanj.sh apparently did not influence 
Irish tactics, but were helpful in training the Irish in 
the use of arms and the employment of field fortifications, 
92Cyril Falls, "The Growth of Irish military strength 
in the second half of the sixteenth-century," in Ir. Sword, 
II (1955), 105. 
93Brendan Jennings, O.F .. 11., "Irish Swordsmen in Flan-
ders: Stanley's regiment," in I.H.S., X:XXVI (1947), 402-10. 
94E'alls, "Growth of Irish military strength, 11 105. 
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for ~hich the Spanish had long been famous.95 
Although Spain and Bngland were constantly at odds, 
Spanish aid to Ireland nevef approached the volume needed 
to be decisive. At the most, Spanish soldiers helped 
train the Irish armies, while Spanish gold was particu-
larly useful for purchas~ng supplies from Scotland.96 
However direct military intervention of any permanence 
depended upon control of the sea, and this the Spanish 
could never firmly establi~h, and the two attempts by 
Spain to organize sizeable expeditions to Ireland before 
1600 ended in failure. 
WJ::l~le the levying and training of troops progressed 
satisfactorily, the problem of equipping and supplying 
his army with arms and ammunition was a task which Tyrone 
never really surmounted. Because of 'the relatively primi-
tive state of northern Ireland, Tyrone could not supply 
the guns and powder his army required. By 1596 Tyrone 
did have Scots gunsmiths in Dungannon making muskets, cal-
ivers and pistols, but not in enough quantity to meet the 
needs of his army.97 The biggest problem was the manufac-
turing of gunpowder. Of the ingredients needed, charcoal 
was in ample supply, saltpetre was available in limited 
quantities, but sulphur had to be imported.98 Therefore, 
95Hayes-McCoy, nr.rhe Army of Ulster," 112. 
960 . s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 
97c.s.P. Ireland, 1596-97, 
98c.s.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 
1'!~2' 190 • 
75, 86, 362. 
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Tyrone had to seek outside aid to keep his army in muni-
tions, and this aid came .from a variety of sources. He 
received some arms from the Queen's troops deserting to 
his army, and later on from arms captured from defeated 
royal forces.99 Powder came from as far away as Danzig, 
while the Spanish increasingly sent more supplies, once 
to the extent of one thousand guns and large quantities 
of lead and powder. 100 The Irish towns in the south, and 
even in the Pale, sold him powder whenever they could get 
away with it; 101 and occasionally enterprising merchants 
from :Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham smuggled him 
arms and equipment which they concealed in hogsheads and 
dryfats. 102 
'While the above sources were helpful, they were ra-
ther haphazard in delivery and limited in the amount they 
could supply. Tyrone's main source of supply, and the 
critical factor in his being able to keep a well-gunned 
army in the field, was hisrupply channels with Scotland. 
The Lowland Scottish burghs sent a steady stream of powder, 
match, calivers and muskets across the narrow stretch of 
sea into Lough Foyle, a protected inlet able to accommo-
date Scottish craft and Spanish sea-going ships. 
99Falls, "Growth of Irish military strength," 104. 
100c.s.P. Ireland, 1600, 239. 
lOlRich, New Description of Ireland, 110. 
102c.s.P. Ireland, 1596-97, 323. 
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By making judicious use of all his sources, Tyrone 
was able to field a well-armed army by 1595. In that year 
it was reported that his total force consisted of four 
thousand "shot," one thousand pikemen, and one thousand 
horse. 103 And by 1596 an English observer reported that 
Tyrone was so well suppl:i,ed with guns that his Kerne had 
been converted into musketeers and calivermen, while the 
Gallowglasses had been formed as pikemen to protect the 
musketeers in the Continental fashion. 104 But despite 
his achievements, powder always remained a worry and his 
supply lines from Scotland through Lough Foyle remained 
in a precarious state. As a final problem in weaponry 
Tyrone never developed artillery. No doubt artillery 
would have been an encumbrance in the type of warfare tne 
Irish engaged in. However, this deficiency made it prac-
tically impossible for Tyrone to take a fortified town or 
outpost, no matter how small the garrison, while English 
artillery doomed any Irish castle to inevitable seizure.105 
Regarding food supplies Tyrone's army was initially 
in a much better position than the English, although even-
tually the Irish would be subdued by famine. Their chief 
source of food supplies were herds of cows which supplied 
the Irish with beef, milk and butter. The English had 
l03c.s.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 236, 299. 
l04Ibid., 486. 
l05c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 98. 
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long understood the importance of destroying this mobile 
food source which invariably accompanied every Irish army 
and acted accordingly. In 1574, for example, the Earl of 
Sussex, the Queen's Lord Deputy, sought to subdue Shane 
O'Neill by slaughtering 4000 of the Irish lord's cows. 106 
Additionally Tyrone's for.ces also were supplied with corn 
which was raised in the more remote regions of Ulster. The 
Irish leader even established mills in Dungannon to grind 
the corn, and built up magazines in hidden storage areas. 
Since Tyrone's army generally lived off the land, food-
stuffs presented no problem as long as the land defenses 
to his areas remained intact. 107 
The end result of Tyrone's effort was a well-trained, 
amply supplied army of 7,000 men, not up to Continental 
standards, but more formidable than any force heretofore 
encounte.red in Ireland. By 1596, Sir Henry Wallop, the 
Treasurer at Wars and an observer in Ireland, wrote to 
Sir Robert Cecil in great alarm that Tyrone's troops could 
now confront the royal armies in the open plain, instead 
of as formerly only in defiles.and forest. 108 While defi-
ciencies in cavalry and artillery, along with vulnerable 
supply lines to Scotland, left Tyrone's army with crucial 
defects, it was still the most potent rebel force the 
106o•Domhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century Ire-
land," 41. 
l07c.s.P. Ireland, 1596-97, 19, 365, 375, 3840 
108c.s.P. Ireland, 1~92-96, 381-82. 
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English had ever faced. 
The improvements made by Tyrone in the organization 
and equipment of the Irish armies did little to change 
Irish tactics, but rather made the traditional Irish tac-
tics more effective. Tyrone never attacked an English 
force which had halted and fully deployed for battle. 
Instead he kept to the time honored tactic of ambushing 
English troops on the march, and having bis skirmishers 
fire at the English from the bush. Since the Irish con-
sistently refused to close, matters seldom came to a push 
of pikes or hand-to-hand combat. Thus the English were 
forced to reply in kind, and the conflict invariably de-
generated into an exchange of fire by skirmishers. 
In summary, the English soldier in Ireland was a 
draftee, often a vagabond who found himself operating ill-
fed and ill-supplied in an unhealthy climate. Basic 
equipment was sometimes lacking and food commodities were 
frequently rancid by the time they arrived. If the company 
were stationed at an outpost, the difficulties of trans-
portation caused.the system to break down completely, 
leaving the soldiers to fend for themselves, while cor-
ruption and inefficiency in the Elizabethan administra-
tive channels inevitably destroyed whatever morale was 
left. Without any real training the English soldier en-
countered an enemy who rarely met him face to face, but 
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who knew every inch of country and could move through 
forest and bog at will. Skirmishes were infrequent, the 
Irish always managing to outrnarch their adversaries and 
to avoid combat except on favorable terms. When engage-
ments did occur they were brisk, confused and merciless. 
Savagery usually begets savagery and in the Irish wars 
both sides discarded any rules of warfare, treating pri-
soners and non-combatants alike with unbridled cruelty. 
In this situation, the English units were whittled away. 
Unless they fell victim to a rare disaster the companies 
disintegrated from fever and dysentery until they were 
disbanded or reinforced with a new batch of sullen con-
scripts. 
CHAPrER III 
THE APPOINTMENT OF ESSEX 
Considering the circumstances of warfare in Ireland, 
one might marvel that a great lord would bring himself 
to seek out and accept the comlland of an army in Ireland. 
Indeed, the selection of Essex as the English Viceroy 
charged with the task of suppressing the revolt was no 
simple matter; on the contrary, it ·was the end result of 
a complicated series of intrigues by those political fac-
tions vying for ascendancy in Elizabethan England, in-
trigues which can best be understood by examining the 
situation in Elizabeth's court at the end of the sixteenth 
century. 
The style and tone of the Elizabethan court was de-
termined by the caprices of the Monarch, whose personal-
ity Neville Williams analyzes in his impressive work 
Elizabeth, the Queen,. Elizabeth fed on admiration and 
demanded the choicest flattery from the men around her. 
To her courtiers she was the "Sun Queen" and all others 
were expected to play the part of satellites. Her deal-
ings with Parliament and her attitude toward most great 
problems--marriage, foreien policy, succession--were un-
predictable and defied description. 1 
lNeville Williams, Elizabeth the First (New York: 
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The Court was basically a masculine society since a 
woman of her vanity would consider any sort of female com-
petition unwelcome. The officers of state found that at..: 
tendance at court was mandatory, although they were given 
peroission to visit wives and families on certain holi-
days. 2 Court gallantry was carried to absurdity and men 
drew their swords on the slightest provocation. 
Since Elizabeth was unmarried, her reign witnessed a 
constant stream of suitors, many froo within the kingdom 
as well as those from without. Through most of her reign 
she had not one favorite, but three or four at a time, 
who rose or fell depending upon the Queen's mood.3 While 
there were many courtiers, onl;y· a few gained her favor and 
confidence to the point where it could be a danger to her 
Crown. 
The Earl of Leicester, Sir Christopher Hatton and Sir 
Walter Raleigh all gained ascendancy over rival courtiers 
at one time or another. But none had any sort of mass 
support which would permit him to fo11ow a course indepen-
dent of his monarch's wishes. Leicester was a Puritan, 
and relatively unpopular with the masses, who ruined him-
self in 1578 by marrying Lettice Knollys without the 
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1968), 214. 
2Ibid., 216. 
3Ibid. 
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4 Queen's knowledge or consent. Hatton was a young lawyer 
who never allied with any court faction, while Raleigh 
was feared and distrusted by populace and Court alike.5 
Elizabeth, therefore, remained in control of her favor-
ites for most of her reign. Those with a mind toward 
independent action had neither the power nor the support 
to oppose her. 
Along with her courtiers whom Elizabeth keJtaround 
for her personal edification, she recognized the need for 
capable administrators to see to ·the ver·:l complex task of 
. 
governing a rising national state. She found her most 
faithful and trusted servant in the person of Sir William 
Cecil, Lord Burghley. Their relationship stretched back 
before the Queen's accession to the throne. In 1550, when 
Elizabeth's future was often in jeopardy, Sir William Cecil 
administered her estates and became her financial advisor. 6 
In the early days of her reign Elizabeth weathered 
many plots by Catholics, Pope Pius V and northern lords 
to place :Mary, Queen of Scots, on her throne. In the Nor-
thern Rebellion of 1569, many of her nobles were involved 
in the conspiracy. She felt she could only trust Lord 
Burghley implicitly and turned more and more to him.? In 
4 Ibi<!·, 185. 
5Ibid. , 188. 
6
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?Ibid., 175· 
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addition to being her "Spirit," as Elizabeth called him, 
he was a capable administrator who made his position as 
Principal Secretary the most important post in the realm. 
As he grew older, Lord Burghley began to turn the 
responsibilities over to his no less capable son, Sir 
Robert Cecil. Sir Robert was an unprepossessing person, 
a hunchback from birth, and an introvert who had no hope 
of competing with the more flamboyant courtiers surround-
ing the Queen. Instead, closely schooled by his father, 
Robert Cecil made himself an indispensable administrative 
assistant--the only logical successor to his father's 
responsibilities when the latter would pass on in 1598. 
Like his father, Robert Cecil was a man of keen percep-
tion, shrewd ambition and sure political insight. Toge-
ther they formed a formidable faction, maintained in an 
almost unassailable position next to the person of the 
Queen. The opposition, always present in the Tudor courts, 
formed no serious threat until a young nobleman made his 
first appearance at court in 1587. 
When Robert Devereux came to London he brought with 
him a. disti.nguished Norman surname and a:,n ancient lineage. 
His ancestors originally resided in the vicinity of Eve-
rux in Normandy. In 1066, the Count of Rosmar and Man-
telake sent two sons, Edward and Robert D'Evereux, with 
William, Duke of Normandy, to assist in the conquest of 
England. Edward settled in Wiltshire and took the surname 
de Salisburie, from Salisbury where his principal manor 
was located. -Robert secured estates in the Marches of 
Wales and retained the family name. The Devereux were 
constantly at the side of kings, receiving titles and 
honors from King John and Edward IV. In Tudor times 
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they rose steadily to prominence in national affairs se-
curing further holdings in Staffordshire and Ireland, 
and fighting under Henry VIII in his Continental wars. 8 
Robert's father, Walter Devereux, married Lettice 
Knollys, second cousin to Elizabeth,9 daughter of Sir 
Francis Knollys, a firm supporter of Protestantism in 
En.gland. Walter was exiled during Queen Mary's reign, 
but he returned in greater stature under Elizabeth, who 
elevated him to the earldom of Essex in 1572 for his sup-
port in suppressing the rebellion of the Catholic earls 
of the north. For the next few years, Walter sought to 
establish his fortune by colonizing eastern Ulster, but 
- 10 his colony failed and his health was broken. In 1576 
he died in Ireland leaving the Devereux titles, honors 
and estates to his nine-year-old son and heir. 11 
The day before Walter Devereux died he wrote to the 
8vernon F. Snow, Essex the Rebel (Lincoln, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 1. 
9conyers Read, Lord Bur~hle~ and Queen Elizabeth (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966 , ij ?. 
lOLacey, Essex, 11-12. 
11snow, Essex the Rebel, 2-3. 
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I Queen's Secretary, Lord Burghley, asking him to be the 
' 
,. 
guard1an of his son, and to bring Essex up in his house-
hold.12 Since Lord Burghley held the title of Master of 
the Wards, he had legal control over the estates of all 
minors, such as Essex, who had come into their j_nheri tance 
before their majority. ~ut Lord Burghley took a special 
interest in Essex, who subsequently spent considerable 
time in Cecil's household. 1 3 While under Lord Burghley's 
protection Essex began his long acquaintance with Burgh-
ley' s son, Robert Cecil, who was three years older than 
young Essex. 
Although the young earl was under Burghley's influ-
ence, the dominating force ·on his life seemed to be his 
widowed mother Lettice. She was a beautiful woman, 11 :force-
ful and flirtatious, 11 who married Walter Devereux and then 
took several lovers. Robert Lacey, Essex's latest bio-
grapher, evaluated Lettice as a "wilful and impetuous" 
woman, insistent on always having her own way, who domin-
ated her son in his youth and then dogged his footsteps in 
court. In 1578 she charmed Robert Dudley, Earl of Leices-
ter, the Queen's favorite courtier, into marrying her; and 
thereafter her relationship with Elizabeth was understand-
bl t . d 14 a y s raine • 
12
nead, Lord Burghley, 467. 
l3Lacey, Essex, 17. 
14Ibid. , 15. 
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Essex received the best possible education, attending 
Trinity College, Cambridge at the age of ten and taking his 
Master of Arts' degree in 1581 at the age of fourteen. He 
plowed through a curriculum of theology, civil law, the 
philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, mathematics, geometry, 
astronomy, rhetoric, Greek, French, Latin and Hebrew. The 
only book on his reading list in the English language was 
an edition of Holinshed's Chronicles. 1 5 Essex was particu-
larly well-versed in Latin and his subsequent writings 
are liberally punctuated with Latin phrases. 
After graduating from Cambridge in 1584, Essex was 
groomed for court life by his stepfather, the Earl of Lei-
cester. In 1587 Leicester resigned as Master of the Horse, 
a position in close attendance upon the Queen, so that the 
eighteen-year-old Essex could take his place.16 The next 
year the Earl of Leicester died and Essex was accepted as 
the leader of the Leicesterians, a faction whose support 
came from the Puritans and young soldiers at Court. Es-
sex did not cultivate Leicester's Puritan ties, although 
he still had their support, but he did eagerly take charge 
of the Earl's military foL\.owing. 17 
Handsome, dashing and dramatic, Essex was the idol 
of the adventurous you..11ger sons who looked on warfare as a 
l5Ibid., 20. 
16Read, Lord Burghley, 46?. 
l?Ibid., 468. 
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glorious profession. He made a spectacular military debut 
by distinguishing himself in a brief campaign to the Neth-
erlands where he was knighted in late 1587. 18 The Queen 
was no less impressed than the younger.nobles, and she 
took to Essex immediately. Since the death of her cousin 
Mary, Queen of Scots, whose execution Elizabeth had or-
dered, the Queen had been in a state of acute depression. 
Only Essex could cheer her, and they would often stay up 
together playing cards until dawn. 19 
Although there are many romantic legends concerning 
Essex and Elizabeth, the fact is that in 1587 Essex was 
only twenty years old, while Elizabeth was fifty-four, a 
very advanced age in the sixteenth century. Indeed, not 
even in his most extravagant boastings did Essex ever sug-
gest that his relationship with Elizabeth was anything 
more than platonic. The reality of the situation seems to 
be that Elizabeth used Essex, as the personification of 
English charm and masculinity, to bolster her own insatia-
ble ego, while Essex sought to use his influence with 
Elizabeth to enhance his prestige and financial position. 
Upon his arrival at Court in 1587 Essex already had 
accumulated some ~23,000 worth of debts. 20 The great no-
bles of England lived, and indeed were expected to live, 
l8r , Th 0 d C . 1 ~2 
.tanuover, e oecon eel. ,, / _. 
l9Williams, Elizabeth, 294. 
20La.cey, Essex, 72. 
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extravagant lives. Great sums were spent in maintaining 
and improving estates, gambling, making gifts to the Queen 
or outfitting expeditions as the need arose. Since those 
who adventured to rise to the top in Elizabeth's eyes had 
to spend lavishly, Essex was constantly immersed in debtf1 
His motives were fa~rly evident from the beginning. 
In May 1587, his servant Anthony Bagot wrote to his fa-
ther: "When she is abroad, nobody near her but my Lord Es-
sex, and at night, my Lord is -at cards, or one game or 
another with her, that he cometh not to his lodging till 
birds sing in the morning." And.while he played cards the 
Earl was advancing his own fortune. His servant contin-
ued: "he told me with his own mouth that he looked to be 
Master of the Horse within these ten days. 1122 And indeed, 
on June 18, 1587, Essex received the appointment, which 
brought with it a sum of Yt,500 a year. 23 
Essex achieved his greatest financial triumph in 
1590, when Elizabeth awarded him the "Farm on Sweet Wines." 
This granting of a monopoly--a common practice in Tudor 
England--allowed Essex to levy all duties in sugary wines 
imported from the ~editerranean, and represented a substan-
tial portion of the national tax office. The "Farm" was 
21 . Ibid., 72-75. 
22walter P. Devereux, Lives and Letters of the Dev-
ereux, Earls of Essex (London: 1853), I, 185. 
23Lacey, Essex, 23. 
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the basis of Essex's financial ascendancy, and in 1597 it 
was producing sufficient revenue to eliminate an estimated. 
~10,000 of the Earl's debt. 24 The only ominous note in 
Elizabeth's generous grant on sweet wines was that the 
lease was made payable for a ten-year period beginning in 
1590. In 1600 therefore .it would once again be the 
Queen's privilege to terminate or renew the lease as she 
saw fit. 25 
Although Essex greatly impressed the fifty-four-year-
old Elizabeth, he immediately began to alienate other 
court members. In the cut-throat atmosphere of Tudor-
Stuart hngland, once enemies were created, reconciliation 
was seldom possible. Grudges were borne an interminable 
length of time, and the desire for vengeance was particu-
larly strong. Offended parties would wait years, if neces-
sary, for the opportunity to settle the score for real or 
imagined grievances. 
The first of many enemies Essex created was Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh. This renowned adventurer, soldier, poet and 
philosopher had become a great court favorite by 1587, 
and was considered one of the most promising personalities 
in Englund. But Devereux, fifteen years his junior, imme-
diately replaced him in the Queen's favor, and by so do-
ing embarked on a feud which would last until Essex's 
24MSS. Salisbury, vol. 7, 283. 
25 Lacey, Es~, 76-7?. 
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death. 26 
Raleigh was in a position to recover his lost role 
in 1590 when Essex secretly married Frances Walsine;ham, 
since Elizabeth took it as a personal affront. The storm 
passed quickly and Essex did not lose much ground. 27 Ral-
eigh had had an excellent opportunity at the time of Es-
sex's marriage, but he ruined it by seducing Bess Throg-
morton, a maid of honor to the Queen. Such indelicate 
behavior sent Raleigh and his maid to the Tower for three 
months' confinement. Sir Walter never again came back to 
full favor and thereafter allied himself with Sir Robert 
C ·1 28 eel. • 
Essex was soon back in his element, leading an expe-
dition to France in July 1591, as Lord General, in which 
the fortress of Rouen was captured. 29 He celebrated the 
capture by conferring knighthood on twenty-four of his 
followers, a practice usually reserved for heads of state. 
Lord Burghley warned him in a letter that he would be in-
curring the Queen's wrath.30 Indeed Elizabeth, like all 
the Tudors, was frugal with money and titles alike. 
26Handover, The Second Cecil, 52. 
27williams, Elizabeth, 315-16. 
28Ibid., 319. 
29George B. Harrison (ed.), The Elizabethan Journals 
(New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), I, 49. 
30Read, Lord Burghlel, 477. 
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Throughout her reign she restored or recognized only eigh-
teen titles, and from 1572 on she created only three earl-
doms. Even after the defeat of the Armada, she consi-
dered bestowing six earldoms, but soon reconsidered and 
belatedly ennobled only the .English commander, Lord How-
ard. 3l Therefore it was.a bit perplexing to have titles 
and honors created wholesale by one of her generals. But 
Essex, headstrong and stubborn, desirous of popularity, 
would persist in creating honors for his friends at every 
opportunity throughout his career. 
In Tudor-Stuart England, strength and influence de-
pended upon being physically present at the royal Court. 
A courtier who absented himself too long would come back 
to find his reputation damaged by slanderous tales and his 
position undermined. Honors and positions were generally 
acquired when a rival was away. Essex was taught this 
lesson in 1591, when he left for France. One week after 
his departure, Sir Robert Cecil, already an antagonist, 
was sworn in to the Privy Council.32 
But Essex recovered quickly by way of his military 
exploits over the next two years and was himself admitted 
to the Council in February 1593.33 In that year also, the 
first of many books was written, dedicated to the young 
3lwilliams, Elizabeth, 330. 
32Read, Lord Burghley, 477. 
33Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, I, 163. 
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Earl. Doctor Matthew Sutcliffe wrote The Practice, Pro-
ceedings and Laws of Arms, which discussed the great mili-
tary leaders of ancient and modern times. The Epistle 
noted that all men's eyes were on Essex, who had acquitted 
himself so well in the Low Gountries, Portugal and France~4 
As Essex rose in popularity, numerous persons sought 
to attach themselves to his star. Such a person was Fran-
cis Bacon, a brilliant young lawyer in poor financial con-
dition, whose father had been Lord Keeper. He befriended 
Essex, apparently in the hope that the Earl would place 
him in some secure governmental post. Essex was flattered 
at the attachment, since he recognized and admired Bacon's 
intellectual talents.35 
In 1593 the office of Attorney-General became vacant, 
and Bacon, heavily in debt, besought Zssex to secure the 
position for him. Essex spent much time and effort in ar-
guing Bacon's case to the Queen.36 In Tudor England, the 
ability of a Lord to secure an office for a friend was a 
very real kind of credit. One's influence with royalty 
would be worth money, either given or at least borrowed 0 
Even an Earl of Essex's stature was constantly in need of 
money, and even Kings were not safe from the creditor's 
34_Ibid., 219-20. 
35catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and the Throne 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), ??-78. 
36Ibi.£. , 77. 
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grasp. Therefore Essex had a strong interest in securing 
as many positions as possible to enhance the reputation 
of his influence. 
However, the Attorney-Generalship, the hiEhest legal 
office in the land, was also sought by Sir Edward Coke, a 
friend of the Cecils, who had pract~cailaw for fifteen 
years and had considerably more experience than Bacon.3? 
Furthermore, Coke already held the post of Solicitor-Gen-
eral, the second highest legal post, and was therefore the 
logical successor to the vacant Attorney-Generalship. 
Essex's pleas were to no avail, as the Queen chose Coke, 
backed by the Cecils, over Bacon. Additionally, the Queen 
appointed Thomas Egerton, another Cecil supporter, to the 
office of Master of the Rolls, the second highest office 
in the Chancery Court.38 
In desperation, Essex and Bacon sought the latter's 
appointment to the Solicitor-Generalship. However, Eli-
zabeth refused to appoint Bacon to any position. Bacon 
had some years before argued in Parliament against the 
right of the Queen to secure a triple subsidy. Whether 
this militated against Bacon is difficult to discern, but 
the fact remains that Bacon, even after changing sides and 
working for the Cecils, was never appointed to a permanent 
position under Elizabeth.39 Essex was furious at the 
37rbid., ?6. 
38 Ibid., 81. 
39 Ibid., 77, 83. 
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re.fusal~ since his reputation was at stake, and sought to 
compensate Bacon adding: "Master Bacon, you are ill be-
cause you have chosen me for your mean and dependance. I 
die if I do not somewhat towards your fortune: you shall 
not deny to accept a piece of land which I will bestow on 
you. 1140 The overall ef.f~ct of the dispute was to set Sir 
Edward Coke firmly in Cecil's camp, particularly since he 
was allowed to keep both offices for fifteen months while 
Elizabeth tried to decide on a successor.41 
~izabeth was not oblivious to the Cecil-Essex dis-
pute and in true Tudor fashion sought to keep the factions 
balanced off. She apparently understood Essex and sought 
to protect him against himself. In July 1594, when Essex 
begged to accompany an expedition against Brest, the Queen 
refused, saying she wanted him by her side and did not wish 
to hazard his person. She gave him Y+OOO to console him 
and added: "Look to thyself, good Essex, and be wise to 
help thyself,. without giving thy enemies advantage, and 
my hand shall be readier to help thee than any other. 1142 
The Earl could not be held back indefinitely, and 
when, in 1596, it was decided to send an expedition to 
Cadiz "to singe the beard" of the Spanish King, Essex se-
cured the position of co-commander along with Sir Charles 
4 0ibid., 82. 
41Ibid., 85. 
42Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, I, 247. 
Howard. As a result, Essex created another formidable 
enemy in the great Lord Admiral Howard, the hero of the 
Armada victory of 1588.4 3 When learning of Essex's ap-
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pointment as co-commander, Howard complained: "my commi-
sion, in being joined with the Earl is an idle thing, for 
4L.J. I am used but as a drudge." Howard's prophecy proved 
true as Essex dominated the expedition. Sir Walter Ral-
eigh also joined the venture, but was relegated to the 
post of Rear Admiral. 4 5 
Outwardly, the attack was successful in that Cadiz 
was sacked and Spain humiliated. By not acting quickly 
enough, however, forty Spanish merchantmen had time to be 
scuttled rather than risk capture. Furthermore a Spanish 
West Indies fleet was due to arrive in the near future, 
but the expedition, upon the urging of Howard, did not 
Wa1·t fO'l"' i·+. 46 A t t' 1 b L '/ H h. h _ v recen ar ice y • ~. enry w ic 
examines the Cadiz expedition, shows that the ill-success 
of the venture was due not to any failing on Essex's part, 
as his enemies alleged at the time, but rather to the un-
cooperative attitude and lack of initiative on the part of 
Howard and Raleigh. While Essex personally led an inspired 
43williams, Elizabeth, 303. 
44Quoted in Handover, The Second Cecil, 135. 
45charles G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Armi (Oxford: 
at the Clarendon Press, 1966), 253-54. 
46Ibid., 276-77. 
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ground attack which captured the city of Cadiz, Howard and 
Raleigh, leading the naval forces, refused to close on the 
Spanish merchantmen, and thus gave the Spanish an oppor-
tunity to destroy their Oi'm treasure-laden ships. 4 7 
Upon arriving in England, the Earl received a tumul-
tous reception from the ~opulace. Essex returned to the 
Court of Elizabeth undoubtedly expecting the Queen's en-
thusiasm to be no less than that of the masses. Instead, 
embarrassing statistics were presented by Robert Cecil and 
his father which showed that the expedition, which had 
cost ~50,000 to finance, was returning only ~28,000 to 
the Crown after the expenses of Essex and his men were 
deducted.48 Elizabeth, ever conscious of finances, could 
hardly be enthusiastic when it was pointed out that rich 
merchant ships had been sunk instead of captured and that 
the returning West Indies fleet had not been intercepted. 
As a final blow, Essex was informed that while he was 
away at Cadiz, Sir Robert Cecil, upon the recommendation 
of Lord Burghley, had been sworn in as Principal Secretary 
to the Queen, 49 an unmistakable indication that Sir Robert 
would follow in his father's footsteps when the latter 
passed on. 
47see L. VI. Henry, '"I'he Earl of Essex as a Strategist 
and r~ilitary Organizer, 1596-7, 11 E.H.R. LXVIII, 363-93. 
48nandover, The Second Cecil, lLJ.5. 
49Ibid. , 137. 
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The Earl's position seemed weakened and members of 
his faction cautioned him to tread softly. Francis Bacon 
tried to convince Essex to rest on the laurels of the 
Cadiz expedition--after all, the masses thought it was a 
great success. If Essex persisted in antagonizing so 
many people, Bacon couns~led, then he, Bacon, might pos-
sibly have chosen the wrong patron.50 
The year 1597 brought new rumors of a Spanish inva-
sion and an expedition was organized to .forestall it by 
attacking the Spanish Azores Islands. Essex secured sole 
command and with 5,000 experienced troops, went off to 
search .for the enemy. Tl?-e expedition experienced problems 
with ocean gales which forced it to turn back without suc-
cess. The only notable achievement was by Sir Walter Ral-
eigh, second in command, who briefly took the island of 
Fayal. This action was taken without Essex's permission, 
and he later .forced an infuriated Raleigh to apologize be-
fore the war council.51 
Essex returned from the "Islands voyage," his ships 
battered by storms, on October 24, 1597, to face a disap-
pointed Queen, who blamed him for spending great sums of 
money without accomplishing anything.52 The day before 
Essex got back, his old enemy, Lord Charles Howard, was 
50Williams, Elizabeth, 329. 
51Handover, The Second Cecil, 207. 
52Ibid., 200. 
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created Earl of Nottingham. Because of Howard's other 
offices as Lord of Effingham, Lord Admiral, and Lord High 
Steward l?ro tem;pore, Essex had to yield to Nottingham in 
the House o.f Lords. Indeed, Howard now outranked all the 
nobility except the hereditary Lord Chamberlain, the Earl 
of Oxford.53 As a furth~r annoyance, Robert Cecil had 
himself appointed as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
during Essex's absence, thus eliminating another office 
Essex had sworn to acquire for his friends.54 But if 
the Earl was disappointed in the Court, the general pop-
ulace loved him even more. The same storm which battered 
Essex upon his return, forced the new Spanish armada to 
turn back.55 Panic over invasion rumors subsided and gave 
way to renewed glorification of Essex, to whom the people 
attributed their deliverance.56 
The year 1597 ended with Essex adding Lord Cobham to 
his growing list of enemies. Cobham, who would later be 
on the jury at Essex's trial,57 sought to be installed as 
the Warden of the Cinque Ports of Kent, a lucrative posi-
tion. Essex violently opposed his bid and managed to de-
lay the appointment until August 29, 1598, when pressure 
53Ibid., 204. 
54rbid., 210. 
55~., 200. 
56Ibid., 209. 
57Bowcn, Lion and 'l.1hrone , 141. 
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from Robert Cecil and Lord Howard forced it through.58 
Cobham was intransigently in the ranks of Essex's enemies 
thereafter, often protesting his hatred for the Earl.59 
In addition to creating enemies, Essex's uncompromis-
ing nature caused many of his supporters to change sides. 
In 1598 he became suspic~ous of the favors bestowed on 
Lord Thomas Grey by Elizabeth. Essex thereafter called 
on Grey to publicly state whether he supported the Sec-
retary or himself--there could be no neutrality. Grey 
stated that he would not be dependent on Essex and that 
Essex had no right to monopolize the advancement of men 
from war as he had been doing, since this was the Queen's 
prerogative. Finally, Grey explained that he liked the 
favor of Sir Robert Cecil, and would never be dishonest 
or ungratefui. 60 
That disputes with the Cecils continued over every 
issue was probably caused by the difference in orientation 
of both :parties, particularly regarding the question of 
warfare. The Cecils were administrators who sought the 
efficient running of a growing bureaucratic structure. 
Warfare, particularly if it brought no treasure, merely 
interfered with the effective running of the ship of 
state. But to Essex war was his mettle and his means of 
58Handover, The Second Cecil, 206. 
59Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, I, 420. 
60Ibid., II, 41 • 
advancement. The war with Spain had dragged on without 
profit for too many years. The Cecils therefore sought 
an end to an uneconomical venture. 
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When the issue of peace with Spain took concrete form 
in April 1598, Essex violently protested that he would 
never consent to a treatY. or peace. Upon this Lord Trea-
surer William Cecil answered that all Essex thought of 
was war, slaughter and blood. Burghley then pulled out a 
psalm book and pointed· to a verse ivhich read: ":Men of 
blood shall not live out half their days. 1161 
Two months later, Essex wrote a letter explaining 
why peace with Spain should not be made. In the same 
letter he made a passing reference to the Irish war, which 
had dragged on inter~ittently for years, referring to that 
conflict as a "beggarly and miserable" war which held no 
prospect of glory as compared to the war against the Span-
ish king. 62 Yet before the passing of another year, Essex 
.. 
would find himself mired in the Gaelic bogs. 
By early 1598 Essex's military reputation had reached 
its zenith, and his fame was renowned throughout Europe. 63 
The King of France, Henry IV, wrote to Essex with "affec-
tion" and offered his good will, 64 while the King's sister, 
6lsir William Camden, Historie of the Most Renowned 
and Victorious Princess Elizabeth (London: 1636), 126. · 
6~ . LHarrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 33. 
631'188. Salisbur;[, vol. 8, 222. 
6L~Ibid., 356. 
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Catherine de Bourbon, wrote to him as her "cousin and dear 
friend·. 1165 His .fame at home was unexcelled. The Bishop 
of Carlisle called him "a Joshua unto us in .fighting His 
battles, 1166 while a layman referred to him as "the Scipio 
and sword of England. 1167 When Essex was appointed Chan-
cellor of the University.of Cambridge, Sir Thomas Cart-
wright congratulated the Earl in a letter, and concluded: 
"Let the chronicles o:f our land be perused, and I think 
it will be hardly :found that there hath been any subject, 
especially of those years that your Honour has yet come 
into, clothed with·so much honour, and girded with so much 
authority as you are. 1168 
By late 1598, however, there were indications that 
Essex's position at Court was on a downward course. Sir 
Robert Cecil had consolidated various posts in the a<Lro.in-
istrative field and was continually strengthening his 
position. Although Essex was regarded as the greatest 
military leader o:f the realm, his relationship with Eliza-
beth was becoming increasingly more strained. Into this 
conflict the Irish problem emerged, offering Essex an 
opportunity to reassert his ascendancy. 
65Ibid., 73. 
66Ibid., 66. 
67Ibid., 561. 
6S ... b.d 
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The situation in Ireland was badly deteriorating by 
June 1598 as Hugh O'Neill remained defiant and unpunished. 
The last Lord Deputy, Lord Burgh, had died in 1597, and 
Elizabeth had still not appointed a successor. Neither 
Cecil nor Essex had wished to send any of their supporters 
to that island. In fact, both men concentrated on con-
vincing Elizabeth that a member of the opposition should 
go.69 
The climax came on July l in a conference in which · 
Elizabeth and the Council tried to finally resolve the 
appointment of a governor for Ireland. Essex had strongly 
recommended that Sir George Carew, one of Cecil's suppor-
ters, should be sent to Dublin. Elizabeth, however, an-
nounced that Sir William Knollys, Essex's friend and un-
cle, should be appointed Deputy. The Earl, in a rage, 
contemptuously turned his back on the Queen, who responded 
by rising out of her throne and cuffing him on the ear. 
Impetuously Essex whirled and laid his hand on his sword, 
swearing that he would not take an insult like that from 
Henry VIII himself. Lord Admiral Howard restrained his 
hand, whereupon the Earl stormed out of the chamber, to 
remain absent for many weeks.70 The issue of a new Vice-
roy for Ireland still remained unsettled. 
Such conduct at the July 1 meeting is reflective of 
69Handover, The Second Cecil, 58. 
7°camden, Historie, 126. 
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Essex's personality. He was passionate, spoiled, quick to 
anger, and unlike other men of his time, he was unawed by 
the position of monarch! While other great men in Tudor 
England tended to consider the Queen as sacrosanct and as 
a personage on a higher plane altogether, Essex tended to 
treat her like an ordina:rzy human being, who, while out-
ranking him, did not command his total adoration. During 
his brief self-imposed exile after the meeting, Essex 
wrote to one of his court friends that he was no lackey 
or slave of Elizabeth, whom he considered to be only an 
earthly power.71 Such a sentiment was heresy in an age 
where the notion of the divine right of monarchs was gen-
erally accepted throughout Europe. 
Essex's presumptive actions, such as creating titles 
whenever the opportunity presented itself, or insulting 
the Queen as no other subject ever dared, reflects the 
peculiar independence he was allowed. This unusual li-
-
cense was the Queen's own doing. Because of her fondness 
over the years for Essex she pampered him shamelessly and 
indulged.his every whim. This indulgence from the begin-
ning only encouraged Essex to become even more spoiled and 
independent. 
On August 14, 1598 Sir Henry Bagenal, Marshal of the 
English Army in Ireland, gathered all the mobile forces 
at his disposal, 3500 foot and 500 cavalry, and invaded 
71Harrison, :Slizabetban Journals, II, 462. 
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Ulster to relieve the small English fort on the Blackwater. 
As he approached the Yellow Ford over the Callan River, 
his force was ambushed by Tyrone's Army, which slew over 
2000 of the English Troops, including the Marshal himself 
. 72 
and thirty of his best officers. The catastrophe in-
stantly thrust Ireland i~to the forefront of English pol-
itics, and debate continued for some time on what course 
of action should be taken.73 
When Essex heard the news from "younder cursed cou...-1-
try of Ireland," he wrote to the Queen: 
••• when I apprehended how much your Majesty 
would be grieved to have your armies beaten 
and your kingdom like to be conquered by the 
son of a smith, duty was strong enough to 
rouse me out of my deadest melencholy.74 
This letter of August 26 was the first indication that 
~ssex might be considering personally to undertake the 
pacification of Ireland. 
In any case, after blocking R:nollys' appointment, 
even though Knollys wanted the position, Essex subsequent-
ly objected to the Queen's and the Council's intention to 
appoint Lord I1ountjoy to the post of Lord Deputy. 75 By 
his dissatisfaction with such proposed Council nominations 
72c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 228. 
73Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, L~7-48 • . 
74 J,·TC'C' S ) • b . 1 8 318 i,.:·....,. !! .is ur;z, vo • , • 
?5sir John Harrington, Nu5ae Antiquae (New York: Ams 
Press, IHCo, 1966), I, 241. 
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Essex was making his own appointment as Lord Deputy an 
inevitability. 
His subsequent investment as Lord Deputy was still 
no ctraightforward appointment; rather, it was to be a 
drawn-out bargaining procedure, involving bitterly disput-
ed proposals and counterproposals, lasting from August 
1598 until March 12, 1599! On September 10, after recov-
ering from several weeks of sickness, Essex returned to a 
warm welcome at Elizabeth's court.76 By November it was 
generally believed in Court circles that Essex would lead 
a great campaign to Ireland in the followine; spring.77 
However, :i:;ssex, the (~ueen and the Council could not come 
to agreement on numerous points in Essex's commission--~ 
namely, the size and composition of his army, the position 
of his subordinates, the military and political powers he 
should have, the title that should be conferred upon him 
and the financial arrangements for the campaign. Concern-
ing the last item Essex had insisted that the Queen for-
give many of the debts he had accumulated in organizing 
past expeditions for the Queen.78 
On December 8 Sir John Chamberlain wrote to English 
officials in the Netherlands: 
Essex's journey is uncertain, because the 
76 T "C ey .,...,, 0 ex 
..J.,JCJ. , ' 1:,,.._:i i.) ·,,. ' 216 • 
7711s.s. Salisburr,_ vol. 8, Lt-48-50. 
78c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 168. 
proportions for his enterprise are daily dimin-
ished. The nwnber of troops wa~3 a.t first set 
down to be lL~, 000 with full allowance of victual 
and money, but these rates are diminished and 
Essex is displeased.79 
Two days later, however, his appointment seemed certain 
and Sir Robert Cecil wrote to the Irish officials: "I 
104 
think Her Hajesty is now.resolved of her General to be 
the Earl Marshall (Essex) and he shall have there a good 
army of 12,000 to 14,000 foot and 1,000 horse. 1180 But on 
December 20 Sir John Chamberlain wrote that the Earl of 
Essex's journey to Ireland "is dashed." Chamberlain ex-
plained: 
Till Sunday the Earl was to go, but there ca.me 
a sudden alteration, the reason of which is 
kept secret. Some say the Queen had promised 
to forgive him his fathers debts of 12,000 h, 
and she says she meant forbearance of it during 
his absence. 81 
As for the relationship of Essex and Cecil, Chamberlain 
commented, "He (Essex) and Mr. Secretary ply the tables 
hard in the presence Chamber, and play so round a game as 
though Ireland were to be recovered at Irish. 1182 
Finally, on January 3 Chamberlain reported that "The 
disgust that stayed the Earl's going are removed, and now 
he is preparing for Ireland. 1183 Apparently by this time, 
79Ibid., 129. 
80 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 401. 
81 C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 131~. 
82Ibid. 
83Ibid.., 14?. 
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Elizabeth had finally agreed to discharge Essex of ~10,000 
worth of debts so that he could meet the expenses of the 
campaign. 84 In a~y case the greatest difficulty had been 
resolved and Essex could turn his full attention toward 
preparing the expedition. There were still other diffi-
culties which would arise and his full commission was not 
agreed upon until January 31, and not signed lmtil March 
12.85 
Essex's final commission, dated January 31, represen-
ted the most far reaching powers any Viceroy had yet had 
in Elizabeth's reign. Instead of the usual designation 
of Lord Deputy, Essex was granted the more prestigious 
title of Lord Lieutenant, an honor which had baen granted 
only to Sir Philip Sidney in 1567. Under his Commission 
Essex was empowered in addition to his prerogatives as 
Governor, also to pardon treasons, to restore traitors, 
to grant lands, to displace martial officers, to make 
knights, to command ships appointed for Ireland, and to 
dispose of the Queen's treasure with the advice of the 
Irish Council, as long as he did not exceed the sums au-
thorized. 86 
Essex, as is evident,.had made many enemies in his 
rise to power, and more recently in his quest for appoint-
84Lacey, Ess~, 217. 
85c.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 156, 168. 
86Ib'd 
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ment as Lord Deputy. Aside from the obvious oppon-
ents of the Cecil faction Essex had eroded his support 
within his own circle. Sir William Knollys, Essex's 
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uncle who had wanted the position as Lord Deputy, was 
reported as being "not well pleased" that Essex had 
blocked his appointment.~? Sir John Harrington, as he 
prepared to follow Essex to Ireland, was cautioned by a 
Court observer, Robert Markham, that Essex "hath so many 
showing friends, and so many unshowing enemies. 1188 Mark-
ham told Harrington that Lord Mountjoy had sent two or 
three of his relations with Essex's army 11 to report all 
your conduct to us at home. 1189 As a precaution Markham 
counseled Harrington: 
I say, do you not meddle in any sort, nor give 
your jesting too freely among those you know 
not: obey the Lord Deputy in all things, but 
give not your opinion; it may be heard in Eng-
land.90 
Harrington would follow Markham's advice, keeping a diary 
as Markham also had suggested, and attempting to keep a 
noncommital position in case things did not go well in Ire-
land. 
Essex's own state of mind at the time of his 
87Harrington, Nugae Antiquae, 242. 
88Ibid. 
-
89Ibid., 241. 
90ibid., 242. 
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appointment and his attitude toward the task ahead have 
been the subject of much speculation. The general opin-
ion has been that he was enthusiastic at first, but quick-
ly became defeatist in outlook. Indeed after his confir-
mation was finally settled on January 3, 1599, Essex 
wrote to.Sir John Harrington with great exhilaration: "I 
have beaten Knollys and Mountjoy in the council, and by 
G-d I will beat Tyrone in the field; for nothing worthy 
her Majesties honor hath yet been achieved. 1191 
At the same time, Essex wrote a very detailed analysis 
of his position to his friend, Lord Willoughby, the Gover-
nor of Berwick, on January 4, 1599. After discussing some 
technical problems concerning the employment of troops from 
the Berwick garrison, Essex devoted the remainder of his 
letter to his own personal situation, and began: 
Now for myself. Into Ireland I go. The Queen 
hath irrevocably decreed it; the Council do 
passionately urge it; and I am tied to my own 
reputation to use no tergiversation. And as it 
were indecorum to slip collar now, so were it 
"minime tutum," for Ireland would be lost, and 
though it perished by destiny, yet I should only 
be accused for it, because I saw the fire burn, 
was called to quench it, and yet gave no help. 
I am not ignorant what are the disadvantages of 
absence; the opportunities of practicing enemies 
when they are neither encountered or overlooked: 
the constructions of princes under whom "magna 
fama" is more dangerous than "mala" and 11 succes-
sus minus quam nullus, 11 the difficulties of a war 
where the rebel that hath been hitherto ever vic-
torious is the least enemy that I shall have 
against me; for without an enemy, the disease of 
that country consumes our armies, and if they 
r 
live, yet famine and nakedness makes them lose 
both heart and strength. And if victuals be 
sent over, yet there will be no means to carry 
it. And yet all those were better endured than 
to have a Hanno at Carthage or a Cato at Rome, 
barking at him that is every day venturing his 
life for his country abroad. All those things, 
which I am like to see, I do now forsee. For 
the war is hard; pulchra que difficilia: the 
rebel successful that only makes him worthy to 
be undertaken: the qUpplies uncertain; it is 
safer for me to perform as much as shall lie 
in me or depend upon me, and to show the world 
that my endeavors were more than ordinary, when 
the state that set me out must conspire w~th the 
enemy against me. Too ill success will be dan-
gerous; let them fear that who allow excuses, 
or can be content to overlive their honour. Too 
good will be envious; I will never forswear vir-
tue for fear of ostracism. The Court is the 
centre; but methinks it is the fairer choice to 
command armies than honorers. In the meantime 
enemies may be advanced; so I show who should 
be, let fortune.show who be. These are my pri-
vate problems and night4.y disputations, which 
from yuur lordship, whom I accow:i.t anotl1e1· mj-
self, I cannot hide. Use them according to 
their nature and their author's purpose, that 
is, to commit them to no other eyes than your 
own.92 
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While some authors have inferred a defeatist attitude 
on the part of Essex,93 this author considers his analysis 
a very realistic evaluation by an experienced soldier and 
politician. Instead of being defeatist, Essex had a heal-
thy respect for the military problems connected with an 
Irish campaign, along with a prophetic insight, borne 
from past experience of the political consequences which 
his absence from Court would engender. In any case, with 
92MSS. Saiisbury, vol. 9, 10-11. 
93see comments in Introduction. 
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his appointment made certain, Essex could now turn to the 
tactical and organizational considerations which a great 
foreign expedition would entail. 
,. 
',. 
CHAPTER IV 
PLANS AND PREPARATION 
The strategy which the English forces employed to 
subdue Ireland was fairly well determined by the politi-
cal situation and the geographical realities. Throughout 
the Irish wars of the sixteenth century, the rebels were 
invariably on the defensive, holing up in their mountains, 
forest and bogs, and putting the onus on the Queen's 
troops to march in and enforce her authority. Tyrone's 
war was no exception to the pattern, for although he did 
have a better army than his predecessors, Tyrone basically 
fought the same defensive war. Indeed, the fortified posts 
of the English, the lack of Irish artillery, English sea 
power, and the great disparity between English and Irish 
logistical production rendered a truly offensive strategy 
impossible for Tyrone. Additionally, the Irish leader 
had built up a precarious alliance of independent-minded 
Irish chieftains, many of whom were less than enthusias-
tic over Tyrone's sudden preeminence, 1 and one serious de-
feat could shatter the loosely knit coalition. 
In view of the Irish methods of warfare the English 
were forced to adhere to an offensive strategy. Since 
1c.s.P. Irelund, 1598-99, 166. 
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Tyrone was the heart of the rebellion the major effort 
would be directed toward neutralizing him. The ideal 
procedure for dealing with revolt in Ulster was to invade 
that country from the two natural overland entrances: in 
the west by an army from Connaught going through Bally-
shannon; in the east by g.n army moving through the I1owry 
Pass to the Blackwater. Further, it had long been recog-
nized that the key to subduing Ulster lay in isolating the 
area from outside support by cutting off the sea-entry 
lane at Lough Foyle. By a sea-borne operation, a garri-
son could be planted at Derry which would not only sever 
Ulster's lines of supply to Scotland, but would place 
Tyrone's home base in imminent danger. 
The above basic strategy for dealing with revolt by 
the O'Neills was developed during Shane O'Neill's rebel-
lion from 1562 to 1567. In 1566 Colonel Randolph estab-
lished a garrison of 1,000 foot at Lough Foyle in October 
of that year, to operate in conjunction with Lord Deputy 
Sidney's overland invasion through Connaught. 2 However, 
the country around Lough Foyle was particularly desolate3 
and a garrison was forced to depend on outside SUJ:?ply. 
In Colonel Randolph's expedition the garrison was immo-
bilized for lack of supplies, and through the winter the 
supply system broke down completely, leaving the garrison 
2
c.s.P. Ireland, 1209-72, 308-09. 
3 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 23. 
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to starve.4 Finally in I1ay 1567 the survivors were with-
drawn, having tied down Shane O'Neill to a degree, but 
being otherwise ineffective due to lack of support. 
With Tyrone's rebellion of 1595-1603 the Irish and 
English faced basically the same strategic situation as 
in Shane O'Neill's rebel~ion. In 1597 Lord Deputy Burgh 
planned to subdue Tyrone with a similar strategy. Forces 
in the east would garrison the Blackwater fort area to 
prevent Tyrone from slipping past the English forces and 
into the Pale. In the west, the Governor of Connaught, 
Sir Conyers Clifford, would attack through Ballyshannon; 
while most importantly, a garrison would be placed at 
Lough Foyle in Tyrone's rear.5 Regarding the Lough Foyle 
aspect of the plan, Sir Henry Wallop, the Treasurer at 
Wars for Ireland, wrote to the Privy Council that he hoped 
Her Majesty would send 1,000 foot and 100 horse to Lough 
Foyle, with supplies to last six or eight months, and con-
eluded: 
The Place, being withal weil fortified will 
more annoy the Earl (of Tyrone) and O'Donnell 
than an army of 10,000 men, making journeys 
into their countries without provision or means 
to enable them to continue in the field longer 
than has been accustomed.6 
In July 1597, however, rebel threats to the Pale 
4c.S.P. Ireland 2 1509-73, 317-18. 
5 c.s.P. Ireland 2 1596-97, 373-75, 357-58. 
6Ibid., 
-
357. 
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caused Lord Deputy Burgh to shift the men a.nd supplies in-
tended for Lough Foyle instead to reinforce the troops 
guardin-,;; the Pale. 7 ·while Lord Burgh was cancellinf5 his 
Lough Foyle plans, Sir Conyers Clifford's invasion force 
was defeated in early August and turned back at Bally-
shannon by O'Donnell's ar;my. 8 The entire project there-
upon collapsed and the plans instead would be held in 
abeyance untii the forces and supply magazines could be 
replenished.9 
At the same time that Lord Burgh's plan was meeting 
with disaster, the Earl of Essex was in Plymouth preparing 
to leave on his Islands Voyage. On August 12, 1597, Essex 
wrote a letter to the Queen in which he commented on sev-
eral matters, including the state of affairs in Ireland. 
Unaware of Lord Burgh's·recent difficulties, Essex stated: 
••• as for Ireland (than.'l{s be to God) your Majesty's 
affairs do ever~ day mend; the last Deputy [Sir 
William Russell ended well and this [Lord Burgh] 
begins well. I your Majesty's garrisons towards 
Ulster of the Newry, Dundalk, the Blackwater and 
Armagh be kept strong and Sir Conyers Clifford 
build up Ballyshannon and by that means free Con-
naught from the incursions of 'l'irconnel, you 
shall keep these countries [the Pale and south 
Ireland] that have ever yielded you profit and 
remained in obedience: and whensoever you shall 
be at leisure to attempt the utter extirpation 
of the traitor Tyrone and his Sept by landing on 
his back at Loughfoile and fortifying and plant-
ing garrisons along the river Liffer, as at the 
?Ibid., 358. 
8Ibid., 373-77• 
9Ibid., 377. 
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Castle of Liffer and Derrie, it will be an 
easy work.10 
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Thus as early as August 1597 Essex, while not yet remotely 
connected with Ireland, demonstrated that he understood 
the strategy necessary to subdue that island, and in par-
ticular the decisive importance of the Lough Foyle expedi-
ti on. 
The emphasis on the Lough Foyle expedition increased 
throughout the next two years and is evident in almost all 
the strategic recommendations for subduing Ulster. In 
July 1598, the Earl of Ormonde, Lord Lieutenant General 
of the forces in Ireland, and leader of the allied Protes-
tant Irish, recommended that 1,200 foot and 100 horse be 
sent to Lough Foyle. 11 In reply Queen Elizabeth and the 
Privy Council, who usually sought to cut down any troop 
request because of the expense, voluntarily increased the 
proposed expedition to 2,000 foot and 100 horse, with pro-
visions for six months. 12 However, before this expedition 
commenced Sir Henry Bagenel suffered his disastrous defeat 
in August 1598 and all of Ireland seemed in danger of fall-
ing to T;>rrone. Once again the Lough Foyle project was 
shelved as the troops and supplies intended for that oper-
ation were diverted to Dublin in order to shore up the 
10 B. M., Hulton MSS., 150. 
11c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 11. 
12Ibid., 202. 
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defenses of the Pale. 1 3 Preparation for the Lough Foyle 
expedition were so advanced in 1598 that the Earl of Or-
monde feared that news of Bagenel's defeat would not 
·reach England in time to countermand the order to sail. 14 
In December 1598, Sir Geoffery Fenton, Commissioner 
for the Affairs of Ulste~ and Connaught, wrote to Sir 
Robert Cecil, emphasizing the necessity of occupying Lough 
Foyle with at least 2,100 men. 15 And in January 1599, 
Captain Thomas Reade, an experienced company commander in 
Ireland, upon hearing of Essex's appointment as Lord 
Deputy, wrote an analysis of the Irish situation for the 
Earl. The strategy he recommended wa.s to occupy Bally-
shannon, Lough Foyle and the Blackwater area, and to 
devastate Tyrone's country in a series of coordinated 
attacks from three directions. Captain Reade further 
recommended that Essex ought to conduct the Ulster opera-
tion until October 1599, and then withdraw to the south, 
thereafter conducting a winter campaign in Leinster, when 
the Irish would be at their weakest.16 The only change 
which Essex recommended in the above strategy was to in-
crease the proposed garrison at Lough Foyle to 4,000 foot 
l3Ibid., 239. 
l'+Ibid., 243. 
l5Ibid., 426. 
16Ibid., 450-51. 
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and 100 horse. 17 Essex also planned to accompany the occu-
pation of Lou~h Foyle by a direct overland thrust into the 
center of Ulster, planting garrisons in Tyrone's country. 
Any other course of action was, by agreement of Essex, 
the Queen and the Privy Council, "but waste and consump-
tion.1118 Tyrone was the center of resistance; once he 
was crushed the rest of the island could be easily subd.ued. 
The strategy which Essex and succeeding deputies should 
follow was generally recognized and agreed upon by all 
the principal personalities concerned with the project. 
However, the Lough Foyle landing and a coordinated 
overland invasion was a particularly difficult strategy 
for a sixteenth-century English army, and could be easily 
upset if any one element of .the operation failed. As we 
have seen, English defeats on the overland routes had 
ruined the strategic plan before the Lough Foyle expedi-
tion was even undertaken. Even if the enemy caused no 
interference, the overall strategy hinged on two crucial 
prerequisites, shipping and horses. The Lough Foyle oper-
ation depended on the availability of shipping to trans-
port men, horses and supplies for six months. While 
England had a respectable navy and merchant marine, gath-
ering and coordinating this fleet for specific projects 
was a colossal undertaking. The overland expeditions, 
17c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 19. 
18Ibid., 106. 
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particularly with a large army, required numerous horse to 
transport the supplies that the army must take to sustain 
itself, Captain Reade, in his advice to Essex in January 
1599, made a special note of the necessity of having "very 
many" of the powerful carriage horses to pull the supply 
carts across the rugged ijlster terrain. 19 
Since the strategy Essex would use was practically a 
foregone conclusion by the time of his appointment on 
January 3, 1599, the new Lord Lieutenant had as his prin-
cipal task the gathering of men and material to implement 
the strategy. Essex therefore ·spent the next three months 
in England supervising the assembly and transporting of 
ships, men, horses and supplies; and it is this important 
effort which we shall now consider. 
By 1599 the Earl of Essex was probably the most ex-
perienced man in England when it came to organizing and 
leading an overseas campaign. In 1585 he had begun his 
military career by recruiting and equipping 700 gentleman 
and 1585 common soldiers for the Queen's Netherlands cam-
paign,20 which lasted two years. In 1592 he played a 
prominent part in the English expedition which raided 
Portugal and threatened Lisbon. 21 Previously in 1591, he 
19 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 451. 
20Lacey, Essex, 35. 
21Ibid., 64-70. 
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had organized and led an English force of 4,000 men into 
France to assis·t Henry IV against the Spanish. 22 Five 
years later, in 1596, Essex had achieved his greatest 
triumph in organizing and leading the expedition which had 
sacked Cadiz. After the Cadiz experience Essex wrote a 
paper in which he called.for major reforms in the English 
military system. Instead of continuing a large, ineffi-
cient militia to conduct campaigns, he asserted that Eng-
land should create a small, efficient standing army of 
6,000 men, organized on a regimental system. 
In 1597, Essex had attempted to implement his ideas 
in preparing the expedition to the Azores Islands. The 
result, according to C. G. Cruickshank, the foremost au-
thority on the Elizabethan military establishment, was 
that Essex's army for the Islands expedition "formed prob-
ably the most efficient force to leave England in Eliza-
beth's reign. 1123 It is in the context of Essex's military 
experience and proven organizational ability that we should 
view the problems and conflicts which arose as Essex made 
his preparations for the Irish expedition. 
Essex's first area of concern was the composition of 
his army. Regarding the force which he had at his dispo-
sal, his contemporaries were lavish in their. praise. Lord 
Chamberlain Hi.msdon articulated the national sentiment 
22Ibid., 82-89. 
23cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 204. 
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when he subsequently stated that with the Army Essex had, 
he should have been able to march through Spain itself, 24 
while later historians have echoed similar judgments. 
(For a more extensive judgment see the comments in the 
Introduction.) From the writings of contemporary obser-
vers and historians the reader may be tempted to picture 
Essex gathering a powerful and cohesive army of 16,000 
foot and 1,300 horse in England, and leading them over to 
Ireland to deal with Tyrone. The facts of his Army's com-
position, however, are not nearly so impressive. 
On December 8, 1599, while Essex's ultimate appoint-
ment was still in doubt, Sir John Chamberlain, a member 
of the Privy Council, wrote to the Crown's representative 
in the Low Countries concerning the estimated composition 
of the army intended for Ireland. The number of troops 
was set at about 14,000, an estimate confirmed two days 
later by Robert Cecil, but that number was to include those 
troops already in Ireland! 25 A more specific breakdown 
was given by Chamberlain on January 3, 1599, when he wrote 
that Essex's force was to consist of "500 or 600 horse" and 
"not more than 2,000 from here (England), 2,000 from the 
Low Countries, and 10,000 are said to be there already. 1126 
24Anthony Bacon, The Earl of Essex's Vindication of 
of the War wi_!;h Snain (London, 1?29), 60. 
25c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 129. 
26Ib'd 
...;.2:,_. ' 147 • 
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The Essex force, therefore, was not to be a whole new army, 
but a combination of soldiers already in Ireland, 2,000 
raw levies from England, "strengthened with the old sol-
diers of the Low Countries. 1127 By February 25, 1599 Essex 
succeeded in having the army increased to 1300 horse, or-
ganized into 26 bands, a~d 16,000 foot organized into 160 
companies, by persuading the Queen to levy about 2,000 
more men from England. 28 
The bulk of Essex's "great army" consisted of 10,000 
troops who were in Ireland by January 3, 1599. Of this 
army, officials in Ireland wrote back of its dilapidated 
state caused by the corruption of the company captains. 
The Earl of Ormonde wrote in October 1598 that the cap-
tains, claiming that they had received little money, had 
only paid their men two months of their pay in the last 
eight months, and had not supplied "hose or shoes, or al-
most any apparal" for the winter. 29 Furthermore, the cap-
tains had replaced many of their English soldiers with 
Irishmen, who served for less pay, or had discharged men 
altogether, but were still collecting money as though they 
had full companies.30 
When word of the defeat at Yellow Ford reached England, 
27 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 389. 
28Ibid., 483. 
29Ibid., 334. 
30ibid., 63, 138. 
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the (t_ueen had immediately attempted to bolster the Army's 
strength. The force scheduled for the Lough Foyle opera-
tion was diverted to the Pale, while on August 26 a new 
levy of l,?OO men was ordered. The assemblin~ of this 
force of levies caused numerous problems since many men 
deserted,3l and 400 Londoners drafted for Ireland mutinied 
on the road to Chester.32 Eventually, Sir Richard Bing-
ham managed to get 700 men to Ireland by the end of Octo-
ber, but they were in a mutinous mood.33 On October 28 a 
further levy of 2,000 men was ordered, and all these 
troops, divided into three contingents, reached Cork, Kin-
sale and Waterford by December 9, 1598.34 
At the end of 1598 Sir Robert Cecil wrote some "Ob-
servations" on the condition of Ireland and noted the cor-
ruption of captains, and emphasized the need for a general 
reform of the demoralized army.35 The bulk of Essex's 
army, therefore, consisted of men who had already been 
defeated in the field by Tyrone, who were cheated of money 
and supplies by their captains, and whose main concern was 
to avoid starving to death in the winter at hand. 
The second part of the army was originally to consist 
3libid., 276. 
32Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 326. 
""'3 ) C.S.P. Ireland 2 1598-99, 411. 
34Ibid., 399. 
35Ibid., 444. 
of not more than 2000 levies from England; however, the 
number of levies was increased to about 4000 by the end 
of March.36 These levies were of the usual reluctant 
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character, despite the fact that Essex applied enough 
pressure on the officials to insure that the troops were 
all present and well supplied. On December 10, an advance 
guard of 1000 men under Sir Arthur Savage was designated 
to go to Ireland. Sir Robert Cecil wrote to Sir Conyers 
Clifford of Connaught that this force was "sent you before 
my Lord of Essex came, ••• to put you into some life ••• 
whereby you may know that you are not neglected."37 Un-
fortunately, the process of assembly, preparation and em-
barkation was so cumbersome, that it was not until Janu-
ary 31 that this first small contingent reached Dublin.38 
As for the remaining 3000 levies, Essex 1 s plans stip-
ulated: 2600 men, 200 cavalry horse, and "a great number 
of carriage horse" were to assemble and embark at Chester; 
450 men, 100 cavalry horses, and 50 carriage horses were 
to assemble and embark at Milford; and 100 cavalry horses 
were to be sent from Bristol.39 Essex found that the mus-
tering, equipping and transporting of these troops took up 
36c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 147; Falls, Elizabeth's 
Irish Wars, 22?. 
37c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 402. 
3Sibid., 473. 
39A.P.C. XXIX, 527, 531. 
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most of his time for the next few months. On January 5, 
immediately after the final approval of his commission, 
Essex sent the Privy Council a list of all the men and 
support he would need for the Irish expedition and then 
began work on the details. 40 
By the end of Janua~y the plans for the assembly 
4-1 
and embarkation for the troops was drawn up, and on 
February 5 Essex sent very detailed instructions to Cap-
tain John Goite and Captain Robert Davies on how they 
were to proceed to gather the shipping to get the troops 
to Ireland. Goite was to go to Bristol and gather all 
shipping -''especially such as will serve to transport hor-
ses" for the troops which were to leave from that port. 
After that Goite was to travel to all ports from Bristol 
to the Cape of Cornwall and gather whatever shipping was 
available. In the meantime, Captain Davies would have the 
task of supervising the assembly of ships for the main 
force assembling at Chester. If Davies found himself 
short of shipping then Goite would send him what he needed 
from Bristol or Milford.42 
The process of gathering ships proceeded slowly and 
on February 26, 1599 Esse~ and the Privy Council directed 
that the nayor of Barnstable send seventeen ships, known 
40 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 449. 
41A.P.C. XXIX, 527. 
L~2~., 529-31. 
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to be in his port, to Chester immediately to assist the 
shipping of troops. 43 By March 21 shipping was fairly 
well assembled to take the bulk of the troops, although 
the horses and the last contingent of 800 men still did 
not have sufficient shipping to allow them to accompany 
Essex. 44 
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The difficulties in the gathering of shipping was 
equalled by the problems of levying men and getting them 
to the port of embarkation. The slowness of the communi-
cations systems, and the difficulties of communicating 
only by letters caused maddening delays. On November 29, 
1598 the Privy Council sent a notice of levy for 400 men 
to the Archbishop of York, and the letter did not reach 
the north country until January 28, 1599! 45 Yet on Febru-
ary 9, the Earl of Stanhope wrote to Essex stating that 
specific instructions had not yet been received; among 
other things, the officials in York wished to know whether 
they should arm the men in York, or send them to Chester 
with the money to buy arms there. In any case they insis-
ted that no further progress could be made until the other 
instructions from the Privy Council had arrived. 46 
On February 2 the Sheriff of Lancashire received the 
4 3Ibid., 615. 
44Ibid., 700. 
4 5r/lC"Q s 1 · b l.:.h., • a. 1 s ur;r , 
46Ibid., 67. 
vol. 9, 46. 
the Queen's letter of January 16 levying 200 men "to go 
into Ireland accordine; to direction to be received; 1147 
the directions, however, were not as yet received and 
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therefore the Sheriffs and Justices of Lancashire repor-
ted, "we cannot proceed in the work for want of your 
directions. 1148 Even when instructions were received and 
understood the problenB continued. Sir John Gocke in 
London was ordered to deliver 100 men to Halifax for 
shipment to Ireland, and to send their equipment by carts 
to West Chester. On February 16 Sir John wrote to Sir 
Robert Cecil to explain the delay by saying he could not 
hire carts because it was seed-time, and the owners re-
fused to rent them out. Sir John asked that Sir Robert 
Cecil obtain a warrant so that he could commandeer as many 
carts as were needed. 49 
Most obstacles were eventually overcome and the main 
contingent of 2600 levies was assembled at Chester by the 
middle of Harch.50 Upon inspection by the f1ayor of Chester 
and Sir Arthur Chichester it was found that all the troops 
were well prepared "except eleven of the men raised in Nor-
folk, whose coats were coarse, who wanted altogether both 
hose and shoes, and of whom some had no sword. 11 51 All but 
47rbid., 69. 
48Ibid. 
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23 of these men were safely embarked for Dublin on March 
21 and 22, a remarkable performance compared to previous 
efforts to ship levies to Ireland. 
While the new recruits were comparatively ·well armed 
and well equipped, they still possessed all the unfortun-
ate characteristics of raw levies serving in Ireland for 
the first time~ Essex therefore was relying on the third 
part of his army, the Low Country contingent, to provide 
the resolution and experience which the other elements 
lacked. In short, the Low Country contingent was to be 
the backbone of the army. Essex's plan, as approved by 
the Queen, was to have 2000 new levies in England organ-
ized into companies v.,ri th their officers, and sent as whole 
units to the Lowlands. In exchange, 2000 English veterans 
serving in the Lowlands, also organized into companies 
along with their own officers, would be transferred dir-
ectly to Ireland to serve as the hard core of Essex's 
army.52 
The reaction of the States General of Holland to 
Essex's plan was immediate and negative. Prince Maurice 
of Nassau, upon hearing of the plan, wrote to the Earl of 
Essex on December 26, 1598, voicing his displeasure at the 
proposal. Prince Maurice pointed out that his country had 
spent much effort in training the English soldiers in the 
methods of service used in Holland and in bringing the 
52 Ibid., 65. 
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4000-man contingent to the point where it was the "chief 
reliance" of the Dutch army. Now, if Essex's ·plan were 
implemented, and if half of their veterans were replaced 
by "novices, 11 the Dutch would have to completely rebuild 
this contingent for the coming spring campaign season.53 
In addition to Princ.e Maurice's obj ec ti on, the chief 
opponent of the Essex plan was Sir Francis Vere, an Eng-
lish nobleman who had brought a regiment to serve in Hol-
land. Vere had first come to prominence through Essex's 
patronage and assistance on the Cadiz expedition in 1596.54 
After that expedition, when Sir Walter Raleigh and Lord· 
Admiral Howard had sought to denigrate Essex's perform-
ance, Vere presented a forceful and incontestable justi-
fication of the conduct of Essex in the presence of Eliza-
beth and the Court.55 Thereafter Sir Francis Vere, osten-
sibly a great friend of Essex, went to the Netherlands 
war where he made a great reputation for himself, and es-
tablished a promising future in the service of States 
General. 
By January 1599 the States General had appointed 
Vere to be general of all English in the field, while his 
personal sentiment seemed to be "wholly addicted unto the 
States and their proceedings. 11 56 To retain his position, 
53rbid., 502. 
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according to one observer, Sir Francis Vere was willing to 
betray "your Majesty's special service into Ireland, the 
Council's determination in England, and ny Lord of Essex's 
intended journey. 11 57 In any case it was both in the 
States General's interest and in Sir Francis Vere's inter-
est to maintain the best.army possible in Holland, despite 
the Queen's directives showing the need for trained troops 
to go with Essex to Ireland. 
When news of Essex's appointment as Lord Deputy and 
his intended journey to Ireland reached Holland, Sir Henry 
Docwra, a commander of the English army in Holland, immedi-
ately wrote to Essex to offer his services.58 Sir Henry 
was an antagonist of Sir Francis Vere, with whom he had 
often quarreled, and he now soug~_t to join Essex's expedi-
tion to be a-way from Vere.59 Since Essex was fully pre-
occupied in organizing the new levies in England and be-
cause Sir Henry Docwra was an experienced and willing 
solicitor, Essex placed Docwra in charge of the project 
of supervising the transfer of troops between Holland and 
England. As a result, from January to March 1599 Sir Hen-
ry Docwra fought a running battle with Sir Francis Vere 
and the States General of Holland in an effort to try to 
have Essex's plan implemented. Although Vere and States 
57Ibid., 124. 
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General could not ignore Elizabeth's orders altogether, 
they did contrive to insure that the transfer would be 
of maximum benefit to Vere's forces. 
Elizabeth had appointed Sir Thomas Yuiollys to lead 
the 20 companies of new levies from :England to Holland, 
and on January 22 he arr:Lved at Flushing with his contin-
gent of 2000 men. 6° From then until February 9 Sir Thom-
as Yuiollys tried in vain to have the transfer of troops 
proceed as Essex had instructed; finally in despair, 
Knollys wrote to Essex in order to appraise him of the 
status of the Low Country contingent. To make up the 
2000 men which had been promised to Essex, Sir Francis 
Vere had appointed only "broken companies, 11 and his offi-
cers chose only the 11 worst men and worst furnished that 
were in the companies. 11 This lot of rejects was sent to 
Zeeland for shipment, "without a captain or any other 
officer to conduct them to Ireland. 1161 
The commanding officer in The Netherlands, Sir Fran-
cis Vere, refused to send one man from his own well 
trained regiment.E2 On the other hand, the troops from 
England who had arrived in company organizations were 
disbanded and distributed to Vere's officers, while Sir 
Francis Vere personally assigned 400 of the new men to his 
6Qr"SC r< ] • b 
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own regiment to bring it up to strength. All the officers 
from England, with the exception o.f Sir Thomas Knollys 
himself, were summarily dismissed by Vere. 63 In this 
position the newly unemployed officers volunteered for 
service with Essex in Ireland. 64 
The problems brought on by such a cumbersome communi-
cation and administrative system are strikingly illustrated 
in Essex's attempt to implement the plan for the use of 
Low Country troops. In an age when a simple telephone 
call can do nuch to solve a crisis or eliminate confusion 
it is perhaps difficult for us to appreciate the admirii-
stra ti ve handicap under which Tudor officials worked, in 
that they had to disseminate all instructions and solve 
all problems through the tedious processes of sending let-
ters or messengers across land and water. 
The most serious administrative handicap was that 
reaction time was agonizingly slow. If orders sent 
out by the Privy Council were lost or misinterpreted, or 
if the recipients chose to violate the orders, it would be 
weeks, and even months, before official inquiries or the 
personal representatives of the Privy Council could sort 
out the difficulties and determine who was responsible 
for not complying with instructions. In preparing for 
the Irish campaign of 1599, and in dealing with Sir 
63Ibid., 64-65. 
6Li-Ibid. , ix. 
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Francis Vere and the States General of Holland, Essex had 
little or no reaction time. 
Essex's appointment as Lord Deputy was not made cer-
tain until January 3, 1599, and since the situation in 
Ireland was critical it was expected that Essex should 
depart as soon as possible. Essex had apparently hoped 
to be in Ireland by February, but problems in organizing 
the expedition forced him to delay his intended departure 
date until March. 65 By February 15, the Queen's Secretary 
in Ireland was ·writing to Sir Robert Cecil that it was 
11 high time" Essex were in Ireland to control the deterior-
ating situation. 66 Despite the pressure, Essex remained 
in England until April 5, supervising the setting up of 
supplies and the embarkation of his raw levies, the main 
contingent of which finally sailed on March 25. It is in 
the context of this three-month period--from January 3 to 
April 5--that Essex's dealings with the Low Country con-
tingent must be viewed. 
In early January, Essex had set out confirmation of 
Sir Henry Docwra's appointment, along with instructions 
for handling the Low Country troops. On January 12, Cap-
tain R. Morison, a Privy Council observer sent over to 
· Holland in December 1598, wrote to Essex about the coop-
erative attitude of the States General, who were readying 
65 C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 151. 
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their companies for transfer to Ireland as instructed. 67 
On the same date, Docwra wrote to Essex, acknowledging 
receipt of the Earl's letter, and assuring Essex that his 
instructions were being followed. He added, however, that 
Essex might not receive the caliber of soldiers which he 
was expecting from Sir Fr.ancis Vere. Essex immediately 
wrote back that if men or equipment were lacking, Docwra 
was to make up the deficiencies by taking men and equip-
ment from Sir 1l'homas Knollys' contingent of new levies 
which was beincs sent to Vere. 68 
The first really ominous note did not appear until 
Sir Thomas Knollys arrived at Flushing, the J.Jowland port 
of embarkation, on January 22. Sir Thomas wrote back 
that he found all things "unready" at the port of embarka-
tion. 69 But on January 23, Docwra wro·te to Essex and in-
dicated that there might be some problems; however, he 
did not wish to discuss "the Particulars of them until" he 
had "waded further in the business." Docwra further con-
eluded by stating that he was carefully following the in-
structions of Essex and that the Earl would most certainly 
be satisfied with his service.70 
On January 25, Sir William Brown wrote to Essex and 
6711ss. Salisbury, vol. 9, 22-23. 
68Ibid. , 42. 
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mentioned that Sir Francis Vere was sending him men from 
"broken companies" without officers, but that Sir Henry 
Doc-...yra had written to Sir :F'rancis Vere about the prob-
lem. 71 On the same day Sir Henry Docwra also wrote to 
Essex, telling him that he had arrived at the port of em-
barkation, and after observing defects in the number of 
rnen and equipment he was in the process of making up the 
deficiencies as Essex had instructed. Docwra concluded 
that he and the troops were preparing to sail from Holland 
with the first good wind, which they expected to be about 
January 31. Docwra's last letter from Holland was writ-
ten on February 6, in which he stated that he expected to 
depart any day, and that he was still having difficulties 
making up the deficiencies from Sir Francis Vere.72 
The full extent of the situation was not made known 
to Essex until Sir Thomas Knollys wrote to Essex on Feb-
ruary 9, reporting the full scope of Vere's betrayal in no 
uncertain terms.73 On the same day, three captains, Nich-
olas Saunders, George Laycester, and Francis Maddisen, 
"'~ 
officers under Knollys, also wrote to Essex confirming the 
true state of the Low Country cont:ingent.74 Essex received these 
reports in the middle of February, and had the Privy 
7libid., 40. 
72Ibid., 59. 
?3Ibid., 64-65. 
74 Ibid., 67. 
Council send out a scathing letter to Sir Francis Vere 
insisting that he comply with instructions.75 The Privy 
Council's letter did not arrive at The Hague until early 
March, by which time it was far too late, since Docwra, 
catching a good wind, had sailed for ~ngland with the 
forces he had in hand, aqd had arrived in Ireland on Feb-
ruary 28, 1599.76 
When Sir Thomas Knollys questioned Sir Francis Vere 
about the problems of the Low Country contingent, Sir 
Francis remained outwardly friendly, while placing the 
blame on Count Maurice of Nassau.77 The Count, in turn, 
"pleadeth ignorance," maintaining that "he never under-
stood, either by the Queen's letters or the lords of the 
Council of England that there was any intent ever speci-
fied whereby whole companies should be drawn from hence, 
but only in exchange of 2000 men that should be supplied 
out of England. 11 78 Since it would be impolitic to call 
Count Maurice a liar, Essex had no alternative but to ac-
cept the fait accompli presented to him by Sir Francis 
Vere in the name of Count Maurice. 
Essex had expected a well-armed, well-trained corps 
of veterans, organized into company units under officers 
75A.P.C. XXIX, 621. 
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who had served with their companies for considerable time. 
Instead he received a leaderless collection of castoffs 
who immediately placed a burden on the supply system to 
make up their deficiencies in equipment.79 If Essex had 
been able to go to the Low Countries personally, such a 
deception could not have _occurred. But Essex had too many 
tasks in England, and had to rely on his subordinates·, 
the good faith of Sir Francis Vere and Count Maurice, and 
the communications and administrative channels of the 
period. 
Aside from the garrisons in Ireland and the Low Coun-
tries, the only other source of trained men in England 
were the Berwick bands and Scottish bands. These troops, 
about 1100 in number, were stationed principally at Ber-
wick on the Scottish border, in order to protect the nor-
thern English counties from any Scottish incursions. 80 
Essex had requested that Queen Elizabeth allmv him to 
draft these well-trained men from Berwick, and send newly 
drafted levies to take their place, on a pattern similar 
to that of the Low Country troops. Yet C.~ueen Elizabeth, 
who had already approved the same basic plan regarding 
2000 troops in the Low Countries, objected to this new 
proposal of switching levies with veterans, stating that 
the transfers, ''being a double work must needs be a double 
79Ibid. , 36. 
BOibid., 43. 
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charge." The apparent reason for her sudden opposition 
to such a sound course of action was that by January 1599, 
when Sssex had made this Berwick request, the staggering 
cost of the expedition was becoming obvious, and Blizabeth 
was unwilling to pay for any other "unnecessary" moving 
of troops. 81 
Even if Elizabeth had approved the Berwick plan, it 
may well have failed, since the Berwick band members, 
like most English soldiers, were totally unenthusiastic 
about the prospect of service in Ireland. When news of 
Essex's proposal reached Berwick, an official wrote to 
Sir Robert Cecil as follows: 
We have been at great charges of training and 
furnishing them, and they were promised when cho-
sen that they should never be pressed to any 
foreign service. I assure you there is not one 
man of them but, before he will go to Ireland, 
will give his captain ±,20, ±i30, or Y+O to put 
another in his room. [Berwick band members 
were generally the sons of the richest farmers 
and freeholders, and could well afford such a 
sum.J What a charge and discontentment that 
woulu breed here you can well conceive. I hope 
you will make a stay if any such matter be at-
tempted; or that if companies must go from this 
shire to Ireland, such men as are fittest may 
be pressed, but our trained bands may be kept 
for the purpose for which they were first chosen. 82 
The officials need not have worried since Elizabeth had 
already disapproved the plan, but the sentiment expressed 
by the above written note is indicative of the provin-
cialism, lack of national allegiance, and general fear of 
81Ibid., 10. 
82Ibid. , 43. 
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Irish service prevalent in England at this time. 
A final element in Essex's army, unique to the Irish 
wars, was the presence of many "gentlemen volunteers." 
The Lord Lieutenant's great reputation among the martial-
oriented nobility of England, resulted in many young no-
blemen, eager for advent~re, to apply for positions in 
his army. Essex could not find places of importance for 
all the applicants, and so a group of about fifty young 
gentlemen foliowed along in his personal retinue, or occa-
sionally accompanied some of Essex's subordinate comman-
ders.83 These enthusiastic volunteers, by their gallant, 
and sometimes reckless example, provided a well-needed 
spark to the generally uninspired disposition of the Army 
rank and file. 
The overall situation of the Army in Ireland was not 
encouraging. In January 1599, the Earl of Ormonde had 
written to the queen that as a result of forgery in con-
nection with the musters by the Captains, "the strength 
certified is far greater than they are in deed. 084 Or-
monde's charge was confirmed by Sir Geoffrey Fenton, who, 
as "Surveyor of the Queen's possessions in Ireland," con-
ducted a careful survey of the entire Army strength dur-
ing the months of February and March 1599. The returns 
were completed on March 7, 1599 and Sir Geoffrey reported 
83 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 505. 
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that of 14,000 men who were supposed to be in Ireland by 
March 1, 1599, only 10,000 were present, concluding that 
Her Majesty was being defrauded "to pay shadows and not 
men. 1185 Essex had insured that the new levies and the Low 
Country contin~ents were close to full strength; therefore, 
the 4000-man shortage came almost entirely out of the 
10,000 men "already there" at the time of Essex's appoint-
ment, an indication of how greatly the rolls were falsi-
fied in Ireland. 
Sir Geoffrey Fenton sent his report to Sir Robert 
Cecil on March 13, 1599, 86 hoping that this report would 
reach Essex in time to arrange to make up the deficiency 
before he left England. However the report did not ar-
rive before the end of March, by which time Essex had al-
ready started his journey to the port of Chester. And by 
the time Essex saw the report, it was too late for him to 
do any more than notify the Privy Council of the Army's 
state, which he did. On March 14 when confirmation of 
this was made, Captain Thomas Reade wrote to Sir Robert 
Cecil that the 2000 men who came out of the Low Countries 
"do much decay, for there are. many of them sick, and they 
do die apace." He concluded that Essex would be "much 
deceived" of the strength of the army of Ireland, when he 
B5Ibid. , 488. 
86Ibid., 489. 
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~ mustered it. 87 
,, 
( The other tasks which kept Essex occupied from early 
r l January to late March were the problems involved in lay-
ing the logistical groundwork for his campaign. In Tudor 
England there was no established governmental machinery to 
gather an army, send it ~verseas and keep it supplied. 
After the county officials had gathered their quota of 
men ~nd had sent them off, responsibility for the men and 
all the other acoutrements which made up an expedition 
fell directly upon the ?rivy Council and the general in 
charge. In practice the general personally had to coor-
dinate and insure the availability of the items which 
would be needed on his campaign, particularly, money, 
shipping, horses and supplies. 
One of the critical problems faced by Essex was the 
financing of his campaign. The late sixteenth century 
was a time of rising national states and rising inflation 
which culminated in a great depression in 1622. In 1597 
the purchasing power of the p.verage weekly wage fell to a 
point lower than at any time between the thirteenth cen-
tury and the present day. At the same time, from 1591 to 
1603, the government had to levy four times as much taxa-
tion as had been levied in the previous thirty-four years 
of Elizabeth's reign. 88 Although Elizabeth was extremely 
87Ibid., 492. 
88Joel Hurstfield, Elizabeth I and the Unity of 
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frugal in her expenditures, the cost of running the govern-
ment in a normal year was up to ~300,000 by the last de-
cade of the sixteenth century. With Tyrone's rebellion 
overall cost skyrocketed from 1595 onward. In the year 
and a half before Essex arrived the cost of the Army in 
Ireland amounted to ~250,963, while the cost of Essex's 
campaign was set at ~277,782 in February 1599. 89 
In order to .finance the coming campaign the Queen 
levied subsidies, and even borrowed ~20,000 .from the city 
of London. By December 1598, in dire need of money, the 
Queen sought to borrow another ~150,000 from the merchants 
and aldermen of London, offering to mortgage ±i5,000 of her 
land, and the customs duties of the city for repayment.90 
The citizens were annoyed at this forced loan, and in Jan-
uary the Queen let it drop after ~100,000 had been paid 
in.91 
Throughout his preparation and campaign Essex was 
constantly at odds with the Queen and the rest of the 
Privy Council over funds. Once the contracts and salaries 
had been provided for, the main point of controversy was 
over how much money Essex would be allowed to take with 
him .for "extraordinary expenditures," which included cost 
En~land (London, 1960), 184; E. A. Abbott, Bacon and Eliza-
beth (London, 1877), 34. 
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of trnnsportation by sea and land for men, horses, muni-
tions, and victuals. 92 11 Extraordinaries'' would also in-
elude the cost of maintaining a headquarters and paying 
for any emergency necessities. 1rhe Council, rightly not-
ing that there was "no superfluity in England, 11 93 agreed 
to give Essex ±i5,000. The Earl on the other hand pointed 
out that the previous administration in Ireland, which had 
far fewer troops, had spent over ~6,000 on extraordinar-
ies. But the Council remained adamant and re.fused to in-
crease the ±i5,000 allowance.94 
At the same time, because of the generally known cor-
ruption in Ireland, particularly on the part of the Irish 
Treasurer at Wars, Sir Henry Wallop,95 Essex sought to 
sever his accounts from the administration which had gone 
before, by having his accounts start afresh as of March 1, 
1599. When Sir Geoffrey Fenton heard of this plan he 
wrote to Robert Cecil, stating that while he admired Es-
sex's intention to eliminate corruption and start anew, 
the Cro1·m owed much back pay both to the army and the 
towns which could not be written off without "several 
clamors" being raised by those ·who were owed money. 96 
92c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 66. 
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Essex's efforts to get this situation rectified were fruit-
less and as late as April the .Pr.ivy Council refused to pay 
any back debts to the soldiers until Sir Henry ·~1allop' s 
records were sent over and examined. Unable to receive 
satisfaction on the state of financial affairs in Ire-
land Essex prevailed upo11 the Queen to dismiss Sir Henry 
Wallop in March, and to appoint Sir George Carey to the 
post of Treasurer in Ireland. 1.rhe l'.Ti V-.f COU..."1.Cil' however' 
still refused to pay any back debts to the army until it 
had examined all of Wallop's records,97 a process which 
would take months to complete. 
Arranging for victuals and clothing was also an imme-
diate concern of Essex. On January 5 he sent p:roposals to 
the Privy Council to have Commissary officers sent to 
Bristol, Milford and Chester in order to look after the 
gathering of levies and supplies.98 On January 12 he and 
the Privy Council signed a contract for the shipping and 
delivery of victuals with a London merchant, John Jolls, 
who agreed to deliver the supplies to the Irish ports of 
Dublin, Newry and Cork.99 After contracting for victuals 
Essex next sought to contract for the supply of winter and 
summer uniforms which the army would desperately need. On 
January 16 it was resolved to contract with two pro.r.iinent 
9Sibid., 
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merchants of London, Ury Babington and Robert Bromley, for 
the supply of uniforms. The total sum, amounting to 
Y+-5,000 was to be given to the new Irish Treasurer at 
Wars, Sir George Carey, who in turn would pay the mer-
chants when the uni.forms were delivered.lOO 
The task of trying ~o gather men, horses, money, 
ships and supplies was a tedious and involved process 
which took the months of January and February, and still 
left many problems unresolved. On March 1, 1599, John 
Chamberlain wrote: 
The Earl of Essex is crazed either in mind or body. 
New difficulties daily arise about his commission, 
about the tine of his abode, his entertainment, 
and the disposing of offices, and he is so discon- 101 tented as sometimes to question whether he will go. · 
In addition to the problefls in England, Essex had by 
this time received ominous reports about the state of af-
fairs in Ire1and. 102 To resolve these problems which 
were delaying his Army's departure to Ireland and jeopar-
dizing his expedition, Essex called an emergency meeting 
of the Privy Council at his house on March 8, 1599. Out 
of the discussions which took place in this meeting one 
may gather a clear picture both of the critical problems 
still facing Essex after two months of preparation, and 
also of an uncooperative and irresolute attitude on the 
1000 , ... I) • 0. • Domestic, 1597-1601, 151 • 
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part of the Privy Council. 
As the meeting of March 8 opened, the first point 
made by Essex was that not enough money had been appropri-
ated to pay for the maintenance of the army in Ireland. 
f The Privy Council however deferred any motion to appropri-
~ ate more money until they had received the next set of 
certificates from Ireland, enu.i'Ilerating the state of sup-
plies and finances. Essex next brought out the fact that 
the original victualing contract was only to sustain an 
army of 10,000. His force was expected to number 17,300 
and required a great increase in foodstui'fs. Here the 
Council agreed to license merchants to transport more vic-
tuals to points designated by Essex. 
Essex had received word about the shortage of uni-
forms in Ireland. He now asserted that half the troops in 
Ireland had not received uniforms, although the two mer-
chants, Babington and Bramley, allegedly had already de-
livered 10,000 uniforms. The Council informed Essex that 
2,000 uniforms had been delayed on the way and that 1,000 
more were due to be sent. They also assured Essex that 
10,000 more summer uniforms would be delivered by June 10. 
The Earl further inquired as to how the Council proposed 
to make good the deficiency in troops from the Low Coun-
try contingent. The Council assured Essex that they would 
request that the Queen raise men .from Kent, Surrey, Sussex 
and London. After thatt however, Sssex would be respon-
r 
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The next two items were absolutely crucial to the cam-
pai~n, and concerned the availability of carriage horses 
and shipping for the Lough Foyle operation. Regarding 
the carriage horses Esse~ reported that there were few 
available in Ireland. J.i,urthermore, in the poorly tracked 
country/of Ireland and particularly in Ulster, an army 
could not march or live without the big carriage horses 
to pull their transport. The Council authorized Essex to 
raise a further 100 horses, thereby bringing his total 
number of carriage horses authorized to 200, enough to 
pull transport wagons for a-force of 1,000 to 1,500 men, 
but still far below the requirements for an army of l?,OOO. 
Finally, Essex inquired about the want of shipping to 
transport the troops to Lough Foyle. Shipping had been 
authorized in order to get his forces to Ireland, but as 
of March 8 he lacked enough shipping to get all his troops 
and supplies across, let alone to conduct a separate am-
phibious operation to the north of Ireland with 4100 men. 
The Council's reply was that they would defer judgment on 
the issue, and con$ider it further at a later time. In 
such an atmosphere of uncertainty regarding key issues, 
the March 8 meeting ended.l03 
Understandably frustrated, Essex spent the next few 
l03c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 167-68. 
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weeks supervising the last stages of the embarkation pro-
ceedine;s for his 3000 levies at Chester and Milford. On 
March 27 he set forward from Landon to Chester, as crowds 
thronged the streets to see him ofr,104 while a measure 
of the popular devotion and expectation was expressed j_n 
William Shakespeare's pla.y, Henry V, which opened soon 
after Essex's departure: 
Were now the general of our gracious empress 
As in good time he may -- from Ireland coming 
Bringing rebellion broached on his sword 
How many would the peaceful city quit 
To welcome him.105 
- And from Ireland, the Justice of Munster, James Goold, 
wrote to Essex and expressed the joy of the English 
Establishment at the prospect of the Lord Lieutenant's 
arrival, and added his hope that Essex's "famous victory 
in mighty Spain shall not be subject to receive blemish 
in miserable Ireland. 11106 
104 Lacey, Essex, 218. 
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CHAPrER V 
THE SOUTHERH CAMPAIGN 
In his own journey to Ireland, Essex experienced an 
ominous indication of the problem in communication with 
. 
which his expedition would have to contend. After leav-
ing London on March 27, Essex journeyed northwest to 
Chester, arriving at the port on April 4. 1 For the next 
several days the sea voyage was delayed by "contrary winds" 
and "mists so great that all the pilots of Christendom 
could not tell how to carry a ship out of the river. 112 
Unable to tolerate further delay, Essex ordered the two 
ships which would carry his party to move out and hug the 
coastline until they reached Beaumaris, on the northwestern 
co?st of wales, from whence it was hoped a more favorable 
wind could be caught. In the meantime Essex and his offi~· 
cers rode over the mountain from Chester to Beaumaris, 
where they met their ships·· on April 11. 3 
The next day Essex sailed for Ireland and arrived at 
a point about eight miles north of Dublin at midnight on 
April 13.4 As the Earl went ashore, the two ships, which 
1 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 2. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., 10. 
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still had their sails "up and full," aJ.most collided. Ac-
cording to Sir George Carey, the collision would have 
sunk the two ships, and.perhaps the campaign as well,. 
since the entire treasure to finance the campaign was 
being carried on the 11 Popinjoy."5 The next day Essex went 
to Dublin, and on the 15~h he took "the sword and sway of 
this unsettled kingdom," after a "grave" sermon preached 
by the Bishop of Meath. 6 Sir Anthony Standon, one of Es-
sex's officers, in describing the magnificence of the 
ceremony, stated: "it passed all the service that I ever 
saw done to any prince·in Christendom. 11 7 Despite the haz-
ards and near catastrophes of the journey, the Earl with 
his inevitable flare for· the spectacular, had made an im-
pressive beginning. 
Despite the confident appearance engendered by the 
majestic ceremonies of his inauguration, Essex was deeply 
troubled by the unsettled state of affairs at home and in 
Ireland. From the time he left the Court on March 27 his 
letters immediately reflected his concern for supplies of 
victuals, apparel, men and money, which apparently were 
still in an uncertain state, despite Essex's many confer-
ences with the PriV'J Council. 8 While at Chester, Essex 
5~s.P. Ireland 2 1599-1600, 12. 
6MSS. Sal~~burl, vol. 9, 134. 
7Ibid., 144. 
8
_c_._S_._P_. __ I_r_e_l_a_n_q,_ 1599-1600, 1, 4-5, 6, 9, 10. 
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had received two dispatches from Ireland which confirmed 
his worst fears about the state of the Army. The first 
( dispatch dealt with the sufferings caused by lack of pro-
f· 
;; 
r 
~· visions, while the second related "idle and miserable 
journeys" the c'om.rnanders in Ireland had recently been 
conducting with the trooP,s, whereby Essex would find many 
of the men "weak and unserviceable 11 when he arrived.9 
Another source of immediate concern to Essex was the 
caliber of his subordinates. A general's success is in 
many ways dependent on the performance of his subordinates, 
and this was particularly true in Elizabethan Ireland. 
Because of the difficulties in travel and communications, 
the Lord Lieutenant could not easily travel to any area of 
crisis, analyze the situation, and give timely guidaDce. 
He needed commanders and representatives in the provinces 
who could make sound decisions, use their initiative, and 
carry through independent actions with a minimum of super-
vision. In this respect Essex was severely handicapped. 
The English officials in Ireland contained no person-
alities of great stature. The Irish Council, who were to 
advise Essex, were a weak-willed and cowed group of indi-
viduals who would repeatedly demonstrate their mediocrity. 
In Munster, the President, Sir Thomas Norreys, had neither 
the means nor the disposition to pursue an active campaign 
9~.' 10. 
r 
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on his own. Additionally, he was suffering from an ill-
ness which would take his life in July 1599. In Connaught, 
Lord Governor Sir Conyers Clifford was an enthusiastic and 
capable politician and administrator, but he had military 
failings which had already led to one setback in Connaught 
and would soon lead to another. Even the E.Brl of Orcronde, 
though a dependable personality, was more concerned with 
protecting his immediate estates in Kilkenny and the Pale, 
and preferred not to venture out of his area. 10 
As for the officers in his army, the Lord Lieutenant 
had many enthusiastic hot bloods, but few men of sor>histi-
cated military background. Prominent individuals, who in 
the past had demonstrated their military ability--Lord 
Mountjoy, Sir Walter Raleigh, Lord Admiral Howard, Sir 
Francis Vere--remained epart from the Irish enterprise 
because of their rivalry with the Lord Lieutenant. 
In Essex's circle, the only persons in whom he had 
confidence were the Earl of Southampton and Sir Christo-
pher Blount, and Essex would experience considerable diffi-
culty in attempting to utilize their services. Southamp-
ton was appointed General of the Horse, a position suited 
to his dynamic personality, but unfortunately he had dis-
pleased C:'~ueen Elizabeth by making her lady-in-waiting, Eli-
zabeth Vernon, pregnant, and then marrying the girl a:-:;ainst 
10c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 258. 
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the ciueen' s wishes. 11 When Elizabeth found out about 
Southampton's appointment she ordered Essex to send him 
home. 12 The Lord Lieutenant, needing this very talented 
officer, avoided this directive of the Queen's, and in 
.fact managed to keep Southampton with him u._11til the end 
of the campai~n, despite.periodic warnings from Elizabeth. 
Regarding Sir Christopher B1ount, Essex had asked the 
Queen to appoint him Marshal of the Army, the second most 
important post in the Army. At first the Privy Council 
wrote back that Elizabeth had refused, whereupon Essex 
complained th<~t he was being sent out "maimed before-
hand. 111 3 The ·~ueen eventually relented in regard to 
Blount's appointment, but refused to make him a member of 
the Irish Council, because as the Privy Council explained, 
"we conceived it rather to be a thing fixed in Her Hajes-
ty's mind ••• thnt she doth not very well approve the gen-
telman's sufficiency to do her service. 1114 This hostile 
attitude on the part of the Queen was undoubtedly prompted 
by the fact that Blount had married Essex's widowed mother 
Lettice, who had incurred the Queen's hatred by taking the 
Earl of Leicester away from Elizabeth. Even after much 
further haggling Blount was not ad:mi tted to the Irish 
11Lacey, Essex, 217. 
i20 (.• P . ....::; . . Ireland, 1599-1600, 62 • 
l3Ibid., 1. 
14Ibid., 29. 
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Council, and was thereby placed in the awkward position of 
commanding officers who were honored with Council member-
ship.15 \./hen Blount was :lncapac.i.:ta.M at the end of August, 
Essex wrote to the Privy Council, "I have with me none 
fit to succeed him, but must myself do his office and 
mine own. 1116 
Equally distressing was the spectacular success 
achieved by Tyrone and his rebels during the months after 
the Yellow Ford, ,and during the time Essex was preparing 
his campaign. Although Tyrone had been unable to follow 
up his victory on the Yellow Ford, due to his deficiencies 
in munitions, the Irish leader had made great progress in 
all parts of Ireland. Ulster had been saved from invasion 
and, except for the towns of Carrickfergus, Newry and 
Carlingford, the province had been abandoned by the Eng-
lish survivors who now cringed in the Pale around Dublin 
expecting Tyrone's new offensive at any time. 17 
In Leinster, Tyrone's allies, the O'Mores, took 
Philipstown and Athy, while one of Tyrone's captains, 
Redmond Burke, seized the Earl of Ormonde's castle of 
Cruminagh on the Shannon River. In Munster, Tyrone had 
set up James Fitzthomas as the new Earl of Desmond, and 
the Geraldine subjects rallied to their new and handsome 
l5Ibid., 5. 
16Ibid., 137. 
l7Silke, Kinsale, 53. 
leader. A number of gentlemen in Munster, principally 
Edmund Fitzgibbon, Lord Mountgarret and Lord Cahir had 
joined the rebel forces. Together they swept away all 
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the New English settlers, including the noted poet Edmund 
Spencer, who had been settled on confiscated Geraldine 
land since the great reb~llion of 1584. By the time of 
Essex's arrival the English held only strongpoints in 
Munster, with Sir George Carew in Mallow, Sir Thomas Nor-
ris at Cork, and the Earl of Ormonde defending Kilkenny 
and Tipperary. 18 
At the same time, Hugh O'Donnell, Tyrone's principal 
ally, kept up an unceasing series of raids in Connaught, 
climaxed by the taking of Ballymote Castle. North of 
Galway the English held only garrisons at Boyle, Tulsk, 
Roscommon and the castle of Sligo, as O'Donnell threatened 
to break the precarious English line of strongpoints and 
open a western passage down to Munster. 19 The total rebel 
strength, according to the Earl of Ormonde and the Irish 
Council, exceeded 20,000 fighting men, distributed as fol-
lows: in Ulster, 8,922; in Leinster, 3,230; in Munster, 
4,555; in Connaught, 3,290. 20 The exactness of the esti-
mates is suspect; however, it does seem to accurately 
18Ibid., 52-54. 
19r~i(~., 53-54. 
20 C.S.P. Ireland, ~599-1600, 14. 
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reflect the relative distribution of Irish forces. With 
the exception of Tyrone's personal army in Ulster most of 
the rebels were indifferently armed, but nonetheless still 
posed a formidable threat. 
For the two weeks fqllowing his arrival Essex con-
sulted with the Irish Council and appraised himself of 
the details of the army's situation. On April 28, having 
arrived at certain conclusions, Essex sent his first de-
tailed report to the Privy Council. This letter, repre-
senting the official position of Essex and the Irish 
Council concerning the state of affairs in Ireland, deci-
sively influenced the course of the entire campaign, and 
therefore deserves detailed consideration. 21 
The principal assertion of Essex and the Irish Coun-
cil was that an invasion of Ulster at this time was pre-
vented by certain insurmountable difficulties. In Ulster 
there was no grass or forage to be had for horses, nor 
would there be any available "till summer be further ad-
vanced." By the same token, the arni.y would have to take 
a great number of "beeves" along with it to have a mobile 
supply of meat. However, the cattle were still weak and 
lean from the winter and, like the horses, would be unable 
to find forage in the northern province. The alternative 
to taking cattle along would be to have the army sustain 
2lcontents of the following letter are taken from 
C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-160Q, 17-20. 
itself entirely with "dry victuals," pulled in carts by 
the huge carriage horses over the poor roads. A survey 
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of carriage horses indicated that there were not even half 
the number present to carry the three-month's supply of 
food which an invading army would require. Essex had 
raised 200 carriage horses in England before he left, but 
had to leave them behind because of insufficient shipping. 
At the time of his writing they had still not arrived in 
Ireland because, as he supposed, "of the contrariety of 
the wind." 
In view of the difficulties with horses and beeves, 
the Irish Council estimated that the Army would not be 
able to move north "before the.midst of June, or the be-
ginning of July next." In the meantime, Essex intended to 
move into Leinster and "prosecute" the rebels there, in 
order to bring back under English control this richest 
part of Ireland. Then after dealing with Leinster the 
Earl intended to go on to Waterford in order to meet with 
Sir Thomas Norreys, the President of Munster, and confer 
with him on the action to be taken in that province. 
Another crucial factor affecting the Ulster strategy 
was the lack of shipping that Essex would need to imple~ 
ment the Lough Foyle expedition, which he and the Privy 
Council had agreed upon. He requested that the Privy 
Council send him "competent shipping to transport thither 
[Lough Foyle] 4,000 foot and 100 horse, with their victuals, 
r 
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munitions and all other necessaries." It would be neces-
sary to transport almost the entire force at once since 
intelligence reports indicated that Tyrone labored "to 
give some impediment to their landing." Since the shipping 
was not now available, the Lough Foyle expedition also 
would have to be held in.abeyance; however, Essex expected 
that the Privy Council would have the shipping ready by 
June. 
Turning from strategy to the immediate problems of 
maintaining the Army, Essex's first concern again focused 
on the lack of carriage horses, the importance of which 
he emphasized at three different points in his report. 
The country, he stated, was "unable to furnish carriage-
horses for this present journey of Leinster, and far more 
unable to supply the great expedition to Ulster." He 
therefore requested that "200 carriage horse at the least," 
in addition to the 200 horses already on the way, be gath-
ered and sent from England so that Essex could move his 
army and its supplies. He also requested that the Privy 
Council take care to insure that the first batch of 2,000 
reinforcements reach Ireland in June as scheduled, so that 
they would be available for the Lough Foyle expedition. 
Essex reminded the Council to send out the supplies 
of victuals and money, "according to the conditions agreed 
upon between such of your Lordships as were Commissioners, 
and me. 11 Specifically the Council was to send a three-
•· 
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month advance supply of food and money; but now, two of 
the three-montm'supply of victuals--starting on March 1, 
1599-- had expired and he had still not heard of the im-
pending arrival of the next three-months' supply. Fur-
thermore, the Privy Council had only signed contracts 
for the provisioning of ~0,000 men, and he urgently re-
quested that the Council amend those contracts to provide 
for an army of at least 14,000. 
The final subject of the dispatch was the strength 
of the Army. Essex found upon his arrival that the list 
strength, for which the captains drew pay, numbered 
19,000 men. However, on examination Essex concluded that 
the real number was only.16,000 and therefore he cashiered 
certain captains and redistributed their men to other com-
panies. 
Along with the above formal report, which Essex and 
the Irish Council sent to the Privy Council, Essex also 
sent a private letter to Sir Robert Cecil, deploring the 
state of affairs in Ireland and complaining that he "found 
all things so in confusion as it hath been an extreme toil 
to bring things to that pass at which they are. 1122 The 
lack of shipping was keeping many men and horses from com-
ing over to Ireland. He had "displeased multitudes" of 
captains and officers by examining the list strength of 
the Army and forcing captains to reflect accurately the 
22 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 20. 
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number of men in their units. But as for the present 
Essex promised: 
••• when I have given some direction to Munster, 
and settled Leinster in some reasonable state, 
I will into Ulster, if you supply me out of Eng-
land according to the agreements, which you know 
was (sic) to have three months victual and trea-
sure still beforehand; for with a less propor-
tion we cannot go tqither.23 
l~ 
Regarding strategy, with the original plan forestalled, 
Essex chose the better of several options. One alternative 
was to simply wait in the Pale until the arrival of the 
ships and carriage horses, which would not take place 
before June at the least, and which, based on past exper-
ience could take even longer. Another alternative was to 
take whatever troops could be supported by the carriage 
horses available, and invade Ulster immediately. Since 
the 200 carriage horses and the available lighter horses 
could only support a mobile force of about 1500 or 2000 
men, Essex would be forced to try to seek out and confront 
Tyrone with a much diminished force. Furthermore without 
the Lough Foyle expedition, which would force Tyrone to 
fight or be crushed between two converging forces, the 
Irish leader could resort to his old tactic of avoiding 
combat altogether while Essex's force wore itself out. 
Without a secondary effort at Lough Foyle to tie down 
Irish forces, Tyrone, if he so desired, would also be free 
to concentrate his entire Army along Essex's route of 
.. 
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advance. The outcome of any battle would have been uncer-
tain at best, considering the untrained state of the new 
English levi.es, the demoralized condition of the old Irish 
veterans, and the unsavory nature of the Low Country con-
tingent. 
The third alternative, which Essex chose, was to gar-
rison the Ulster borders to keep Tyrone pinned up, place 
other garrisons in the weakly-held rebel territories in 
Connaught and the Pale, take all the troops which could be 
supported by the supply horses available, and then sweep 
tllil:'ough Leinster and northern Munster. \.Jhen the horses 
and shipping arrived in June, Essex could then pursue the 
original attack on Ulster with an army which had gained 
some cohesiveness and combat experience. As a final jus-
tification, Essex received word that Tyrone was consider-
ing an invasion of Munster with 3000 or 4000 men in the 
near future to render assistance to his ally, Ed.ward Gyb-
bon, the White Knight. 24 Therefore a journey through 
Leinster and :Munster at least offered the possibility of 
stopping the invasion of Munster and of eliminating sever-
al of Tyrone's allies in the south. 
Having decided upon his course of action Essex dis-
tributed his forces to implenent his strategy. By April 
28, when Essex sent a detailed strength report to the 
Privy Council, the Army in Ireland was located as follows: 
24Ibid., 8, 20. 
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in Connaught, Sir Conyers Clifford had 3000 foot and 175 
cavalry; in Leinster, the Earl of Ormonde corm.anded some 
2500 foot and 100 horse; while in Munster, Sir Thomas Nor-
reys disposed of 3450 foot and 200 horse. In order to 
keep Tyrone secured in Ulster, and to protect the northern 
approaches into the Pale, Essex placed over 2000 more 
troops in the following areas: in Carr1ckfergus, Sir Ar-
thur Chichester had four infantry companies and one cav-
alry company; Sir Samuel Bagenal, brother of the English 
Marshal slain at the Yellow Ford, occupied Newry and the 
surrounding area with eight infantry companies and one 
cavalry company; Dundalk on the northern boundary of the 
Pale was garrisoned by Lord Crumwell with four infantry 
companies and one cavalry company; and further south Ardee 
was held by one infantry company under Captain Bingley. 
After placing one other foot company in Dublin, Essex was 
left with 4950 infantry and 450 cavalry for his campaign 
into Leinster. 25 
However, between April 28 and May 9 Essex decided 
that no more th~n 3000 foot and 300 horse could be sus-
tained on the southern campaign by the number of supply 
horses available. Essex therefore disposed of a further 
1950 infantry and 150 horse as follows: Sir Henry Harring-
ton took five infantry companies and one cavalry company 
25MSS. Salisburi, vol. 9, 143-46; C.S.P. Ireland, 
1599-1600' 32. . 
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into Wicklow; Ardee was reinforced with two foot companies 
and some cavalry under Sir John Shelton; while the remain-
ing fourteen companies were distributed throughout the 
Pale border areas. 26 
In the meantime the Privy Council was writing letters 
of its own to Essex, crystallizing their position and re-
plying to the Earl's first dispatch. The first letter of 
the Privy Council was sent on April 17, two days after 
Essex arrived in Ireland. It began with an ominous state-
ment:- "The main points and pillars that must uphold this 
service [the Irish Campaign], at least for anything to be 
provided for by us, are these five: men, munition, apparel, 
lendings [money], and victuals. 1127 
In this statement the Council was defining the areas 
for which it would accept responsibility. Significantly 
absent from the Council's list were two critical items 
necessary for the prosecution of the campaign: shipping 
and horses. Essex had tried to get the Council to give 
him affirmative support on the shipping for Lough Foyle, 
but in his emergency meeting on March 8 before he left for 
Ireland, the Council's only answer was to say that ship-
ping for Lough Foyle was "to be further considered of. 1128 
Now, in this letter of April 17 the council was implying 
26Ibid. 
27 . C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 13. 
28c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 168. 
r [ 
' 
162 
that shipping and horses were Essex's problems, which he 
would have to solve. 
As for the five items which the Council considered 
their responsibility, they discussed each point and showed 
their determination to meet their obligation, asserting 
that all the agreed-upon.supplies of munitions, money, 
apparel and victuals had been provided for. Regarding the 
first batch of 2000 reinforcements, the Council suggested 
that Essex try to recruit the English and Anglo-Irish who 
had been ejected from their homes by the rebellious Irish. 
Such a recruitment would save a great deal of money. Fin-
ally, the Council promised that they would do their utmost 
to root out corruption from their areas of responsibility~ 
The Privy Council did, in fact, take measures to stop 
corruption. On April 24 they sent orders to the Treasurer 
at Wars, the Master of the Ordnance, the Mustermaster in 
Ireland and the Comptroller of the Victuals, directing 
those key individuals to send a report every two months, 
accounting for every item received or used, and the status 
of the overall supply system.30 To discourage corruption 
the Council made an example of Sir Henry Wallop, the pre-
vious Treasurer in Ireland, who died on the day Essex 
arrived, and who had apparently stolen at least bl4,000 
29cc.S.P. Ireland, 1299-1600, 14. 
30ibid., 15. 
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during his tenure.31 As punishment, the Council resolved 
to have his lands and goods seized, despite the pleas of 
his son, who complained that the family and many servants 
would be ruined.32 The Council therefore intended to 
cover itself and meet its obligations so that, as they 
announced in their letteD, "not one man living" would "be 
able to cast one spot of just imputation on them," if 
deficiencies arose in their areas of responsibility.33 
On May 8, the day before Essex left for the Leinster 
campaign, the Council drafted a reply to Essex's first. 
dispatch, a reply which left little doubt as to the sin-
ister attitude of the Privy Council. The Council stated 
that Her Majesty, in view of the circumstances, approved 
his distribution of forces and the proposed campaign in 
Leinster.34 But as to his request for 2000 reinforcements, 
there was a difference of opinion as to when they would be 
due. Essex assumed that since his official tenure began 
on March 1, 1599, and since the Queen had agreed to send 
2000 men every three months, the first batch of reinforce-
ments should arrive on June 1. The Council, however, had 
received Essex's certificate of April 28 of .A:rmy strength 
which showed a list strength of 16,000 men. Therefore 
3libid., 7. 
32 Ibid., 23-34. 
33Ibid., 14. 
34 Ibid., 28. 
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since Essex had the full strength of 16,000 men on April 
28, the Council did not feel obligated to send the 2000 
reinforcements until three months after April 28, which 
would be July 28. Even this levy would not be authorized 
until the Pri~J Council had heard if Essex had been able 
to recruit volunteers from within Ireland. 
Regarding Essex's request for shipping to transport 
the 4000 foot and 100 horse to Lough Foyle, the Council 
asserted that "his Lordship cannot be so unprovided with 
barks in Ireland, as to be driven to fetch all shipping 
from England for such a service. 11 35 The Council reminded 
Essex of the great sums Her Majesty had spent in trans-
porting the Army and horses to Ireland. Therefore, if the 
Earl could procure some proportion of the shipping in Ire-
land, the Council "might" then provide the rest from Eng-
land. After all the difficulties which Essex had exper-
ienced in attempting to gather shipping for 3000 levies 
from England, difficulties which delayed his initial depap. 
ture for over a month, it was an insidious suggestion on 
the part of the Privy Council that Essex should try to 
gather shipping in Ireland to transport 4000 men to Lough 
Foyle.36 This is especially true because contemporary 
naval records, which were available to the Privy Council, 
35Ibid. 
36Ibid. 
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revealed that few ships were in Ireland at the time.37 
In any case, in view of the cost of hiring ships, the 
Council would not make final arrangements for contracting 
transport vessels until the Leinster rebels had been sup-
pressed and concrete preparations made for Lough Foyle.38 
As to Essex's requeqt for horses, the Privy Council 
expressed surprise that the Earl was asking for an extra-
ordinary allotment of 200 more carriage horses, in addi-
tion to those already promised, without having scored any 
success against the rebel. The Queen was expecting a re-
turn for her great investments and nothing had so far been 
achieved, and yet Essex was asking for further expenditure. 
The Council reluctantly agreed to his request, commenting, 
"if it be so necessary, and cannot otherwise be supplied, 
we will then move Her Majesty that they may be provided 
and the charge borne by the checks. 11 39 Unaware of the 
Privy Council's answer to his requests, which would not 
arrive until the end of the month, Essex moved out on his 
Leinster campaign on May 9, 1599. 
Essex's original plan was to march inland from Dub-
lin to Carlow, relieving the fort of !1aryborough on the 
way. From Carlow he would march south to Waterford, 
37Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 9. 
38 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 28. 
39Ibid., 29. 
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confer with the President of Munster, and then march back 
up along the coast through Wicklow to Dublin. The entire 
journey was expected to take about three weeks. 4° From 
the beginning, however, there were problems with the hor-
ses and the cavalry force was made up of only those hor-
ses, drawn from all the troops, which appeared fit to sur-
vive the journey. Carriage horses, and even lighter pack 
horses, were in such short supply that only one half of 
the Army's provisions could be carried at one time! Thus 
the carriage horses had to make two trips from Dublin to 
the Army's first stopping point at Naas. 41 From Naas the 
Army moved towards Athy, leaving behind two companies at 
Naas to guard one half of the victuals which could not be 
transported by the horses. 
Rebel Irish soldiers showed themselves as soon as the 
march started; but despite intermittent skirmishing which 
occurred, they did not prevent Essex from reaching Falla-
cory, a short distance from Athy, on the 11th of May. 
There Essex met the Earl of Ormonde, who joined the Lord 
Lieutenant with 700 foot and 200 cavalry, and two captured 
rebel leaders, Viscount Mountgarrett and Lord Cahir. The 
two rebels humbly submitted to Essex on their knees, con-
fessing their faults and begging Her Majesty's forgiveness. 
After admonishing these individuals, Essex forced them to 
40Mss. Sali~bur~, vol. 9, 212-13. 
41c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 37. 
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accompany his army to Athy. At the approach of Essex's 
army, James Fitz Piers, who co1Il.Il1anded the rebel-held cas-
tle of Athy, surrendered to Essex, and was turned over to 
the Provost Marshal. On the 13th and 14th of I1ay the 
army waited in the vicinity of Athy until supplies could 
be brought up from Naas •. So far the progress was moving 
according to plan, but the lack of carriage horses was 
causing great inconvenience. In order to move faster 
after· taking Athy, Essex had to order his men to carry 
the next four days' provisions on their backs, while the 
horses were used to carry relief supplies into Maryborough 
fort. 42 
After seizing the castle of Athy, Essex started dis-
tributing his force to secure his line of march, sending 
350 men to Carlow, 750 men into Offally, 350 horse and 
foot to garrison O'Dempsey's castle, and 500 foot, 50 
cavalry, 150 horses and great quantities of supply to Mary-
borough. Essex accompanied the relief force into Mary-
borough whereupon the commander of the fort presented Es-
sex with an important prisoner, Captain Nugent, one of 
Tyrone's best subordinates. The rebels offered Essex 
~,000 sterling to spare Nugent's life, but Essex declined 
the offer and turned Nugent over to Sir Francis Rush, the 
commander, instructing that Nugent be executed and his 
r 
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head set above the gate. 43 
By now the rebels were showing themselves in great 
numbers and attempting to draw the English into a skir-
mish in the woods. Some of the gentlemen volunteers were 
only too happy to accept the taunting Irish challenges, 
and Essex had to order these hotheads not to leave the 
Army formation. On May 16, in one such skirmish near 
Ballyknocken, Lord Grey disobeyed his superior, the Earl 
of Southampton, and charged right up to the treeline, 
endangering his life and those who followed him. For this 
indiscretion, Grey was sentenced to one night's imprison-
ment by Essex, a humiliating experience for a member of the 
nobility. After the incident, Lord Grey was the implac-
able enemy of Essex and the Earl of Southampton, and would 
later play a significant part in the intrigue surrounding 
Essex's trial.44 
With the Irish so close and in such numbers, Essex 
had to continue his advance in tactical formation. At the 
very head of the army marched a reconnaissance group, 
aptly named the "forlorn hope," which consisted of 40 mus-
keteers and 20 calivers. Following them was the vanguard 
composed of a regiment of infantry. Next in order were the 
baggage.train and part of the cavalry, the main "battle" 
of regimental strength, the bulk of the cavalry, a 
4 3Ibid., 38. 
44Harrington, Nugae Antiquae, 271. 
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rearguard of a few foot companies, and finally a detach-
ment of 30 cavalry called the "forlorn rear. 1145 To pro-
tect the flanks were wings of musketeers, supported by 
pikemen and calivermen who would relieve the musketeers 
if the enemy got too close.46 In .this formation Essex 
approached the pass of C&shel on May 17, held by "great 
multitudes" of Irish rebels, who were determined to stop 
the Army's advance. The pass was about 500 yards long, 
wooded on both sides, with a hill on one side, a bog on 
the other, and an enemy entrenchment across the far exit. 
Essex debated as to whether they should go around the 
mountain or force the pass, and concluded that "it was 
necessary to teach the world that Her .Majesty's army could 
and would in all places make way for itself. 1147 A force of 
500 musketeers, supported by pikes and calivers, assaulted 
straight into the pass. At the same time wings of shot 
and pikes held the pass on either side and secured the 
woodlines as the main assault force advanced. Om section 
of the vanguard attacked and captured the trench on the 
far end of the pass, while other sections secured the 
sides of the exit of the pass. The cavalry thereupon 
charged straight through and seized a hill on the far side. 
In the meantime the baggage sections moved into the pass 
4 5Ibi.d. , 273. 
46 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 39. 
47Ibid. 
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covered by the rear guard. The Irish attacked from all 
sides, and on all sections of the Army, including the rear 
guard, but were repulsed on every quarter as the Army 
methodically cleared the area. None of the English bat-
tle formations were broken during the operation and the 
total loss amounted to two officers and four men killed 
and two officers and seven men wounded. The rebel loss 
was "far greater," and their force scattered and fled, 
"glad to trust to their lightness and swiftness. 1148 
After the encounter at Cashel pass Essex's army con-
tinued unopposed, although the enemy hung about on all 
sides and occasionally skirmished with the cavalry. On 
May 18 the Army approached another tight pass leading to 
Ballyragget Castle but the enemy offered no resistance, 
and Essex occupied this important strategic position with-
out incident. After placing 100 men in the castle the Earl 
then pushed on towards Clonmell, where he settled his Army 
down for a much needed rest from the "foul marches" which 
they had endured on this first phase of the Leinster jour-
ney. Essex himself, however, went on to Kilkenny, where 
he summoned the President of Munster to meet bim, and from 
where, on May 20, he sent a journal of his proceedings and 
a personal letter to the Privy Council. 49 
The first ten days of his march had been a sobering 
48Ibid. 
49Ibid., 36. 
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experience, and a rude introduction to the nature of the 
problem he faced. In his letter he concluded that the war 
was no ordinary rebellion which could be lightly and 
quickly snuffed out; instead the rebellion was "like to 
exercise both our faculties that do manage it, and Her 
Majesty's patience that DJ.Ust maintain it."50 Essex's re-
cent confrontation with the Irish fighting men led him to 
conclude: 
••• this people ·against whom we. fight hath able 
bodies, good use of the arms they carry, boldness 
enough to attempt, and quickness in apprehending 
any advantage they see offered them. Whereas our 
new and common sort of men have neither bodies, 51 spirits, nor practice of arms, like the others. 
Essex further explained that the English advantage in cav-
alry ancl OL .. derl;y formations was lost; when the rebels i:e-
treated into woods and bogs. The English "men of quality," 
however, had great courage and spirit, too much at times, 
and it grieved Essex to see them hazard their lives against 
"rogues and naked beggers. 11 52 The volunteer men of qual-
ity were now the very heart of the Army and Essex intended 
to husband their lives with all care. 
After dwelling on the circumstances of the last ten 
days, Essex next discussed his future plans. Originally 
he had intended to spend only three weeks on the southern 
journey, but now circumstances convinced him to carry 
50ibid. 
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the campaign further into Munster. The I)resident of Mun-
ster and his Council had informed Essex of the strength 
and pride of the rebels, who possessed a well-organized 
Army and had fortified several castles. The English for-
ces assigned to Munster were incapable of taking the cas-
tles, or conducting a ca~paign to confront the main rebel 
force under the new Earl of Desmond. After considering 
the situation, Essex decided that since he was now in the 
area it would be best to seek to eliminate the southern 
rebel forces completely. Thereafter, "with more strength 
and less distraction of mind," he would be able to pursue 
"the main,service 11 53 of invading Ulster. 
Considering the situation which Essex found upon ap-
proaching Waterford, his decision to continue the campaign 
into Munster seemed to be the most sensible course of ac-
tion. The rebel force numbered a cohesive army of 4000 
men in Munster, while the English army there was militar-
ily weak and morally intimidated. If Essex had adhered to 
his original plan and returned directly to Dublin, he would 
certainly have had to leave numerous garrisons and detach-
ments to guard against the Munster rebels. On the other 
hand if now he could pursue the campaign into Munster and 
defeat the rebel forces, then only a minimal number of 
troops would be needed to hold t-hat province while the 
bulk of the Arny invaded Ulster. On the one hand, there 
53Ibid. , 37. 
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was a probability that the rebels might not fight, but 
there was also an equally good probability that an inva-
sion by the Lord Lieutenant would cause the rebels to sub-
mit when confronted by the Army. Having concluded his 
conferences with the Munster officials, and having decided 
on this new course of ac~ion, Essex rejoined his Army at 
Clonmell on May 23 • .54 
The objective of this new extended campaign was to 
sweep through Munster by way of Waterford, Limerick, Cork 
and then bayk to Waterford again. In addition to the 
prospect of confronting and defeating the main rebel force, 
the route of march offered Essex the opportunity to accom-
plish several secondary goals. In marching from Waterford 
to Limerick Essex would be able to attack Cahir castle, 
reputed to be the strongest fortress in Ireland, and the 
cornerstone of rebel strength in Munster. At Limerick, 
the natural meeting place for Munster and Connaught offi-
cials, Essex intended to meet with Sir Conyers Clifford, 
the President of Connaught, to discuss and plan their 
joint operations for the invasion of Ulster in July or 
August. Finally, by traveling down to Cork and then back 
up the Coast to Waterford, Essex sought both to examine 
the coastal defenses and also to strengthe? the area 
against any threatened Spanish landing, rumors of which 
were ever-present.55 
54Harrincton, l\~ugae Antiguae, 275. 
55MSs. Salisbury, vol. 9, xviii-xxiv. 
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To assist in the campaign, Sir Thomas Norreys, Presi-
dent of Munster, was instructed to join Essex with all the 
forces available, about 1000 men, along with additional 
supplies of food and munitions which the new campaign would 
require.56 Accordingly, on May 25 the two forces linked 
up a short distance from "Waterford, and began the march 
to Cahir castle and Limerick. The march would be slower 
since many supply horses had been used to sustain garri-
sons, like Har,yborough, and much of the remaining supplies 
would have to be carried by the men themselves or by por-
ters! Particularly troublesome were two artillery pieces, 
a cannon and a smaller culverin, which Sir Thomas Norreys 
had been instructed to take along for the attack on Cahir 
Castle. Weak bridges, lack of draught horses, and wet 
roads often made it necessary for the men to manhandle 
the two weapons in order to get them from Waterford to 
their objective.57 
On May 29 Essex's army approached Cahir castle. The 
fortress was situated on a rock in the middle of the Suir 
river, and was protected by strong walls and great towers, 
a fortress in which "40 men might easily" hold "out against 
4000. 11 58 Essex had taken Lord Cahir along with him as 
hostage, since that Irish peer had promised in his original 
56.t"IDS. Carew, vol. 3, 301. 
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submission to turn the castle over to the English. The 
Earl apparently had little faith in Lord Cahir's influence, 
since he went to such trouble to bring the cannon along, 
but nonetheless when he reached Cahir castle, he gave 
Lord Cahir an opportunity to induce those within to sur-
render. Essex sent Sir ~enry Davers and Lord Cahir to 
parley with the rebel garrison, commanded by the latter's 
brdther. Davers reported back that the rebels were confi-
dent and resolved to hold the castle to the end, adding 
that "Cahir himself was insolently and disgracefully used 
by those who came out t9 parley. 11 59 The confidence of the 
garrison was undoubtedly bolstered by the presence of ·!;he 
main rebel army of Munster, now numbering some 5000 men, 
which remained in the immediate vicinity across the Suir 
river. 60 
Essex thereupon placed the castle under siege, moving 
the cannon and the culverin within 50 paces of the wall, 
and preparing four veteran companies with ladders and 
scaffolds to make the assault. The cannon methodically 
blasted "great breaches" in the walls all day on May 30 
and the assault was scheduled to take place the next morn-
ing. Cut off from all aid, and apparently no longer con-
fident about their ability to stand off the impending at-
tack, the 100-man garrison sought to sally out at night to 
59Ibid., 302. 
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cut their way free through Essex's lines. Their surprise 
attack failed and most of the rebels were killed, while 
the castle was immediately occupied by two alert English 
captains and their men. The next day Essex placed a gar-
rison of 100 men in the castle, commanded by Captain 
George Carye, who had be~n wounded "in the face. 1161 
·With the rest of the army, Essex continued the march 
unopposed, arriving at Limerick on June 4. For the next 
four days Essex rested his troops and conferred with Sir 
Conyers Clifford about the state of affairs in Connaught 
and plans for the future prosecution of the war in that 
province and in Ulster. 62 Essex and Cliffo:;-d apparently 
i· 
made the ini.tial decision to conduct an amphibious opera-
tion by moving men and supplies from Galway to Sligo. 
From Sligo a major assault would be mounted on Ballyshan-
non, the key fort and passage leading into the O'Donnell 
part of Ulster. 63 After the conference Clifford was dis-
patched back to his province to begin his preparations, 
while Essex resupplied his army from the city stores. 
On June 8, Essex continued his journey, moving out 
of Limerick towards Askeyton, an English garrison which 
needed to be resupplied. The Irish rebels under the pre-
tended Earl of Desmond boasted that they would block his 
61Ibid., 303-04. 
62Moryson, Itinerary, 238. 
63Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 12. 
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passage, and at Adare Desmond's army, "betwixt 2000 and 
3000 men, with five or six ensigns flying," emerged from 
the bogs and woods and challenged the English forces. 
When the English advanced, the Irish faded back into the 
woods and let the army pass. The next day, while Essex's 
force moved through another wooded pass, a fierce skirmish 
occurred, causing 26 English casualties and 100 Connaught 
"Bonnaughts" to be slain. 64 The slow and tedious march 
continued as Essex moved down to Cork and back along the 
coast towards 'Waterford. The Irish skirmished constantly 
with the cavalry and flank guards as the Army moved along. 
They taunted the English and "breathed out great vaunts of 
wonders they would do,'' but they refused to close for any 
decisive clash. 65 
By the end of May, the wet climate and harsh living 
conditions both on the march and in garrison were begin-
ning to have an effect. In the field, the troops subsis-
ted on water and raw meat from the cattle which they had 
b~ought along, slept on wet ground in the same damp boots 
day after day, and began to fall sick in great numbers 
from "heat and colds."66 Those who remained stationed in 
garrisons fared·little better than the troops with Essex. 
On May 28 Sir George Carey reported to the Privy Council 
6l+M"'Q c db,..1. arew, vol. 3, 304. 
65Ibid., 305. 
66Harrington, Nu~ae Antiquae, 258-59. 
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that over 300 sick men had already been sent back to Dub-
lin from the outlying garrisons. 67 Those who could not 
get back to Dublin to recuperate simply died, as in the 
garrison of Roscommon in Connaught, where, out of a force 
of 150 troops, some 60 men died of sickness, "some as 
lusty men as an:y came out of England. 1168 
With the days slipping by and his army suffering from 
dysentery, which afflicted the Lord Lieutenant as well as 
his men, Essex decided that he could delay no longer in 
Munster. On June 18 at Youghal, Essex called a conference 
of Munster officials to ascertain what forces would be 
required for the defense of Munster and what plans should 
be followed in his absence. Regarding forces, the Presi-
dent of Munster estimated that he would need 800 foot and 
50 horse added to his men to prosecute the war. Essex 
thereupon assigned him 900 foot and 50 cavalry, "all cho-
sen companies commanded by able and gallant commanders. 1169 
The Earl thereupon ordered the President of Munster 
to make Youghal, because of its central location between 
Cork and Waterford, his main headquarters to prosecute the 
rebels in Munster and to guard against Spanish landings. 
Furthermore Norreys was to "place a garrison in every 
walled town" and to place any rebels who submitted 
67 . C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 43. 
68Harrington, Nugae Antiguae, 258. 
69MSS. Carew, vol. 3, 307. 
directly under the supervision of the neares·t garrison 
commander. Finally, Norreys was to conduct a campaign 
to deprive the rebels of food, by destroying everything 
which could not be defended by the Government forces.?O 
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With Norreys so instructed and greatly reinforced, Essex 
left Youghal on June 20 and continued his journey along 
the coast via Waterford and Wicklow to Dublin. 
With the garrisons and reinforcements which Essex 
had left along his march, and with the casualties due to 
battle and sickness, Essex's original force was now re-
duced to 1200 men. However, while his fighting men had 
dwindled, the camp followers increased until they num-
bered well over 3000. These were composed of horseboys, 
porters and many other "unserviceable people," who had 
joined Essex's forces for protection, and whom the Earl 
felt a responsibility to look after.71 Consequently, 
while the army was considerably smaller, it could not 
march any faster due to the increased number of refugees. 
As for the rebel forces in Munster, once Essex had passed 
through Waterford he saw little of Desmond's rebel army, 
which stayed back in Munster to harass Norreys' forces at 
Youghal. 
While Essex's army plodded up the Irish coastline, 
meeting little opposition, one of his subordinates, Sir 
?Oibid., 307-08. 
71~.' 309. 
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Henry Harrington, suffered a disastrous defeat in Wicklow. 
Before Essex had left Dublin for his Leinster journey, he 
had appointed Sir Henry Harrington, a member of the Irish 
Privy Council who had governed the county of Wicklow, to 
take a force back into that cow1ty and defeat the rebels 
under Phelim McFegh, and.their allies the O'Tooles. Orig-
inally Harrington was to have had 700 foot, of whom 300 
were to have been Low Country veterans,72 and a force of 
50 cavalry under his nephew, Sir Charles Montague. Addi-
tionally Harrington was to have had Sir Alexander Rad-
cliffe, an experienced soldier, to be his second-in-com-
[· mand. However, as Essex prepared for the Leinster journey 
he resolved to take all the experienced soldiers with him, 
including Radcliffe. Sir Henry Harrington was left with 
only 550 foot, composed of four "new" companies of raw 
recruits, and one company of foot who were all Irish, "most 
of them lately come from the rebels."73 The only depend-
able group were the fifty cavalrymen under Montague. 
With this uncertain force Harrington moved back to 
his government in County wicklol~, determined to suppress 
the rebels and Phelim McFeagh and the O'Tooles and "other 
rogues of their consort. 11 74 Arriving at Wicklow, Harring-
ton settled his troops into garrisons and conducted some 
72 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 68. 
73Ibid., 81. 
?4 Ibid., 68. 
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. limited training for the next few weeks. On May 28, Har-
rington suddenly moved out of Wicklow and ventured toward 
the rebel area for a distance of about five miles. His 
purpose, as he later explained, was to give his recruits 
some practice in setting up camps and conducting marches, 
to "refresh them" from the boredom of being cooped up in 
Wicklow, and finally, to give them some experience against 
the enemy. ?5 As the men set up camp near a. bog and woods, 
Harrington's scouts came back to report that a great num-
ber of rebels, who always seemed to have good intelligence 
regarding English troop dispositions, were gathering 
against him. The guard was doubled and the men spent an 
anxious night, as the rebels, hidden by the darkness, per-
iodically fired volleys into the English camp.76 
The next day Harrington ordered his recruits, nervous 
and tired from a sleepless night, to begin the march back 
to Wicklow. As Harrington began his retreat the forces 
of Phelim McFeagh emerged from the woods with banners fly-
ing, and for the next three miles hung on the English 
flanks and rear. Despite the pressure, the English offi-
cers and sergeants held the ranks steady until Harrington~ 
force approached a ford, which some of the rebels had occu-
pied. As Harrington and his recruit companies fought 
their way across, the main force of the rebels suddenly 
75Ibid. , 82. 
76Ibid., 83. 
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converged on the rear English element, which was the "Ir-
ish" compan;v commanded by Captain Charles Loftus. 
As the Irish closed in, Lieutenant Piers Walsh, the 
company executive officer, suddenly grabbed the unit ban-
ner from the ensign and galloped off toward Wicklow. At 
this, the pikemen, whose·function it was to keep the en-
emy at bay while the "shot" reloaded, likewise broke 
·ranks and fled after the lieutenant. Without the secur-
ity provided by the pikemen, the musketeers fired one 
volley at the oncoming Irish, dropped their weapons and 
ran. The men from Loftus' company fled into the ranks of 
the recruit companies which were crossing the ford behind 
them, and a general panic ensued. Sensing their opportun-
ity the Irish crashed against the English troops, who 
were too panicked to defend themselves. As the Irish 
followed the English across the ford, Captain :Montague's 
cavalry which had been leading the way toward Wicklow, 
turned back and charged the rebels. The charge stopped 
the Irish, and Montague reformed and charged again, where-
upon the rebels gave ground. 
Instead of using this breathing space to reform, Har-
rington's recruits took the opportunity to divest them-
selves not only of their weapons, but of their armor and 
heavier clothing.77 The officers tried to halt this 
cowardly behavior, but they were not particularly effective. 
77Ibid., 82-86. 
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In this state o:f panic the main body streamed into Wicklow 
as the Irish slaughtered all the stragglers. To a rebel 
force which barely matched the English in numbers, Harring-
ton had lost almost hal:f of his force of 600, 78 and more 
importantly, an inestimable amount of prestige. 
Essex received news·of the debacle a few weeks later 
as he arrived in Waterford from Cork. On June 25, he 
wrote to the Council that he would make straight for Wick-
low in order to "seek some revenge on those rogues who, in 
my absence, had the killing of our base, cowardly, and il~ 
guided clowns. 11 79 As for the conduct of the officers and 
men in Harrington's force Essex stated: "I purpose, by 
God's grace, to do such justice as shall be for Her Majes-
ty's honour, and make other men hereafter know that the 
justice of a martial court is no less terrible than the 
fury of all the rebels in this kingdom. 1180 
One might be teopted to criticize Essex for not hav-
ing left at least one veteran company to stiffen Harring-
ton's force. However,,, it should be noted that the Lein-
ster journey was the main effort, and there were few de-
pendable veteran companies to be had. Furthermore, Har-
rington was not expected to encounter much resistance and 
had even indicated to Sir Alexander Radcliffe that he 
78 Ibid., 69. 
79Ibid., 65. 
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intended "to do nothing" until Essex returned froo Leinster 
with reinforcements. 81 Later, Harrington and his captains 
all wrote reports describing the battle from their view-
, 
points, attempting to justify their actions and placing 
all the blame on Captain Loftus and Lieutenant \lalsh of 
the Irish company.82 Despite their efforts at self-justi-
fication, the facts of the battle, and the extent of the 
panic would seem to indicate that the English leaders, 
with the exception of Captain Montague, were, at best, 
uninspired. 
While at Water:'ford, Essex also wrote a letter directly 
to Queen Elizabeth in which he evaluated the overall state 
of affairs in Ireland. He had been through Leinster, Mun-
ster, and on the frontier of Connaught, and what he had 
observed led him to conclude that the war would indeed be 
"great, costly, and long. 1183 Essex then discussed the 
specific problems in subduing Ireland and recommended 
certain courses of action, which, incidentally, would 
later be implemented by JJord Mountjoy in his three-year 
subjugation of Ireland from 1600 to 1603. 
Essex's principal suggestions were to garrison the 
towns, stop their trade with the rebels, cut the rebels 
off from Scotland and Spain, waste the countryside, destroy 
s1rb·, 
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the Irish herds of cattle, and starve the Irish into sub-
mission. Essex concluded his letter by noting that it 
was common talk in the army and amongst the rebels, that 
many in Ene;land--Lord Cobham, Sir Walter Raleigh and 
others whom he could not mention "for their places sake"--
wished to see the ill success of. this "most important 
action," and the destruction of Her Majesty's most faith-
ful servants. 84 After senqing both letters off and rest-
ing his forces, Essex prepared to move off on the final 
lap of his journey back to Dublin. Essex moved north 
from Waterford along the coast, and by June 29 was in the 
vicinity of Arklow. Since leaving Waterford not one rebel 
had been seen, but now Essex suddenly confronted a rebel 
force of 800 foot and 40 horse determined to give battle. 8 5 
The rebels tried to ambush Essex's vanguard under the Earl 
of Ormonde, and at the same time sought to cut off his 
supply horses from the rest of the army. Essex reacted 
by sending all his cavalry under the Earl of Southampton, 
and 300 of his "lightest foot" to attack the rebels on 
their flank and rear. The result was a severe defeat for 
the rebels, who scattered into the bogs after sustaining 
numerous casualties.86 Phelim McFeagh, the Irish rebel 
leader, sent word on the conclusion of t.g,5 e;Ilg,agement 
84Ibid., 238-43. 
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that he desired a conference with Essex. The Earl replied 
that he would confer with McFeagh only if the latter came 
in as "a repentant rebel, to tender his absolute submis-
sion.1187 McPeagh thereupon withdrew into the woods, while 
Essex moved through Wicklow and on towards Dublin. 
On July 1, with his.southern journey almost completed, 
Essex sent off to the Queen a journal of his proceedings 
in Leinster and Munster from June 22 to July 1. His re-
port, as Essex said in a letter which accompanied the jour-
nal, was indeed a "plain and true text" of the events in 
the southern campaign, without any attempt to gloss over 
the shortcomings of the campaign. However, in his private 
letter to the Privy Council, which accompanied his jour-
nal, Essex claimed that he was forced to work with " a 
weak and inefficient Council" in Ireland which provided 
few trustworthy subordinates. 88 
More seriously, Essex again charged that the Privy 
Council in England was undermining his service, and stated; 
"I was provided for this service with a plastron and not a 
curate; that is, I am armed on the breast, but not on the 
back.u89 Furthermore, the rebels were aware of his diffi-
culties with the Privy Council at home; they knew that he 
. 90 
was'wounded in the back, not lightly, but to the heart." 
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But Essex promised that when he returned to Dublin, and 
after he had settled his "distempered brains" from the 
Munster journey, he would reorganize his forces and con-
tinue the mission. Two days later he arrived in Dublin.91 
The southern campaign was over. The objective of 
the journey had.been to ~resent a strong show of force, 
capture certain strong points, intimidate the rebels into 
submission, and leave behind pacified provinces in Lein-
ster and :Munster. Based on the conduct of past Irish 
wars and rebellions, it was a common occurrence for local 
Irish leaders, when confronted by an English army in 
their province, to make a submission to Her Majesty and 
be forgiven in return.92 
Indeed, when Lord Mountjoy arrived in Ireland in 
1600 and viewed the situation, he wrote back to the Privy 
Council that Essex's course of action, considering the time 
of the season and resources available, was the only sensi-
ble course which could have been followed.93 In this re-
spect, both Essex and Mountjoy initially underestimated 
the impact of Tyrone's influence and the determination of 
the rebel Irish chiefs. After the experience of several 
weeks in Leinster and Munster Essex reevaluated his opin-
ion of the problem he faced, but by then it was too late. 
9lMSS. Carew, vol. 3, 312. 
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Aoide from winning some minor skirmishes and the taking of 
Cahir Castle, the Lord Lieutenant had made little impres-
sion on the enemy. 
At the same time his Army returned to Dublin "weary, 
sick and incredibly deminished in number. 1194 Instead of 
leaving secure areas behind him and being able to concen-
trate all his strength on Ulster, Essex had left behind 
over 3000 men, many of them his best troops, to garrison 
strongpoints in Leinster and to help Sir Thomas Norreys 
prosecute the war against Desmond in r·Iunster. Finally, 
whatever success Essex might claim paled before the dis-
graceful route of Harrington's force at Wicklow, a defeat 
for which Essex would later be blamed by the Privy Coun-
cil. 95 But if the southern campaign were fraught with 
disappointments, it was nothing compared to the frustra-
tions Essex would experience in the next few weeks. 
94Ibid., 243. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE W-ESTERN JOURNEY 
Upon arriving back in Dublin on July 3, Essex met 
with the Irish Council, received an account of all that 
had transpired in his, absence, and conferred about the 
status of provisions for the invasion of Ulster. Regard-
ing the latter subject the news was ominous: no carriage 
horses or reinforcements had arrived, and no ships had 
yet been made available for the Lough Foyle operation. 1 
After concluding the meeting, Essex delivered himself 
over to the care of his physician, in an effort to recov-
er from the dysentery he had incurred during the Munster 
journey. 
Three days later,' Essex turned his attention to the 
disastrous rout in Wicklow and kept his promise of deal-
ing harshly with Harrington's ill-fated troops. A court 
martial of all Harrington's officers was immediately held; 
and it was determined that the English troops, having had 
"advantage of number, and no disadvantage of ground," 
were cut to pieces "without striking a blow. 11 Therefore, 
Lieutenant Peirs Walsh, of the Irish company, "for giving 
the first example of cowardice and dismaying to the 
1Mss. c~, vol. 3, 312. 
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troops" was condemned to death, and shortly afterwards 
executed. The other captains and officers who had not 
run away, but whose troops had fled, were all cashiered 
because "in such an extremity and distaste they did not 
something. very extraordinary, both by their example to 
encourage the soldier and to acquit themselves." The 
rank and file of Harrington's force were all condemned 
to death for cowardice in the face of the enemy. Essex 
modified the order, and 11 for example's sake," executed 
every tenth man and pardoned the rest. 2 
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As for Sir Henry Harrington himself, since he was a 
member of the Irish Privy Council, Essex decided to take 
no action until he knew Her :Majesty's pleasure.3 In fact, 
Harrington was never brought to trial, although he did not 
command any other troops while Essex was Lord Lieutenant. 
After Essex's departure Harrington wrote to Robert Cecil, 
asking for a new command of 200 foot, noting how he had 
lost his "blood and limbs," his eldest son and most of his 
possessions in doing the Queen's service in Ireland for 
4 twenty-three years. His request was granted and by Janu-
ary 1600, Harrington was back in Wicklow, building a new 
castle and commanding a new force.5 
2Ibid. 
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Having taken such stern measures to restore discip-
line, Essex spent the next week surveying the Army's situ-
ation in Ireland, and on July 15 sent a detailed report to 
the Privy Council. 6 The purpose of the report, according 
to Essex and the Irish Council, was to make known "the 
means we have, or are like to have, ••• lest Her Majesty 
and Your Lordships should expect more at our hands than 
we have ability to perform, or we fail of supplies by 
not making our wants known in time. 11 The list strength of 
the Army was still 16,000 foot and 1300 horse, now distrib-
uted as follows: 3300 fo'ot and 200 horse in Munster to. 
face Desmond's army of 5000; 2850 foot and 200 horse in 
Connaught, although Sir Conyers Clifford felt he was too 
weak to attempt to attack Ballyshannon; 3000 foot and 300 
horse in the Leinster area facing the victors over Har-
rington's force; and 1000 foot and 100 horse in garrisons 
along southeast Ulster to pen up Tyrone. This left a list 
strength of 6000 foot and 500 horse to attack Ulster. 
Essex stated that if he should attempt to try a land-
ing at Lough Foyle, he would have to divide his forces 
into two parts of 3000 men each, and Tyrone would be in a 
position to defeat each force in turn. It should be noted 
that in his report, Essex was talking in terms of the "list 
strength" of the army, rather than the real strength. The 
casualties from battle and sickness on the southern 
6contents of the July 15 report are taken from C.S.P. 
Ireland, 1599-1600, 80-81. 
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caopaign, as well as casualties suffered by those simply 
in garrisons around the country, were so extensive that 
the 2000 reinforcements which were due on June 1, and 
which still had not arrived, would barely bring the army 
up to full strength. Even the presence of 16,000 sol-
diers was deceiving for, ·as Essex reported, "our men do 
fall sick, and our companies decay daily." 
The troops, as we have seen, were suffering from 
poor clothing and equipment, which rapidly disintegrated 
in the wet climate, and from the lack of adequate victuals. 
Regarding the latter problem Essex concluded that part of 
the victuals "is not come out of hngland, part lost by 
shipwreck, and intercepted [by pirates] off the coast of 
Connaught, and a very great part so unsavory and unservice-
able, that it would poison all the soldiers to whom it 
were delivered, ••• " Essex suggested to the Privy Council 
that food would not spoil so readily if they would "make 
:f' 
the provision of butter and ch~ese not in Essex and Suf-
folk [counties], places so remote, but in Cheshire, Lan-
cashire and Wales," so that the journey would not be so 
long. 
After considering the above conditions, Essex sugges-
ted that the Lough Foyle operation, ships for which were 
still not available, and the invasion of Ulster must be 
postponed again. Until the other provinces were subdued, 
the most that could be attempted at Ulster would be for 
Sir Conyers Clifford to take Ballyshannon in the West, 
while Essex planted another garrison at Armagh. Even 
these plans would be doubtful if Elizabeth did not send 
more reinforcements. 
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Essex's final suggestion of the report gives an indi-
cation of how highly he had come to regard the endurance 
of the Irish fighting men. The Earl requested that 2000 
Irish be hired by his army, and added: 
••• these rebels will hardly be subdued, ii' some 
of themselves be not used against themselves. 
For besides the daily decay of our English sol-
diers, those men which are sent hither do not 
in good time make so good soldiers as these 
rogues here are. 
Essex suggested that he be allowed to draw Irishmen from 
the rebel side, and under his personal leadership, "carry 
them every day to fight, assuring myself I shall do good 
service in making a riddance of either side." In this man-
ner he would be able to save his Englishmen, his "triarii, 11 
and to deliver the final blow once loyal Irishmen had 
weakened rebel Irishmen. It was an interesting scheme, 
representing a cold-blooded outlook--using natives against 
each other while the outsider reaped the benefits--but 
Essex would not have the opportunity to implement it. 
Along with the above official report of the Lord Lieu-
tenant and the Irish Council, Essex sent a personal let-
ter to the Privy Council. Essex had just received a let-
ter in which the Privy Council assured him that the Earl 
did indeed have "sufficient backpiece of defense," and 
that the carriage horses, victuals, apparel and 
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reinforcements had already been sent, or would be sent in 
the near future.7 Essex thereupon sarcastically replied: 
I do humbly beseech your Lordships to believe 
that I charge not your Lordships with want of care 
or breach of promise in directing supplies of all 
things in this war; but these wants we have, I 
acknowledge to have grown by casualty by sea, or 
by ill choice of victual, or contrariety of winds, 
which have stayed the supplies of men and provi-
sions. 8 
Laying aside the sarcasm he continued: 
I lay open to the malice and practice of 
mine enemies in England, who first procured a 
cloud of disgrace to over-shadow me, and now in 
the dark give me wound upon wound--I know that 
those who are guilty of them will confidently 
deny, and cunningly distinguish to excuse them-
selves. 9 
But Essex was confident that once back in England he 
would be vindicated because: "Your Lordships' own memories, 
and the Council book, wherein all your dispa~ches are re-
corded, will make up some part of this account." Having 
made his feelings plain Essex concluded: 
But no more, neither now nor hereafter, of this 
argument. Your Lordships shall see that I will 
not fail of doing the uttermost duty that the 
happiest man could have performed. And I will 
humbly and patiently bear my unlooked-for, con-
temptible destiny.10 
After this written exchange, and while waiting for 
horses, ships, reinforcements and victuals for the Ulster 
7c.s.P. Ireland, 1599~1600, 80-81. 
8 Ibid., 95. 
9Ibid., 96. 
lOibid. 
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campaign, Essex resolved to make an interim campaign 
across the western borders of the Pale, in the areas known 
as Kings county and Queens county. Essex had received 
word that the rebels in Kings county had recently ambushed 
Captain William Williams and 300 of his men, killing 60 
and sending the rest fleeing back to the principal city, 
Phillipstown, which was now endangered. 11 In Queens 
county, the O'Mores were threatening Maryborough, the prin-
cipal fort in that area, which Essex had resupplied in 
May, but which now needed another convoy of provisions. 
Essex was exceedingly disappointed with the army's perform-
ance in Kings and Queens counties, complaining to the 
Privy Council in a letter on July 13 that, although the 
men had been well victualed and provided for in this area, 
they had u1aid still.like drones without doing service." 
Their recent defeat, in which they had showed rrextreme 
cowardice," was indicative of the failing morale, and 
Essex.resolved to move out and put some life into them. 12 
Accordingly on July 22 Essex sent the Lord Marshal, 
Sir Christopher Blount, into Queens county with 1000 men 
to relieve Maryborough and suppress the 0'.Mores, while the 
Lord Lieutenant led 1200 foot and 200 horse towards Phil-
lipstown.13 The objective of Essex's force was to move 
11Dymrnok, A Treatice on Ireland, 42. 
12MSS. Salis12_ur;y, vol. 9, 231. 
l3Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 42. 
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into a part of King's County knov-m as Fercal, an area "so 
strong as nature could devise to raake it by wood and 
bog, 1114 and the place which, because of its supposed inac-
cessibility, was the chief rebel stronghold wherein the 
rebels stored munitions, food, and cattle. At the same 
time, Essex wished to use this western journey as another 
opportunity to confer once again with the Governor of 
Connaught, Sir Conyers Clifford, who was accordingly in-
structed to bring a strong force and meet Essex in the 
Fercal area. 
Essex moved to Phillipstown without incident, viewed 
the qight of the williams' ambush, and then moved on to 
Fercal. An enemy force of 600 men hung on the flanks and 
rear of his force, but attempted only one attack in which 
they lost a principal coI!lillander of the O'Connors and about 
40 men, whi.le Essex sustained only a few wounded. His 
force cut its way through the thick woods, built a small 
bridge across the Derrow river and arrived at Ardengroffe 
without further incident. Sir Conyers Clifford, with nine 
companies, entered Fercal from the western side, and 
encountered fierce opposition, losing 10 killed and 40 
wounded as he cut through the woods, while the rebels re-
portedly lost twice as many men. 15 
Battered and weary from his labors, Clifford arrived 
14Ib~., 43. 
l5Ibid. 
~. 
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at the Ardengroffe meeting place, and for the next two 
days, the troops rested while the Lord Lieutenant and Lord 
Governor of Connaught discussed future plans. 16 One of 
the chief topics of their discussion was the fate of 
O'Connor Sligo, an Irish chief who was the principal 
English supporter in ConRaught, 17 but who had recently 
been besieged in his castle at Sligo by O'Donnel1.18 It 
was resolved that Clifford should employ all means neces-
sary to rescue O'Connor Sligo, and thereafter protect the 
landing of the Galway force at Sligo (discussed in their 
first meeting at Limerick) and finally to tie down O'Don-
nell's forces by capturing Ballyshannon. After conclud-
ing their conferences Clifford departed for Connaught 
while Essex turned to the business of subduing Fercal. 
Essex divided his army into three units, resolving to 
sweep through the rebel area with two units abreast, each 
consisting of 500 infantry, while the Lord Lieutenant fol-
lowed with a reserve of 200 foot and 200 horse, ready to 
reinforce or react to any enemy threat to the leading 
units. In this configuration the Essex force moved 
through Fercal, burning houses and corn, destroying sup-
plies, and capturing about 1000 cows and 100 horses. 19 
16Henry, 11 The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 16. 
17 C.S.P. Ireland, 1299-1600, 22. 
18MSS. Salisbur~, vol. 9, 289. 
l9Ibid., 268; Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 44. 
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The rebels tried unsuccessfully to battle Essex's force, 
but after losing many men, they decided the effort was 
futile and disappeared into the woods. Essex completed 
the systematic destruction, leaving the rebels of Kings 
and Queens counties scattered and defeated, and returned 
to Dublin in early August. 20 
Upon entering Dublin, Essex was presented with a 
letter from Queen Elizabeth which she had written on July 
19, after receiving Essex's official report of the jou!-
ney to Leinster and Nunster. 21 Elizabeth wasted few words 
with preliminaries, and immediately complained: 
••• you must needs think that we, that have the 
eyes of forei~n Princes upon our actions, and 
have the hearts of our people to comfort and 
cherish, who groan under the burden of continual 
levies and impositions, which are occasioned by 
those late actions, can little please ourself 
hitherto with anything that hath been effected. 
Essex's two-month journey had "brought in never a capital 
rebel. 11 
Regarding the seizure of Cahir castle, the most sub-
stantial military accomplishment on Essex's southern jour-
ney, the Queen contemptuously characterized the action as 
having taken "an Irish hold from a rabble of rogues." But 
to Elizabeth the most exasperating aspect of this 
20Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 44. 
21The following excerpts are taken from the Queen's 
letter to Essex, dated July 19, 1599, found in the C.S.P. 
Ireland, 1599-1600, 98-101. For complete text, see Appen-
dix A. 
situation was the adverse effect on her prestige which 
resulted .from allowing an Irish rebel to remain defiant 
and unpunished. She lamented to Essex that 
••• this one thing, that doth more displease us 
than any charge or expense that happens, which 
is, that it must be the Queen of England's for-
tune, to make a base bush kern to be accounted 
so famous a rebel, ~s to be a person against whom 
so many thousands of foot and horse, besides the 
force of all the nobility of that kingdom, must 
be thought too little to be employed. 
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She continued: "Little do you know how he [Tyrone] hath 
blazed in foreign parts the defeats of regiments, the death 
of Captains, and the loss of men of quality in every corn-
er; and how little he seemeth to value their power ••• " 
She conc.luded her letter with the forceful ins true-
tious: 
••• we must now plainly charge you, according to 
the duty you owe us, so to unite soundness of judge-
ment to the zeal you have to do us service, and 
with all speed to pass thither [to Ulster] in such 
order, a~ the axe may be put to the root of that 
tree, which hath been the treasonable stock from 
whence so many poisoned plants and grafts have 
been derived. 
While Essex was still contemplating this first letter, 
a second letter. arrived from the ·~ueen. The occasion for 
this correspondence was to answer Essex's report o:f July 
15, in which the Earl had enumerated the difficulties of 
going to Ulster this year. The Privy Council had received 
Essex's report on July 28, and Elizabeth sent an immediate 
reply on July 30. 22 In her letter, Elizabeth quickly 
'>2 
c. The following excerpts are taken from the Queen's 
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dismissed Essex's complai.nts of shortages in supplies by 
stating that her examination of the problem had revealed. 
that most supplies had been sent, while the remainder of 
the promised supplies were delayed merely "by those acci-
dental causes which accompany sea transportation." 
Elizabeth's main co~cern was Essex's overall conduct 
of affairs, and she again launched into a denunciation of 
his actions. She reminded the Earl that the agreed-upon 
plan was "to assail the Northern Traitor, and to plant 
garrisons in his country, it being ever your firm opinion, 
amongst others of our Council, to conclude that all that 
was done in other kind in Ireland, was but waste and con-
sumption." 
Elizabeth stated that Essex's complaints of defi-
ciencies in troop strength defied explanation, "except it 
be that by your unseasonable journey into Munster, and by 
the small effects thereof, you have broken the heart of 
our best troops, and weakened your strength upon inferior 
rebels, and run out the glass of time which hardly can be 
recovered ••• " She further commanded, "we must expect at 
your hands, without delay, the passing into the North, 
for accomplishment of those counsels which were resolved 
on at your departure, to the intent that all these six 
months charges prove not fruitless ••• " 
letter to Essex, dated July 30, 1599, found in the C.S.P. 
Ireland, 1599-1600, 105-07. For complete text see Appen-
dixB-:--
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Elizabeth concluded her second letter on a particu-
larly ominous note. In Essex's original commission the 
Earl had been given permission to return to England when-
ever he deemed it advisable, and to constitute a temporary 
governor in Ireland in his absence. Now the Queen revoked 
that liberty and warned: ·"we do charge you (as you tender 
our pleasure) that you adventure not to come out of that 
kingdom, by virtue of any former liscense whatsoever." 
In the second letter; as in the first, Elizabeth 
again seemed to find it incomprehensible that the northern 
strategy had not been implemented, and seemed unaware of 
the true state of affairs in Ireland. A certain insight 
may be gained by considering the problem of correspondence 
' 
between Essex and the Queen. Essex addressed all but two 
of his letters to the Privy Council--which was the appro-
priate communications channel--and consequently the corres-
pondence passed through the hands of Sir Robert Cecil, who 
quite probably merely briefed the sixty-six year old Eliz-
abeth about the contents, and most certainly was asked for 
his opinion. An indication of how various aspects of the 
Irish campaign were interpreted to the Queen can be seen 
in Elizabeth's first letter in which she referred to the 
seizure of Cahir castle as the taking of "an Irish hold 
from a rabble of rogues." In the same letter she con-
demned Essex's movement into Leinster and Munster before 
"that proud rebel" in the north was attacked, even though 
i 
l 
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the Privy Council earlier reported that she had given her 
consent to both the Earl's distribution of forces and the 
Leinster campaign. 23 Ernest George Atkinson, editor of 
the Calendar of State Papers, Trela~~' explains this dis-
crepancy by stating that Elizabeth "forgot" that she had 
given Essex permission tQ go to Leinster first. 24 The 
next document in the Calendars, however, shows the cor-
rections made in the letter of July 19 to Essex by the 
Queen's secretary, Robert Cecil. 25 If Elizabeth did for-
get, is it possible that Robert Cecil, who corrected parts 
of the letter, forgot also? The more logical explanation 
is that either Cecil did not inform Queen Elizabeth of 
Essex's intent to go south in the first place, or that 
Elizabeth really did forget and Robert Cecil sent the let-
ter out anyway, w~thout bringing this obvious error to her 
attention. 
In the Queen's second letter of July 30 we see that 
the Queen merely accepted the Council's word that provisions 
were not arriving only because of those common accidents 
which normally accompanied sea transportation. Since 
Elizabeth took only two days to answer Essex's letter, 
her "examination" of the supply situation must have been 
very superficial, and probably only consisted of receiving 
23c.s.P. Ireland, 1299-1600, 28. 
24Ibid. , xxvi. 
25~.' 101. 
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assurances from the chief officials that all things had 
indeed been sent. In the Queen's reproaches Essex could 
undoubtedly see the work of Sir Robert Cecil, particularly 
in that part of the letter in which Essex was now forbidden 
"to come out of that kingdom by virtue of any former lis-
cense whatsoever," until·he had "reduced things in the 
north." In view of the impossibility of conducting a 
northern campaign without the necessary means, and consi-
dering the difficulties Esse~ was experiencing in acquir-
ing those means, Elizabeth's revocation of his license to 
return to England when he saw fit, must have sounded like 
a sentence of exile by his enemy, Sir Robert Cecil. In-
deed, in the copy of this letter kept in the State Papers, 
Cecil has endorsed the Queen's letter, and has written on 
his copy the words: 11 To command him not to come over. 1126 
At the same time, a court official made the following ob-
servation to a friend in ·Venice: "since Essex is away Her 
Majesty is wholly directed by Mr. Secretary, who now rules 
all as his father did," and added, "though he pretends 
friendship to the Earl, he is thought at heart his great-
est enemy, envying his former greatness with the Queen, 
and intending his utter overthrow if Irish affairs take 
no better effect. 1127 
26 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 107. 
27c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 251. 
r 
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Essex had little time to dwell on the ramifications 
of the Queen's first two letters, for on August 5 occurred 
the most decisive disaster of the Essex campaign. In 
accordance with agreements made by Essex and Clifford at 
their meeting at Fercal in July, the Governor of Connaught 
prepared to conduct an e~edition to Sligo, to rescue his 
ally, O'Connor Sligo, from O'Donnell's forces. In order 
to assist Clifford, Essex had reinforced him with four of 
his best foot companies, the Earl of Southampton's crack 
cavalry unit, and the services of Sir Alexander Radcliffe, 
one of Essex's best subordinates. Essex must have still 
been dubious about Clifford's chances, for on July 30 the 
Lord Lieutenant sent the ·Governor a message, warning him 
not to "venture the breaking of his neck," and counselling 
him that unless he was assured that he could go .forward 
without danger, it would be better to wait until the Lord 
Lieutenant had started his force toward Ulster, to distract 
the rebels. 28 Although 'Clifford privately professed that 
he feared the upcoming expedition,29 he resolved neverthe-
less to carry on the mission without waiting for Essex. 
The Lord Governor of Connaught moved out .from Tulske 
with 1900 infantry and 200 English and Irish horse. Al-
though he had some reinforcement from Essex, Sir John 
Harrington described the force as one consisting of 
28 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 121. 
2911ss. So.lisbur;J::, vol. 9, 289. 
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twenty-one weak companies, some of which had only 60 men 
instead of the authorized 150.30 The army moved in a nor-
therly direction toward Sligo, and by early afternoon had 
traveled fourteen miles to the town of Boyle, at the foot 
of the Curlews Hills. By then it was four o'clock in the 
afternoon and Clifford had decided to camp for the evening. 
However, Captain Henry Cosb~r, who had traveled through the 
dangerous Curlew pass the day before, told Clifford that 
the enemy had only a few scouts in the pass, and advised 
that it would be expedient for Clifford to push 011 through 
the pass immediately, before the enemy had a chance to 
fortify it.31 
Without reconnoitering the pass further, the Lord 
Governor gave the order for the army to continue its march 
into the Curlew pass, which started out as a narrow way 
between two bogs, The pass soon broadened out untii it 
gave "liberty for twelve men to march in front," and then 
led up a gently rising slope with a hill and bog on the 
left, and thick woods on the right. The order of march 
was the vanguard of 571 men, commanded by Sir Alexander 
Radcliffe, followed by the main battle of 421 men, comman-
ded by the Lord Baron o! Dunkellin, and the rearguard of 
50L~ men commanded by Sir Arthur Savage. Behind the main 
army was the Irish cavalry and the Earl of Southampton's 
30Harrington, ~ugae·Antiqua~, 264. 
31~., 265; Dymmok, A 1rreatice on Ireland, 44. 
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cavalry troop, commanded by Sir Grtffin Markham, whose mis-
sion was to guard the baggage train and to reinforce the 
main army if the need should arise.32 
As Sir Alexander Radcliffe's vanguard moved into the 
pass, they were surprised to find about 400 rebels, led 
by O'Donnell's ally, O'Rourke, entrenched on both sides 
of the pass and manning a barricade near the entrance. 
Radcliffe pushed forward driving the rebels back from 
their barricade, and then placed companies along both 
sides of the pass as he moved through, and ordered the 
company commanders not to relinquish their positions until 
he had so instructed. The vanguard, followed by the main 
battle and the rearguard, moved into the pass until they* 
reached another great barricade acro.ss the pass, held byi'iilb: 
numerous rebels. Sir Alexander Radcliffe, who had already 
been shot "in the face," nevertheless resolved to lead tbie 
charge, and ordered Captain Cosby, an Anglo-Irish officer:~ . 
to take his company and attack with him. Cosby refused 
and held back from the enemy fire, whereupon Radcliffe 
stated: "Well Cosby, I see I must leave thee to they base-
ness, but I must tell thee before my departure, that it 
were much better for thee to die in my company by the hanas 
of thy countrymen, then at my return to perish by my 
sword."33 Cosby still refused to move and Radcliffe 
32 Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 44-45. 
33Ibid., 45. 
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p~epared to attack without the captain, and about 200 men 
who also stayed behind. 
By this time Colonel Radcliffe's men had fired off 
most of their powder, so he be(5an to assemble "choice 
pikes" from the body of the vanguard, calling key men out 
by name. While gathering the pikemen Colonel Radcliffe 
was shot again in the leg and collapsed in the arms of 
two "gentlemen volunteers. 11 34 As they tried to bring the 
Colonel away one of the gentlemen was shot dead, while Sir 
Alexander Radcliffe was shot a further time through the 
body and fell dying. Upon observing the fate of his •• com-
mander Captain Cosby turned and fled with his unit. The 
rest of the vanguard, raked by enemy fire, likewise broke 
and ran back through the following formations, causing the 
inevitable panic. 
Sir Conyers Clifford, traveling with the main battle 
saw the vanguard streaming back down the pass, pursued by 
the exultant Irish, and vainly tried to reform them. As 
the Irish closed in on the Governor Sir John MacSwine and 
Captain Oliver Burke tried unsuccessfully to convince 
Clifford to withdraw, and finally forcibly laid hold of 
him and pulled him back. Enraged at the spectacle of his 
men fleeing in such a cowardly manner, the Lord Governor 
tore himself loose and charged the rebel horde singlehanded. 
He crashed into the oncoming Irish and died fighting in 
34 Ibid., 46. 
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their midst, with a pike through his body.35 Perceiving 
the leaderless, panicked mob of English soldiers fleeing 
down the pass, with the Irish slaughtering them at will, 
Sir Griffin Markham attacked with all his cavalry. Al-
though wounded by a bullet which broke his arm, f'1arkham 
pressed home the charge,·broke the Irish attack and scat-
tered the rebels, thus giving "security to this ignomin-
ious flight. 11 36 
When the English had a chance to ascertain their 
losses, they found 241,o.fficer~a.nd men slain, and 208 
officers and men wounded.37 The rebel loss was later re-
ported to have been greater than that of the English,38 
although considering the circumstances of the action, it 
hardly seems probable. As for the Lord Governor, his head 
was cut off by the O'Rourkes and sent· to the O'Donnells 
as a trophy, while his body was taken and buried at a 
nearby monastery.39 Captain Cosby's subsequent fate is 
unknown, although he and his conpany were initially left 
to garrison Boyle, at the foot of the Curlews, while the 
rest of the demoralized army retreated further back to 
Tulsk. Aside from the loss of men, and the negative effect 
35Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 47. 
37 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 113-14. 
3Bibid., 123. 
39Dymm.ok, A Treatice on Ireland, 47. 
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on morale, the Curlew disaster meant that the threat to 
Ballyshannon and western Ulster had been totally elimin-
ated. Tyrone and O'Donnell were now free to concentrate 
all their forces against any invasion of eastern Ulster 
through the Mowry Pass. 
When Essex heard th~ news, he was understandably en-
raged, and immediately sent off instructions to Sir Ar-
thur Savage and Lord Dunkellin, the two surviving senior 
officers. First, they were to send back all of Southam.p-
ton' s cavalry troop, along with any other cavalry they 
could spare. Sufficient garrisons were to be kept in the 
key cities of Galway, Athlone, Boyle, Tulsk and Roscommon, 
while the rest of the foot were to be sent back to Mullin-
gar. Essex contemptuously stated: "I will send them to 
keep walls, since they do so cowardly and basely in the 
field. 114·0 While his rage at the rank and file of the Con-
naught army was boundless, he had only the highest praise 
for the heroic efforts of Sir Alexander Radcliffe, Sir 
Griffin Markham, and the gallant Sir Conyers Clifford. 
Regarding the Lord Governor Essex commented: "Connaught 
hath lost a valiant, a liberal, and understanding Governor, 
and cannot by me be supplied with another Conyers Clifford, 
though he also found too hard an encounter, and perished 
in it. 1141 
Ireland, 1599-1600, 120. 
123. 
When Essex returned from the Western expedition to 
Kings County on July 31, he assembled the Irish Council 
and announced his intention to move into Ulster. 42 The 
210 
Council objected to this course of action, and on August 
3 voiced their objections in a letter to the Privy Coun-
cil. The Irish Council members asserted that Essex, par-
ticularly after receiving the Queen's first letter of 
July 19, had been strongly urging the invasion of Ulster, 
in spite of the weak state of the army. The Council, how-
ever, believed that "perilous sequels" would grow out of 
such a course of action. The key to a successful invasion 
was the Lough Foyle operation, which the Lord Lieutenant 
was not able to implement. Therefore the most he could 
accomplish would be to plant garrisons at Armagh and the 
Blackwater, and even these garrisons would only turn into 
hospitals for the weak and sickly soldiers. 43 
There was a great lack of carriage horses, which 
would make any such garrison virtually impossible to re-
l 
1 supply except by "frequent convoys," which only invited 
l 
ambush. Additionally the original plan called for the 
Governor of Connaught to attack Ballyshannon to divert 
Tyrone's forces; however, t-he Governor was in a weak posi-
. tion, while the rebels had "dangerously fortified the 
Curlews and other straits by the which he must pass. 1144 
42Mss. Salisbury, vol. 9,.263. 
43rbid., 263-64. 
44rbid. , 265. 
To further their argument, the Irish Council included a 
list of the troop dispositions in Ireland, which showed 
11,250 .foot and 925 horse in garrisons and patrol duty 
throughout the country, and no more than 4750 foot and 
378 horse available for the Ulster journey. 45 In clos-
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ing their letter, the Irish Council, in spite of Essex's 
objections, strongly urged that the Ulster campaign be 
again postponed until the other provinces had been set-
tled. 46 
On the same day in which she received the above let-
ter .from the Irish Council, Elizabeth sent a scathing 
reply to both Essex and the Irish Council, a reply which 
probably would have been.harsher still if she had known 
of Clifford's recent defeat on August 5.47 She began: 
"The letter which we have read this day from you of that 
Council concerning your opinions for the northern action, 
does rather deserve reproof than much answer." Elizabeth 
charged that the Irish Council, because of its "former suf-
fering (nay, favouring) Popery, 11 was responsible .for much 
of the present trouble in Ireland. 
The Irish Council's suggestion that the Ulster cam-
paign must be postponed brought a torrent of abuse from 
· Elizabeth. Such a course of action would "increase the 
45c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 111. 
46r1ss. Salisburv, vol. 9, 267. 
4 7The following excerpts are taken from the Queen's 
letter to Essex, dated August 9, 1599, found in the C.S.P. 
Ireland, 1299-1600, 114-16. For complete text see Appen-· 
dix c. 
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rebel's pride, and frustrate one whole year's charges," 
adding, "What would you have us believe, if we did not 
think you loyal, but that either some of you cannot for-
get your old good wills to that Traitor, or else are in-
sensible of all things, save your own particulars. 11 
Regarding the alleged inability of the English for-
ces to implement the Lough Foyle landing, Elizabeth com-
mented: "Lastly, for Lough Foyle, which still you ring in 
our ears, to be the place that would most annoy the rebel, 
we doubt not but to hear by the next that it is begun, and 
not in question." Her final comments concerned the strength. 
of the army. The Irish Council had estimated that only 
4750 foot and 340 horse would be available for an inva-
sion of Ulster. Elizabeth, on the other hand, calculated 
that if one took into account the forces in Connaught, the 
new reinforcements, and portions of garrisons throughout 
the country, "you may not reckon under ten or eleven thou-
sand for that service." 
Elizabeth's letter of August 9 again illustrates her 
lack of appreciation of the true conditions in Ireland. 
Particularly revealing are her comments on the Lough Foyle 
operation, in which she simply cannot understand why the 
landing has not yet been accomplished, and in which she 
demands that it be accomplished immediately. Addition-
ally, Elizabeth's calculation that Essex should have had 
at least 11,000 men. available for the Ulster project· shO\rn 
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that she did not appreciate the necessity for garrisons 
or the problem of sickness which brought the real strength 
of the army far below the list strength. 
Part of Queen Elizabeth's false impression was un-
doubtedly caused by Essex, who in his letters back to 
England dealt in "list-st.rength" figures. Essex may have 
used list strength numbers so as to simply explain the 
relative distribution of the Army without complicating 
his explanation with a breakdown of "unserviceable" men 
in all garrisons, a figure which would have been diffi-
cult to ascertain or document with certainty. A more 
probable reason, however, may have been connected with 
finances. The Lord Lieutenant was terribly short of money 
to conduct the ca.mpaign, and had protested th.at "no Gover-
nor in the kingdom \-ms ever so limited and restrained. 1148 
Government funds were so scarce that Essex had to pay for 
the bedding and sheets of casualties out of his own poc-
ket, 49 and to use his own carriage as an ambulance,50 
.facts which help in explaining his popularity with the 
troops. If he reported the list strength of the Army as 
remaining at 16,000 .foot and 1300 horse, which he did, 
then he would at least get the salary due all these 
troops. On the other hand, if he reported the real 
48Ibid., 94. 
49Ibid., 43. 
50ibid., 98. 
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strength of the Army, which was well below the above fig-
ure, he may well have feared that the money for troop 
salary would be cut proportionately. However, the Earl 
was caught in a 11 numbers-game 11 dilemma; by dealing in 
list strength figures he gave Elizabeth the impression 
that his strength was far greater than it was, and conse-
quently she expected more out of his forces, and found 
his troop dispositions incomprehensible. 
However, the Privy Council, which was well aware of 
the realities of campaigning in Ireland, might have en-
lightened Queen Elizabeth or explained Essex's position, 
if they were so inclined and had the success of his expe-
dition at heart. Instead, on the day after Elizabeth sent 
her third letter, the Council sent Essex a letter of their 
own, in which they stated that the Queen had called them. 
in for consultation and that they 11 must now only concur 
with Her Majesty" concerning Essex's disposition of forces 
and his lack of progress. The Council further charged 
that "there should have been a prosecution of the capital 
rebels in the north, whereby the war might have been shor-
tened. 1151 They concluded by informing Essex that his 2000 
reinforcements, which he had b~en promised by June 1, had 
not yet been sent, but would arrive shortly; and then 
closed by wishing him "the same success" which bLs own 
heart desired.52 
51rbid., i17. 
52rbid., 118. 
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Stung by the reproaches of the Queen and the hypocrisy 
of the Privy Council, Essex resolved to march at the ear-
liest opportunity. On AuB-ust 14 Essex assured the Privy 
Council that as soon as his "best companies'' came in from 
Munster and Connaught, and as soon as he gathered up all 
his "beeves" and carriag~ horses, which would take about 
eight days, he would be off to Ulster.53 
53 Ibid., 121-25. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE NORTHERN JOURNEY 
Essex's determination notwithstanding, the English 
Army of Ireland had fallen to an exceptionally critical 
state by mid-August. A report written by Captain Francis 
Kingsmill, a company commander in Munster, was sent to 
Sir Robert Cecil on August 22, and gives a vivid illus-
tration of the Army's plight. In Mallow, an English gar-
rison consisting of 500 men from veteran companies was 
not able· to field more than 200 effective soldiers. Other 
units were in similar straits, many having as many as half 
their men down with sickness. The troops had not been 
given a new issue of uniforms in eight months, and the 
damp, moist climate had long since reduced their clothes 
to tatters. The food, particularly the cheese and butter, 
was rancid by the time it arrived. As for pay, they had 
not received one penny of their salary in the last four 
months, and had to commandeer what little food was avail-
able in the surrounding area. In expressing his contempt 
for the supply system, the captain sarcastically complained 
that the troops had to wait for "six winds to blow" before 
the cargoes reached them. 1 
1 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 130. 
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Essex confirmed that the situation in the other prov-
inces was just as serious, although he placed as much blru::ie 
on the character of the individual soldiers as he did on 
the want of supplies. On August 14 he wrote to the Privy 
Council: "every town and place of garrison is a hospital, 
where our degenerate countrymen are glad to entertain 
sickness a~ a supersedeas for their going into the field, 
and every remove of an Irish company is almost a breaking 
of it. 112 The result of the supply situation, coupled with 
the terrifying news of Clifford's recent disaster, had 
destroyed morale to the point where, as Essex complained, 
"the Irish go to the rebels by herds; the others make 
strange adventures to steal over; and some force themselves 
to be sick, and lie like creatures that have neither 
hearts nor souls. 11 3 
Conside~ing the crucial part supplies and transporta-
tion played in the Essex campaign, it would be appropriate 
at this time for us to explore in greater detail the prob-
lems of the Lord Lieutenant in acquiring the needed requi-
sitions of ships, horses, victuals and clothing. The most 
critical item, on which the entire strategy hinged was the 
I acquisition of shipping for the Lough Foyle operation. In 
{: 
the original warrant for shipping by the Queen on Decem-
ber 16, 1598, Essex was assigned two great warships, three 
2Ibid., 124. 
3Ibid., 125. 
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pinnaces, and four double fly-boats which were each capa-
ble of transporting 300 soldiers or a great quantity of 
provisions. The warrant for warships and fly-boats was 
for a six-month time period; thus the ships would have to 
be reassigned, and recommisioned not later than June 16, 
1599.4 In order to transport his 3000 levies from Eng-
land to Ireland Essex was granted the use of seventeen 
merchant transports from the period January 16 to March 
16.5 
As we have seen, Essex's transporting of levies was 
delayed by "contrary winds and other accidents," so that 
he could not transport his units from Chester by the 
March 16 deadline. 6 Therefore the seventeen merchant 
ships were extended in commission by the Queen for one 
month until.April 16, by which time the transporting of 
levies was complete. When the Queen assigned the warships 
and transports for Essex's use, she stipulated that after 
the initial transport of troops, the ships were "to per-
form upon the coast such service as he [Essex] shall dir-
ect. 11? 
Thus, in summarizing Essex's shipping assets, by 
early Aprill the time of his arrival, he should have been 
4c·.s.P. Ireland, Addend~, 1565-1654, 507. 
5Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 9. 
6 Ibi.d. 
-
?c.S.P. Ireland, Addenda 2 1565-1654, 60?. 
219 
able to count on two great warships;, three lighter pin-
naces, four double fly-boats and seventeen merchant ships 
for the Lough Foyle operation. It is interesting to note 
that in 1600 when Sir Henry Docwra actually conducted the 
Lough Foyle landing for Lord Deputy Mountjoy, with 4000 
men--the same number whi~h Essex had planned to take--
Docwra' s shipping strength amounted to one pinnace and 
seventeen merchantmen to make the initial landing, and two 
pinnaces, three "special" ships and three converted mer-
chantmen to keep the force supplied. 8 
In Essex's commission for shipping, however, there 
was a great exception to his authority, which stipulated 
that all shipping dispositions were subject to the appro-
val of the Lord Admiral, Sir Thomas Howard.9 Essex and 
the Lord Admiral had long been antagonists, and continued 
their feud up until the time Essex left for Ireland, quar-
relling on January 1710 and again on March 1.11 The com-
mand structure for the use of shipping implied that Essex 
and Howard would have to cooperate on the use of shipping 
to support the.campaign. The Lord .Admiral exercised his 
authority and ordered that the two great warships, one 
pinnace, and the four double fly-boats should patrol a 
8Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 20. 
9Ibid., 10. 
10 C.S.P. Domestic, 1598-1601, 151. 
11Ibid., 166. 
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line across the Irish Sea from Cornwall to southwest Ire-
land to scout for Spanish ships. 12 Essex does not mention 
this diversion of his ships in any of his letters and 
apparently did not protest the Lord Armiral's decision 
too vociferously, probably because he still had at his 
disposal two pinnaces and seventeen merchant ships, which, 
judging from Sir Henry Docwra's landing in 1600, was still 
sufficient shipping to conduct the initial landing at 
Lough Foyle. In any case the warships were taken from 
him and by April 30 were still on patrol duty for Howard, 
and remained on patrol duty until their six-months com-
mission came to an end on June 16.13 
The decisive blow to the Lough Foyle operation oc-
curred when Admiral Howard ordered that the seventeen 
merchant ships, which had just delivered Essex 3000 levies 
to Ireland in early April,, were to join the Lord Admiral's 
naval force off southwest England. On May 17, the mer-
chant ships arrived at Scilly and joined up with Admiral 
Howard, thus leaving Essex with only two pinnaces. 14 
Throughout Essex's campaign the two pinnaces did good ser-
vice by shuttling men and supplies back and forth from 
England, but the Lough Foyle expedition was clearly out 
of the question. 
12MSS. Salisbury, vol. 9, 172. 
l3Ibid. 
-
14Ibid. 
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When Essex returned from the Munster journey on July 
1, and found that shipping had still not been made avail-
able, he again protested to the Privy Council about his 
lack of shipping. By that time the periods of commission-
ing had long since run out, and the transports had to be 
recommissioned all over ~gain, in the usual cumbersome 
manner. On July 19, in response to Essex's protest, Lord 
Treasurer Buckhurst wrote a memo to a Mr. Skinner, one of 
his assistants, instructing him to make out an order for 
the payment of money to hire the necessary shipping. In 
the same memo Buckhurst explained how the Earl of Essex 
would not be able t.o go· north to Lough Foyle without this 
requisition. 15 
Thus as late as July 19, while the Queen raged that 
the Ulster expedition was not being pursued, and while 
Essex, .deprived of his shipping by Lord Admiral Howard, 
conducted torturous secondary campaigns while waiting for 
more shipping, the Privy Council was only at the stage of 
appropriating money to get the vessels needed! In these 
circumstances, because of the slowness of gathering up 
shipping, the ships could not, and indeed would not, be 
available before Essex's northern journey started in late 
August. In any case, by then it was far too late; the 
critical time for the Lough Foyle operation--late April 
l5Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 20 • 
• 
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or early May--had long since passed and Essex was off on 
his Munster journey. When he returned from Munster, his 
troops, as Essex related, were too depleted to conduct 
the Lough Foyle operation, although if shipping had been 
available in Dublin, Essex might have attempted the opera-
tion before his troops ware further depleted in the Kings 
county campaign. 
How the shipping situation was explained to Eliza-
beth by the Privy Council is not known for certain. How-
ever, later at Essex's trial, Lord Admiral Howard testi-
fied that the ships for the Lough Foyle expedition were 
all prepared to sail, but Essex's aroy was in such a 
weakened condition that it was not able to use them. 16 
From the remarks made by Elizabeth in her letters regard-
ing shipping, it would seem that the Queen, unconcerned 
with such technicalities as commissioning dates, was as-
sured by the Privy Council that the shipping was available, 
and only awaited Essex's directions. 
Lord Admiral Howard's order for Essex's ships to 
screen the south English and Irish coasts has been ex-
plained b?" citing the great "Spanish Alarm" which swept 
England in the summer .of 1599. 17 Indeed, at the height 
of the panic, there were rwnors and reports that England 
;, was about to be invaded by 30,000 Spaniards, 20,000 French, 
l 
16Bacon, Essex's .Vindication, 65. 
l?Silke, Kinsale, 57-61. 
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and 40,000 Scots, supported by a fleet of 250 Spanish and 
Danish sailing ships and 70 galleys. 18 The English quick-
ly mobilized almost 20,000 men from all the shires and 
designated Lord Admiral Howard as supreme coI'llllander of 
the forces :for defense. 19 The Reverend John J. Silke, in 
his book Kinsale, quite rightly points out that although 
the rumors were later proven false, it was still a threat 
which the government could not ignore. 20 However, while 
there were the usual rumors of a Spanish invasion, begin-
ning in January and21 continuing through May and June, 22 
it was not until the end of July that real and universal 
alarm ensued, when information reached the Court that the 
Spanish fleet had assembied at Brest and Conquet. 23 The 
crisis lasted from the end of July until August 20, by 
which time all the rumors had been proven false, and Howard 
was ordered to dismiss the motley collection of militia 
which had been mobilized. 24 The "Spanish alarm" of late 
July does not explain Essex's lack of competent shipping 
in late April and early May, or Howard's order for the 
18Mss. Salisbu~, vol. 9, 282-83. 
l9Ibid., 289. 
20silke, Kinsale, 
21Me<r-. C' l' b JJVb • .::>a is ury, 
22Ibid., 171-72. 
23Ibid., 253, 322. 
2L~Ibid., xxi, 307. 
57. 
vol. 9, 20. 
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ships to ply off the south English coast at that time; 
although it does explain why Essex could not acquire 
shipping after he completed the Western campaign in early 
August. 
One of the greatest.mysteries of the Essex campaign 
is that the carriage horses, both those which Essex had 
gathered himself and had left in .England, and the new 
allotment of 200 horses assigned by the Privy Council, 
never arrived in Ireland! After the Essex campaign had 
ended, and Lord Mountjoy was preparing to embark for Ire-
land, Lord Treasurer Buckhurst, in writing a list of "con-
siderations" for the Irish campaign of 1600, listed as 
Item 15: 
That as well the 200 carriage horse allowed to 
the Earl of Essex at his going over, as also 
the other 200 carriage horse allowed him after-
wards out of the chec}::s, may be known where theY: 
be, and accounted for, and that they m'i"'y be de-
livered to the Lord Mountjoy for the Queens ser-
• vice.25 
Before Mountjoy left .for Ireland in January 1600, he was 
instructed, among other things, "To insure as to the 400 
carriage horses supplied to the Earl of Essex. 1126 The 
mystery was never satisfactorily cleared up and the inci-
dent was eventually forgotten as government officials 
moved on to other matters. However, an examination of 
the Cecil papers reveals an interesting letter from 
25c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 380. 
26Ibid., 443. 
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Essex's. supposed friend, Sir William Knollys, to Sir Rob-
ert Cecil, written in May 1599. Apparently Knollys was 
responding to a letter from Cecil and commented as follows 
on the subject of Essex's request for carriage horses: 
I am not of opinion you have reason to hearkon 
to any new demand, though he shew a necessary 
reason touching the tarriage horses which are 
not there to be had, and without which he will 
not be able to march.27 
Knollys further counselleQ. Cecil that "unless you keep 
touch with him (Essex) in the agreements councluded on, 
both for his number and the timely supplies, he may allege 
the same excuses that former governors have done, ••• 1128 
The coptext bf this letter would appear to indicate 
once ae;ain that the Privy Council, principally Sir Robert 
Cecil, wanted Essex to fail, but wished to insure that he 
failed in such a way that no blame could be attached to the 
Privy Council. In Knollys' statement on the carriage hor-
ses he is alluding to facts obviously known to Cecil: 
that carriage horses were not available in Ireland; that 
the army could not march without them; but then he recom-
mended that Cecil ought not send Essex any more carriage 
horses! Sir William Knollys' hopes were to be realized, 
for the horses would not arrive, and the bulk of Essex's 
army then was not able to march. 
/' 
Concerning the lack of victuals and clothing Essex 
27r-ms. Salis~ur~, vol. 9, 188. 
28Ibid. 
-
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was hampered not by the Privy Council, but by corruption. 
The Privy Council, as we have seen, openly accepted the 
supply of these items as its responsibility and did all 
that could reasonably be expected to insure their timely 
arrival. According to instructions from the Privy Coun-
cil on April 24, Sir Geor.ge Carey, the Treasurer in Ire-
land, and George Beverly, the Comptroller of the Victuals 
in Ireland, were to send in reports on the status of vie-
tuals, clothing and the money they had in their posses-
sion. Upon receiving these orders Sir George Carey wrote 
back to the Privy Council that, because of the difficul-
ties of communicating, with the outlying pro1.rinces, it 
would be very difficult for him to keep track of the var-
ious supplies of victuals and clothing, which often were 
shipped directly to Munster or Connaught. 29 His reasons 
for not being able to keep an accurate account were plau-
sible, considering the circumstances surrounding commtmi-
cations; however the Privy Council still demanded an ac-
counting. But neither: /Sir George Carey, Sir George Bev-
/ . 
erly nor Sir Ralph Lane, the Muster-Master, sent in their 
bi-monthly reports, and on July 11 the Privy Council cen-
sored all three individuals for not following instructions. 
The three men protested that "the state of this rebellious 
kingdom being as it is," they could not get accurate and 
timely certificates from all their subordinate officials 
29c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 32. 
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strung out in all the garrisons.30 And so the debate went 
on by exchange of letters throughout the Essex campaign. 
As early as May 16, Sir John Jolles, a merchant of 
London who had contracted to supply victuals to Ireland, 
complained to the Priv-y Council that Her Majesty was being 
defrauded in respect to yictuals being sent to Ireland, 
particularly to Munster. An inquiry was sent to Sir Thom-
as Norreys, President of Munster, to look into the matter;31 
however, he died before any investigation could be made,32 
and the matter was not followed up. On July 29, Jolles 
again complained that all the victuals were being sent by 
his firm, but that the prevailing great corruption in Ire-
land resulted in food being sold, stolen or wasted. John 
Jolles was apparently fulfilling his part of the contract 
in England, because he suggested that a Mr. Darell, one 
of the Privy Council's lesser officials--a Surveyor of 
Victuals for the Navy•-should take the merchants' records, 
go to Ireland, and check for himself the way Her Majesty 
was being defrauded.33 
The Privy Council apparently believed John Jolles, 
because on August 4 they wrote to Essex that if there were 
a shortage of victuals, then "the Treasurer (Sir George 
Carey) must either have the magazines ~ull, or have a good 
.?Orb id. , 96. 
3lrb~., 35-36. 
32IP~.£. ' 128. 
33rbid. , io5. 
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34· store of money in his hands." In any case, to sort out 
the matter the Council would send one of their Victualling 
officials (Mr. Darell) with all the records, in order to 
give Essex a "more clear satisfaction in all things."35 
However, Mr. Darrell was not able to gather up his records 
and depart before September 9,36 and by the time he ar-
rived, the Essex campaign was over, and the matter was 
subsequently unresolved in the general confusion follow-
ing Essex's departure on September 24. 
Although the investigation regarding victuals went 
unsolved, the corruption in clothing was more clearly 
brought to light. Again, in response to Essex's protes-
tations the Privy Council assured the Lord Lieutenant on 
August 4 that over 12,000 uniforms should have been re-
ceived by this time, and insisted that if there were los-
ses the fault must be with the officials in Ireland.3? 
Indeed, Essex's choice of Sir George Carey as Treasurer, 
and merchants Babington and Bromley as contractors for 
uniforms, was unfortunate because together they perpetrat-
ed one of the most outrageous frauds in Elizabeth's reign. 
The case was not brought to light until 1616, but the in-
vestigation revealed that the Crown had been defrauded of 
34Ibid., 111. 
35Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 14?. 
3?Ibid., 111-12. 
b27,000 by the merchants between 1597 and 1600.38 
The merchants had supplied only two-thirds of the 
uniforms contracted for, and in the winter of 1598 had 
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supplied only 2500 of the 10,000 uniforms which had been 
authorized. The way the deception worked was that the 
merchants paid the captains money instead of giving them 
clothing. The Crovm, for instance, contracted for a 
winter outfit costing forty-nine shillings, and then, in-
stead of delivering the uniform, the merchants simply 
paid the Captain twenty-four shillings, which the captains 
pocketed. Another method was to give the men rotten uni-
.forms, and then offer to buy the uni.forms back for eighteen 
shillings. The men would gladly agree to receive money 
which they could use for food, instead of useless, rot-
ting clothing, and in this way ~he merchants would obtain 
as much as ~20 on a single uniform. Finally the deception 
was kept quiet by bribing officers in Ireland, principally 
! Sir George Carey, and port officers in London, Bristol 
r: 
and Chester, to certify that the correct number of uni-
~ .forms had le.ft England and had arrived in Ireland.39 
~ 
l'. 
r While Essex assumed he was making a clean sweep of t~e cop. 
l 
ruption of the past, he was in fact inadvertently bring-
ing together some of the most corrupt individuals which 
the Irish wars had seen. 
38cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 99-100. 
39Ibid., 99-101. 
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After Essex's campaign the Privy Council attempted 
to conduct an investigation, noting that since the cap-
tains and officials in Ireland made no complaint, they 
must have been bribed into silence. They ordered Mount-
joy to investigate the matter, but nothing conclusive was 
proved until well into James I's reign. 40 
While Essex, as the overall commander must assume a 
certain responsibility for not rooting out this corrup-
tion in victuals and apparel, we must consider the real-
ties of the situation. The Lord Lieutenant, as his jour-
nal indicates, spent virtually every moment in Ireland 
either on his three journeys, or getting the army ready 
for the journeys. It is obvious that he had no time to 
really delve into and keep up with the d~y-to-day prob-
lems of supply contracts and shipping schedules. It is 
easy to see how Sir George Care~ the Treasurer in Ireland 
could have answered any of Essex's inquiries by attribut-
ing the shortage of promised supplies to transportation 
problems, or to bad faith on the part of the Privy Coun-
cil, an explanation which Essex would have been all too 
willing to accept. 
On August 21 Essex called a council of all the high-
ranking Army officers at Dublin Castle to discuss the in-
vasion of Ulster. Faced with the Lord Lieutenant's 
40 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 441-42. 
determination to prosecute the campaign with any means 
available, the officers tendered the following declara-
tion: 
The opinion of the Lords and Colonels of the 
Army dissuading the journey northward. 
We, the Lords, Colonels and Knights of the 
Army, being called to a Council at War, the 
day and year above written, at what time the 
Lord Lieutenant, proposing to us his purpose 
of invading Ulster, as well in regard of Her 
Majesty's express commandment, as also to pull 
down the pride of the Archtraitor Tyrone, to 
redeem the late scorn of the Curlews, and 
lastly to hold up the reputation of the army, 
required us to deliver our opinions in what sort 
of present journey thither might be made, we, 
who were then present, being thoroughly acquain-
ted with the state of Her Majesty's forces (as 
having particular charge of them, some as 
Colonels over regiments, and some as Captains 
over companies), after long debating every one 
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of us having spoken in order, at last by common 
consent resolved that, seeing the army so unwilling 
to be carried thither, that some secretly run into 
England, others revolt to the rebels, a third sort 
partly hide themselves in the country, and partly 
feign themselves sick, and seeing that there 
could be no planting this year at Lough Foyle, 
nor assailing of the north but one way (the Con-
naught army, consisting of a great part of old 
companies, being lately defeated), and that our 
army, which passeth not the number 3,500 or 4,000 
at the most, of strong and serviceable men, 
should be far overmatched, when all the forces 
of the north should encounter them; and sithence 
that it was a course full of danger, and of 
little or no hope, to carry the army into their 
strengths, where the rebels should be first 
lodged, and were able to bring 6,000 shot to 
entertain fight with less than 2,000 (in which 
places, also, our horse should never be able to 
serve, or succour our foot); and, further, foras-
much as we could place no garrisons in the north, 
but such as consisted of very great numbers, and 
great numbers we could not spare from so small an 
army, with any likelihood of making a good retreat 
with the rest (to say nothing of the want of ship-
ping and especially of victualling caused by the lack 
thereof); and lastly sithence, if we could spare 
a.sufficient number, and could lodge them at Ar-
magh and the Blackwater, it would but tie the 
army to be ever busied in victuallj.ng them, and 
consequently more incommodate us than trouble the 
~ebels (as it appeareth in the former plantations 
there in the times of the Lord Burgh, Sir William 
Russell, and Sir John Norreys) in regard of the 
premisses, we all were of opinion that we could 
not, with duty to Her Majesty, and safety to 
this kingdom, advisfi or assent to the undertak-
ing of any journey far north. In which resolu-
tion if any man suspected it proceeded of weak-
ness or baseness, we will not only in all likely 
and profitable service disprove him, but will 
every one of us, seal with his life, that we dis-
suaded this undertaking with more duty than any 
man could persuade into it--Dublin Castle, 1599, 
~ Augus~t 21. 41 
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To support the gloomy picture described by the army 
commanders, Sir George Carey wrote to the Privy Council 
on August 26 that "the soldiers fall exceedingly sick. 1142 
Even after the arrival of the long-awaited 2000 reinforce-
ments brought over by Sir Francis Darcy at the end of 
July,43 Carey estimated that there were only a total of 
10,000 men alive and physically present, instead of the 
44 now authorized list strength of 19,000. 
Against the unanimous opposition of the Army comman-
ders, Essex gave the order for the appointed companies to 
assemble at Kells, and on August 28 he left Dublin with 
100 cavalrymen, to join them. It took until August 31 
41Ibid., 126-27. 
42 . Ib:i.d. , 131. 
43Ibid., 79. 
44Ibid., 131. 
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for all the units to arrive, by which time Essex's force 
numbered 2500 foot and 300 cavalry. After waiting ano-
ther day for supQlies to arrive from Drogheda, the Lord 
Lieutenant started his army off to challenge the wilds of 
Ulster and the army of Tyrone. 4 5 Without the Lough Foyle 
operation to tie down Tyr~ne, without the attack at Bal-
lyshannon to engage O'Donnell, Essex could expect to find 
the full force of the best Irish armies waiting to meet 
him. 
On September 3 near Ardolph Essex approached Tyrone's 
force and the Irish leader sent out some foot and horse 
to skirmish with Essex's troops. 46 The two opposing lea-
ders finally caught sight of each other, and Essex wrote 
to the Privy Council on September 4: "yesterday Tyrone and 
I looked one upon another from two hills; but the river 
and his fastness was betwixt us. 1147 In the same short 
note to the Council Essex informed them that he intended 
to move towards Louth, where he hoped to meet another con-
voy of victuals coming north from Drogheda. As Essex 
marched towards Louth along an open plain, Tyrone paral-
leled Essex's march, keeping his Irish soldiers generally 
in the woods, except for occasional skirmishes. On Sep-
tember 5 Essex arrived at Louth, met up with the victual 
4 5Ibid. , 144-'+5. 
46Ibid., 145. 
47Ibid., 142. 
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convoy from Drogheda, and held a council of war, to con-
sider what should be done about Tyrone's army, which was 
hovering nearby. 
Essex had been keeping track of Tyrone's disposition 
and plans, by means of intelligence reports which he had 
been receiving continuougly throu@lout his campaign.48 The 
general opinion of the Essex agents was that Tyrone inten-
ded "to make strong fights upon every pass" by which Essex 
was to go to Ulster, drawing out the war to "unmeasurable 
length" until "the three furies, Penury, Sickness and 
Famine," forced the Queen's army to retire. 49 Captain 
"J.C." in his intelligence report in June concluded that 
Tyrone would make use of "the desert, craggy and boggy 
mountains of Sleoughe Gallaine, containing forty miles in 
compass, with the great woods of Killultagh, Kilwarlin, 
Kileleyrto, and Clancakie !'50 The captain added: "these 
fastnesses were inevitable stops to the journeys of all 
former Deputies into Ulster, in times of far easier wars 
than this one is like to prove. 11 51 As for the size of 
Tyrone's army, the estimate fluctuated continuously. By 
early September, Essex and the Irish Council estimated 
' Tyrone's force at 6000 foot, while Sir George Carey in 
48Ibid., 43, 68, 136. 
49Ibid., 69. 
50ibid. , 69-?0. 
5libid., 70. 
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Dublin, estimated Tyrone's Army at 8000 foot and 700 
horse,52 and Captain Dymmok estimated 10,000 foot and 
1000 horse.53 
In view of the Irish leader's commanding position, 
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one can imagine Essex's surprise when he received a mes-
sage from Tyrone on Septe.mber 5 that the Irish chief 
wished to have a parley. Essex refused, but informed the 
messenger that if Tyrone still wished to parley he could 
find the Lord Lieutenant the next day at the head of his 
troops. 5'+ 
On September 6, after leaving 500 foot and 20 horse 
behind to guard the supply train, Essex formed his army up 
on the plain of Louth and began to move towards Tyrone's 
position. Essex's force of 2000 foot and 300 horse were 
drawn up in a tactical formation which Captain Dyrn.mok 
called a "Saint Andrews cross" which consisted of infantry 
in the center, 100 horse on the left, 100 horse on the 
right and 100 horse in the rear, which could rescue any 
threatened part of the army, and prevent any retreat. At 
the head of the formation was the Lord Lieutenant and his 
immediate party, who led the way as the army drew closer 
55 to the rebels. 
52J_bid. ' 143. 
53Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, Lt-8. 
54c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-l~QO, 145. 
55Dy:mmok, A Treatice on Ireland, Lf.9. 
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Tyrone's advance guard of cavalry drew back as Essex 
approached, while the Irish infantry refused to emerge 
from the woods. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, after 
much feinting and some skirmishing, an Irish horseman 
approached Essex and delivered a message, the substance 
of which was 11 that Tyrone would not fight, nor draw forth, 
but desired to speak with the Lord Lieutenant, but not 
between the two armies. ,,56 Essex sent the messenger away 
without an answer and, since it was approaching dusk, 
Essex made 11his rear, the vanguard" and withdrew back to 
his camp for the night.5? 
The next day the army moved out again, but before 
they had gone a mile, Tyrone's messenger approached, and 
stated that the Irish leader desired Her Majesty's mercy 
and that the Lord Lieutenant should meet with him at a 
ford called Billaclynthe, located a short distance to the 
right of Essex's army. Essex halted his troops and sent 
two gentleman volunteers to the ford, where they found 
Tyrone, who was, however, located too far out in the water 
to converse with the messengers. Upon hearing this report 
Essex grew impatient and exclaimed, "Then I shall despair 
ever to speak with him. 11 58 At last, however, a suitable 
place was found and the Lord Lieutenant led a troop of 
56c.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 146. 
57Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 49. 
r:a . 7 Harrington, Nugae Antiquae, 299. 
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cavalry to a hill above the ford. Below, in the water up 
to the belly of his horse, was Tyrone, waiting there alone 
for the Lord Lieutenant. When Essex saw this he left his 
cavalry escort on the hill and rode down to the edge of 
the ford by himself. Upon Essex's coming, Tyrone saluted 
"with much reverence" anc! the two conversed alone for one 
half-hour, out of hearing distance of any other witnesses.59 
Such a private conference by the Queen's representa-
tive was a highly irregular procedure in Tudor England, or 
in any diplomatic circle. Since no witnessed record was 
kept of the proceedings, the meeting was the subject of 
much speculation among the Lord Lieutenant's friends and 
enemies. Essex later stated that the private meeting was 
only an occasion to arrange for a more formal meeting, 
which took place later in the day. The various State 
Papers, however, tend to shed a different interpretation 
on the conference. As Essex began his Ulster journey, one 
of his agents, Richard Weston, wrote a report on August 
28 which Essex may not have seen until after he returned 
from Ulster. According to Weston, Tyrone had received a 
letter from an agent in Scotland. The agent asserted that 
"your honor (Essex) was mightily crossed in England, since 
you left it, and did think that you would make no great 
stay here. 1160 If the above report is true, and if Tyrone 
59nymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 50; Harrington, Nuga~ 
Antiquae, 299; C. ;:.~ ._..>. 1'.rolana, 159Y-=1600, 146. 
60c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 137· 
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believed it, it would explain why Tyrone offered to par-
ley with Essex, hoping that the Earl would be ready to 
make any truce, so that he could leave Ireland and return 
to his affairs in England. 
Another reference to the private conference occurs 
in the Calendar of State .Pauers in the Archives of Siman-
cas. On July 1, 1600, the Archbishop-elect of Dublin 
wrote to the Spanish king: 
O'Neil (Tyrone) had almost gained the earl of 
Essex, the Queen's commander, to leave her side 
and join your Majesty, surrendering the country 
to you on the promise of great favors in your 
majesty's name, and O'Neil gave him his own son 
as hostage. The Earl did not carry out arrange-
ment, out of suspicion of your Majesty in con-
sequence of certain acts of his against Spain 
some time ago.61 
The "certain acts" undoubtedly refers to the sacking of 
Cadiz in 1596, a humiliation which the Spanish King would 
be loath to forget. 
Another interpretation of the private conference was 
later offered by Sir Robert Cecil, who stated that Essex 
had made a bargain with Tyrone by which a force of Irish-
men were to land in England with Essex, depose the Queen, 
and make all the English "prey to Irish kern. 1162 While 
. . . . ·'' ·.:;)ii-.. · . ·,_ .. 
Cecil's interpretation seems a bit outlandish, it is 
probable that Tyrone did make treasonable offers, and that 
Essex, anxious to make a quick end of the matter, was in 
61c.S.P. Simancas 2 1587-1602, 663. 
62 Domestic 2 159(-1601, r:54 C.S.P. / . 
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no mood or disposition to drive a hard bargain. 
In November, after Essex had left Ireland, Tyrone 
sent a letter to England containing twenty-two articles, 
which supposedly had been agreed upori, or at least dis-
cussed, by the Earl of Essex. The most controversial 
provisions concerned rel~gious freedom, and stipulated 
that Catholicism could be "openly preached and taught"; 
that the Catholic Church in Ireland was to be governed by 
the Pope; that free travel of all priests and missionar-
ies was to be insured; and that the lands and privileges 
of the Catholic church should be restored. The remaining 
articles provided for measures which would allow Ireland 
and the Irish people virtually an autonomous existence. 
Robert Cecil labeled the document with the word "Eutopia" 
and cast it aside. 63 
In any case at the end of the half-hour private con-
ference Essex and Tyrone each brought down six of their 
principal advisors. Again Tyrone and all his party rode 
their horses into the water, while the Lord Lieutenant's 
party remained on the shore, and in this setting they 
continued the conference for another hour. After agree-
ing to have their commissioners meet to draw up terms o:f 
a truce, Essex and Tyrone parted, and would not set eyes 
on each other again. 64 The next day an agreement was 
63 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 279-80. 
64Ibid., 13?. 
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drawn up whereby there would be a six-weeks' truce, which 
would be renewed from one six-weeks' period to another 
six-weeks' period until May day, and could be terminated 
by either side with 14 days' notice. Additionally, com-
missioners would mee·t and draw up more details of the 
terms during the next fe'V( weeks. 65 To seal the bargain 
Essex gave his word, while Tyrone gave his oath, after 
which the English commander dispersed his army and returned 
to Drogheda to "take physic" for his illness, while the 
Irish commander retired, "with all his forces, into the 
heart of his country. 1166 
Essex immediately sent a copy of his journal of pro-
ceedings from August 28 to September 8 to the Privy Coun-
cil. In this journal the Earl only mentioned that a six-
weeks' truce had been concluded, but did not give any 
details. 67 Essex had given Tyrone twenty days to discuss 
terms of the truce with his allies, principally O'Don-
nell, 68 and the Lord Lieutenant moved back to Dublin Oas-
tle to await Tyrone's final answer. While in Dublin, on 
September 15, Essex wrote up a detailed description of all 
the truce's terms and sent them off to Elizabeth. 69 
651188. Salisbur;y, vol. 9, 348. 
66 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 147. 
67Ibid. 
68Harrington, Nugae Antiguae, 301. 
69c.s.P. Irelan~, 1599-160Q, 154. 
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On September 20 Essex received a stinging letter from 
Elizabeth, written in response to the Earl's short note of 
September 4 in which he related his Ulster proceedings; 
proceedings which may well have appeared cautious and ir-
resolute. 70 Elizabeth opened her letter to Essex by not-
ing "how little the mann~r of your proceedings hath an-
swered either our direction or the worl.ds expectations." 
She then launched into a lengthy denunciation of the whole 
course of Essex's campaign. 
The Queen would accept none of Essex's excuses for 
having postponed the Ulster invasion: 
If sickness of the army be reason, why was there 
not the action undertaken when the army was in 
better state? If the spring were too soon, and 
the swmne:i::· th.at fullowecl othei·wise spent, if the 
harvest that succeeded were so neglected as 
nothing hath been done, then surely we must con-
clude that none of the four quarters of the year 
will be in season for you and that Council to 
agree to Tyrone's prosecution, for which all our 
charge is intended. Further, we require you to 
consider whether we have not great cause to 
think that your purpose is not to end the war. 
Concerning strategy she continued: 
How often have you told us that others that pre-
ceded you had no judgement to end the war, who 
often resolved us that until Lou~h Foyle and 
Ballyshannon were planted there could be no hope 
of doing service upon the capitol rebels? We 
must therefore let you know, as it cannot be 
ignorance so it cannot be want of means: for 
you had your asking, you had choice of times, you 
had power and authority more ample than ever any 
70'l'he following excerpts are taken from the Queen's 
letter to Essex, dated September 14, 1599, found in the 
C~S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 150-53. For the complete text 
see Appendix D. 
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had or shall have. 
As for the steadily diminishing numbers of the army 
the Queen observed: "For the small proportion (of troops) 
you say you carry with you of 3,500 foot, when lately we 
augmented you 2,000 more, it is past comprehension, except 
it be that you have left.too great numbers in unnecessary 
garrisons, which do increase our charge and diminish our 
army ••• " Finally, the Queen commented on Essex's inces-
sant charges that his campaign was being undermined by 
persons in England: "We have seen a writing, in manner of 
a catalogue full of challenges, that are impertinent, and 
of comparisons, that are needless, such as hath not been 
before this time presented to a State, except it be done 
more with a hope to terrify all men from censuring your 
proceedings." 
This last letter contained the most serious accusa-
tions burled at Essex to date. In addition to a general 
condemnation of his proceedings, there was the ominous new 
charge that perhaps Essex's purpose was not to end the 
war. Furthermore, Elizabeth's comments concerning Essex's 
"catalogue full of challenges" against the Privy Council 
made it obvious that the Queen was believing the Privy 
Council's interpretation of events. 
Three days after writing her letter of September 14, 
Elizabeth received Essex's journal and letter of September 
8, describing the termination of the Ulster campaign and 
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the prospect of a truce. The Queen immediately sent off 
. 71 her final correspondence. The Queen initially expressed 
surprise to "see a quick end made of a slow proceeding." 
But Elizabeth was skeptical, and stated: 
We never doubted but that Tyrone whensoever he 
saw any force approach, either himself or any of 
his principal partisans, would instantly offer a 
parley, especially with our supreme Governor of' 
that kingdom, having often done it to those who 
had but subaltern authority. 
Elizabeth was particularly distressed about Essex's private 
conversation with Tyrone and commented: 
••• it appeareth to us by your journal, that you 
and the traitor spake together half an hour alone, 
and without anybody's hearing: wherein, though we 
trust you with our kingdom, are far from mistrust-
ing with a traitor; yet both for comeliness, exam-
ple, and for our own discharge, we marvel you 
would c~rry it no better. 
Regarding any truce terms which Essex might offer to 
Tyrone, the Queen sarcastically noted: 11 ••• you have pros-
pered so ill for us by your warfare, as we cannot but be 
very jealous lest you should be as well overtaken by the 
treaty." And she grimly observed: 
••• if this parley shall not produce such a con-
clusion, as this intolerable charge may receive 
present and large abatement, then hath the man-
aging of our forces not only proved dishonorable 
and wasteful, but that which .followeth is like 
to prove perilous and contemptable. 
In respect to any promises Tyrone might make, the 
71 The following excerpts are taken from the Queen's 
letter to Essex, dated September 17, 1599, found in Har-
rington's augae l> ntiqua~, 302-08. For the complete text 
see Appendix E. 
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Queen continued: 
To trust this traitor upon oath, is to trust a 
devil upon his religion. 1ro trust him upon pledges 
is mere illusary, for what piety is there among 
them that can tie them to rule of honesty for 
itself, who are only bound to their own sensual-
ities, and respect only private utility. 
Therefore the terms which the Queen expected Essex to im-
. 
pose were expressed as follows: 
••• unless he [Tyrone] yield to have garrisons 
planted in his country to master him, to deliver 
O'Neils sons [as hostages], and to come over to 
us personally here, we shall doubt you do but 
piece up a hollow peace, and so the end prove 
worse than the beginning. 
The Quee.n then emphatically directed: 
And therefore, as we well approve your own volun-
tary progession, (wherein you assure us that you 
will conclude nothing till you have advertised us, 
and heard our pleasure), so d.o we absolutt;l;y- co1lli.ilar.1.d 
you to continue and perform that resolution. 
Lastly, the Queen explained her reasons for taking such an 
uncompromising position: 
For whatever we do, ought to be well weighed in 
such a time, when the world will suspect that 
we are glad of anything out of weakness, or apt 
to pardon him out of mistrust of our power to 
take due revenge on him. 
When Essex received the above letter, he immediately 
appointed a temporary government in Ireland, and, in dir-
ect disobedience to the Queen's order through the Privy 
Council, too several close companions and departed Ireland 
on September 24, 1599, for Her .Majesty's Court at Nonsuch.72 
Exactly why Essex left in such a manner is still a 
720 (' P • u. • Ireland, 1599-160Q, 156 • 
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matter of speculation. Perhaps it was to e}..~lain the terms 
of the truce which the Queen would receive shortly, terms 
which would :hardly meet her expectations. Perhaps he was 
apprehensive about Her Majesty's inference of treasonable 
activities in her letter of September 14. Undoubtedly the 
last two letters from th~ Queen had inflamed his passion-
ate disposition, and such a flamboyant, dramatic gesture 
was certainly in keeping with his personality. In any 
event his departure from Dublin brought to a close one of 
the most controversial campaigns in English history. 
l 
CHAPTER VIII 
EPILOGUE 
On September 28, 1599, four days after leaving Ire-
land, Essex arrived at the Court of Elizabeth and burst 
. 
into her bed chamber unannounced. After making an ini-
tial hasty e~planation, he was dismissed until the after-
noon, when his conduct would be examined in detail. 
Essex had brought a company of knights, captains and 
other officers with him and they remained close to the 
Earl throughout the long afternoon and evening. 1 
If Essex had hoped to persuade Elizabeth to his way 
of thinking, he was mistaken. A court observer noted 
that the Queen privately commented: "By God's Son I am no 
Queen, that man is above me! 112 Elizabeth made no sudden, 
rash decisions immediately upon Essex's arrival since 
there was no way of knowing how many men he had brought 
with him, and what his intentions were. She may well have 
recalle·d a statement made by Francis Bacon only nine days 
before. On September 15, when discussing Irish questions 
and Essex'~actions, Bacon, still considered a friend by 
. the unsuspecting Essex, offered the observation to the 
1Harrison, Elizabethan Journals II, 116-18. 
2Quoted in Bowen, Lion and Throne, 129. 
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Queen, that if Her Majesty 
••• had my Lord of Essex here with a white staff 
in his hand, as my Lord of Leicester had, and 
continued him still about for society to yourself, 
and for an honour and ornament to your attendance 
and Court in the eyes of your people and in the 
eyes of foreign ambassadors, then were he in his 
right element, for to discontent him as you do and 
yet put arms and power into his hands, may be a 
kind of temptation ~o make him prove cumbersome 
and unruly.3 
In any case, after a day of questioning, with Eliza-
beth now certainly aware that Essex had brought few fol-
lowers, the Earl was turned over to the custody of the 
Lord Keeper, Thomas Egerton, for confinement at York 
House. 4 A hearing of the Star Chamber was considered, 
but its fines were ruinous, and apparently Elizabeth still 
held Essex in affection. Instead, he would be judged by 
a private commission of peers headed by the Lord Keeper.5 
The public reaction was one of disbelief and dismay. 
Unaware of all the circumstances surrounding the Earl's 
return, the people would remain stubbornly loyal to Essex 
.throughout. 
The official hearing regarding the Earl's conduct 
during the Irish campaign took place in June 1600. However, 
preceding this an important meeting of the Star Chamber 
3John Bruce (ed.), Correspondence of Kin5 James VI 
of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and O'thers in '.EnglanO: 
(Lonuon, 1830), 107-68. 
4Williams, Elizabeth, 33?. 
5Bowen, Li~n and Throne, 129. 
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had taken place in November 1599. It was at this meeting 
that the charges against the Earl were clarified and the 
opinion of many otherwise neutral persons were swayed 
against Essex. Additionally, Essex's conduct during the 
official hearing in June 1600 can be understood only by 
examining the proceeding9 of the November Star Chamber 
meeting. It would be profitable, therefore, to consider 
'these proceedings in detail. 
The occasion for the Star Chamber meeting, which 
Essex did not attend, was the end-of-term speech of Lord 
Keeper Egerton. Six members of the Privy Council used 
this opportunity to speak out against treason in general 
and the conduct of Essex in particular. Though not charg-
ing Essex outright with sedition, the implication was 
clear. 
The first speaker was Lord Keeper Egerton, who began 
by condemning certain libels and slanders leveled by 
"wicked Traytors" against Her Majesty. There.were rumors 
that the Queen had not taken the affairs of Ireland with 
as much "Care and Providence as was meet. 116 Yet, Her 
Majesty had sent a splendidly equipped army, had forgiven 
Essex fS,000 of his private debt, and had sent all the arms 
and victuals which were needed. Thus, "if this be no Care 
and Providence in Her Majesty, I know not what Pains, what 
Councel, what Foresight is required in a carefull and 
6Bacon, The Earl of Essex's Vindication, 60. 
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Provident Prince. n7 
Lord Egerton then sought to determine the cause of 
the failure in Ireland. Essex had been instructed to go 
north to Ulster; instead he had gone south and had wasted 
his army. Then, with his army weakened, he had engaged 
in a private conference ~ith Tyrone, had made a dishonor-
able truce, and had returned to England without permission. 
The Lord Keeper concluded that the Earl should get the 
punishment he deserved. 8 
The next speaker was Lord Treasurer Buckhurst, respon-
sible for supplying and financing the expedition. He 
cov€red the subject of support for the expedition, point-
ing out that Essex had the best equipped army ever sent. 
All the men had been paid in advance and all supplies had 
arrived generally as planned. Therefore, no blame could 
be placed on Her .Majesty for lack of support.9 
Buckhurst was followed by Lord Admiral Howard, who 
castigated Essex for going south into Munster after he, 
Essex, had even rec.ognized the need to destroy Tyrone in 
Ulster. 10 He further condemned the promise of religious 
toleration Essex had granted in the truce with Tyrone. 
Nottingham finished by stating that the ships to carry 
?Ib:!£., 62. 
8 Ibid. , 64. 
9Ibid., 64-65. 
10 C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-160~, 349. 
troops to the north had been ready to satl, but Essex's 
weakened army had been in no condition to use them. 11 
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At this point, Sir Robert Cecil interrupted. He 
acknowledged Lord Egerton as being the "mouthpiece of 
Her Majesty" and explained: "It goes against my Heart to 
speak in this Cause, but·when my Sovereign's Honour is in 
Question, I cannot be silent. 1112 He then launched out 
against "these wicked Spirits," who were saying that the 
Queen cared not for her soldiers. Regarding Ireland, he 
stated: "I have heard that my Lord of Essex said that if 
he had had men and money, Ireland had not been lost, but 
I do not think he would say so. 1113 Furthermore, from the 
time Essex's army first landed, it had never tried to de-
feat the main rebel army, but instead had gone south. 
Essex, in going south, proceeded contrary to instructions, 
:for the "Council here declared they never advised such a 
course. 1114 Cecil reiterated the other charges against 
Essex, ending by declaring that he had heard that the 
insolent Irish, heartened by the easy terms Essex had 
granted, were boasting o:f invading England itself. 1 5 
The remaining speakers stated that they were not 
11Bacon, The Earl of Essex's Vindication, 65. 
12Ibid., 67. 
13 C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 353. 
14
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l5Bacon, The Earl of Essex's Vindication, 66-72. 
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present when Irish affairs were being discussed, therefore 
they could make no statements on the specifics of the cam-
paign.16 However, Chief Justice Fortiscue commented that 
libelers and slanderers must be rooted out, or else there 
would be chaos. As for Ireland, all he knew was that the 
island was now in worse condition than when Essex's army 
first landed. Lord Chamberlain Hunsdon, another neutral, 
expressed complete bewilderment at the Irish debacle and 
stated that with the army Essex had, he should have been 
able to march through Spain itselr. 17 
Cecil, Egerton, Buckhurst and Howard had presented 
their declaration in such a way that Essex could not re-
spond without seeming to attack the Queen herself. As a 
final warning, the Coun~il stated that anyone who per-
sisted in slanderous tales concerning the alleged lack of 
care regarding the ·Irish expedition, would be subject to 
severe punishment. 18 
Essex and his followers quickly heard of the proceed-
ings in the Star Chamber and recognized the vulnerability 
of their position. The next day Edward Reynolds, secre-
tary to the Earl of Essex, wrote to Henry Cuffe, another 
Essex supporter, relating the details of the Star Chamber 
proceedings. Reynolds informed Cuffe that Essex wanted 
a thorough check of the Irish records to answer the accusa-
16c.s.P. Domestic, 1,297:-J.60~, 351. 
1 7E 'rh "" 1 f ..... ' v· d · · · 66 aeon, e £;ar. o. J:Jssex s in 1.ca-r;1on, · • 
18Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 129-30. 
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tions of the Council. As for the present, Reynolds felt 
that discretion was the better part of valor. If the 
Earl protested in his usual vociferous manner, he would 
only antagonize the officials and make things worse. Rey-
nolds concluded: "If he gets out of this bog, he may speak 
home hereafter, and yet lose nothing now by a humble and 
temperate proceeding. 1119 As we shall.see, Essex followed 
the advice of his friends when he attended the June hear-
ing. 
On December 1, 1599, the Lords of the Star Chamber 
declared that because of his misgovernment in Ireland, 
along with his other errors and faults, the household 
staff of Essex, numbering 160 persons, was to be dispersed. 
He would be· allowed to keep a few retainers in his new 
residence, which was to be designated by Elizabeth. Essex 
was in no position to argue, particularly since he was 
seriously ill from the effects of campaigning in Ireland. 
By December 15, it seemed that he would die, so Elizabeth 
sent her personal physician to look after him. 20 The peo-
ple were much aggrieved and prayed for Essex's recovery. 
One of Cecil's supporters, Dr. Ed.ward Stanhope, complained 
in a letter that sermons were being preached on behalf of 
Essex, while puolic prayers were offered in his name. 21 
19c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 354. 
20Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 174. 
21 . . C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 365. 
253 
With the coming of Spring, Es.sex recovered and appeared 
before the Council for a formal hearing on June 5, 1600. 
The session lasted for eleven hours, beginning at nine in 
the morning. The charges against him were those discussed 
in the November meeting. The only significant change was 
that Francis Bacon openly joined the ranks of the witnes-
ses against Essex. The Earl was condemned for appointing 
Southampton as General of the Horse, going souttito Munster 
in Ireland contrary to his instructions, and returning 
from Ireland without permission. 22 
Throughout the long session, the Earl was the pic-
ture of humility, rarely speaking, and then only in barely 
audible tones. He began the hearing by voluntarily kneel-
ing at the feet of the Council. As the session went on, 
he was given permission to stand, then to lean, and fin-
ally to sit. When the testimony ended, Essex offered no 
excuses, not even to the insinuations of Sir Edward Coke 
of the Earl's disloyalty. All the Councilors condemned 
Essex for "contemptuously offending so great a sovereign. 11 
However, they could not agree on his punishment, sugges-
tions about which ranged from loss of of fices to imprison-
ment in the Tower. Finally, he was told to return to his 
house to await the Queen's pleasure. 23 
~' 
Elizabeth was possibly impressed by Essex's new-found 
22Ibid., 159. 
23Ibid., 160. 
25LJ. 
humility and kept the sentence relatively light, seques-
tering all the major offices Essex had accumulated and 
keeping him under house arrest. In August, convinced of 
his repentance, she decided to set him free. This deci-
sion prompted controversy among the Court members, as Sir 
Walter Raleigh warned: 
His malice is fixed and will not evaporate by 
any mild courses. Let the Queen hold him 
while she has him for he will always be a dan-
ger. Princes are lost by security and preserved 
by prevention: if he have his liberty then we 
have seen the last of her good days and all 
ours.24 
Raleigh's advice notwithstanding, Essex was freed in late 
August and publicly announced his intention to live a re-
tired life. 
Whether a man of Essex's temperament would have been 
content to retire at the age of thirty-three seems doubt-
ful. \.Jhatever his plans, a new crisis emerged over the 
issue of finances, the plague of king and commoner alike. 
In an age when a teacher could expect to earn I;,5 a year, 
and a good privateer ~9 or ~10, the Earl had run up stag-
gering debts. As we have seen, Elizabeth had written off 
his debt of f8,ooo when he left for Ireland. 
By September 1600, being over %,16,000 in d.ebt, he 
wrote to Elizabeth regarding his financial status. His 
main source of income was from his lease to a monopoly on 
i.nported sweet wines. The ten-year lease would be up in 
24Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 174. 
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t October 1600 and the Earl begged the Queen to renew it, 
t I to save him from his creditors. 25 Elizabeth made no deci-
1 
I sion until the very end of October, and then sent Essex 
word that she had decided to keep the lease herself and 
award it to no one. 26 
Neville Williams, author of Elizabeth the Queen, 
states that Her Majesty decided to hold it until Essex 
would mend his ways. 27 A more plausible explanation lies 
in a comment made by Sir Francis Bacon, who was present 
when the Queen read Essex's letter, wTitten in his usual 
flowery style. Apparently Elizabeth still cared for Essex 
and was deeply disappointed upon receiving this letter, 
for "she took the letter to be the abundance of his heart, 
she found it to be but a preparation for the renewing of 
his farm on sweet wines. 1128 Thus, in her offended vanity, 
she refused to allow Essex to keep his means of financial 
support. 
The news instantly threw Essex into a frenzy. His 
friends told him that the Queen, the Council and his other 
adversaries intended to thrust him down to extreme pover-
ty. 29 Sir John Harrington, who served with him in Ireland, 
saw him shortly afterwards and wrote to a friend: 
25williams, Elizabeth, 340. 
26Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 191. 
27williams, Elizabeth, 340. 
28narrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 186. 
29rbid., i 95. 
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His soul seemeth tossed to and fro like the waves 
of a troubled sea. His speeches of the queene 
becometh no man who has ~ens sana ~n corpore sano. 
He uttered strange wordsbordering on such strange . 
desygnes that made me hasten forth and leave his 
presence. Thank heaven! I am safe at home.30 
When .the Queen turned down his request for renewal of his 
lease, the Earl committed himself to the idea of rebellion. 
When one considers his dealings with James VI of 
Scotland and Lord Mountjoy in Ireland, it would seem that 
rebellion had been in the back of his mind for some time. 
The Scottish King, who had long set_ his mind on succeeding 
to the Crown of England, had had constant correspondence 
with Essex, and there were many who advised James that 
Essex was the man with whom he would have to deai.31 
At the same time, Essex had been keeping in close 
touch with Lord Hountjoy, his successor in Ireland, and 
correspondence indicates that I1ountjoy and Essex had a 
plan for an invasion of England from Ireland and Scotland. 
Immediately after taking over the Irish army, Mountjoy 
sent Henry Leigh, his personal emissary, to James VI, pro-
posing that if James would mass troops on the border, 
Mountjoy would invade England with four or five thousand 
men, and under Essex, effect a coup, turning the Crown over 
to James.32 James, as usual, was hesitant and unwilling 
30Quoted in Bowen, Lion and Throne, 130. 
31 . Helen G. Stafford, James VI of Scotland and the 
!_~r~ne of Enf:\lend (New York, 1940), 205. 
32navid H. Wilson, James VI and I (New York, 1967), 
150-51; Handover, The Second CeciI, ~Co. . 
r 
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to take so drastic a step; thus negotiations stretched 
throughout the summer of 1600. At the same time, Mount-
joy was experiencing great success in Ireland and quickly 
grew lukewarm to the idea of an armed invasion. 33 After 
the sweet-wines incident, Essex attempted to push the in-
vasion plot again, playing on James' fear of exclusion by 
writing that Cecil was considering the establishment of 
the Spanish Infanta on the throne of England.34 But James, 
though alarmed, still would not risk offending Elizabeth, 
while Lord Mountjoy no longer wished to risk his career, 
and possibly his head, for Essex. 
With or without James VI and Mountjoy, Essex was de-
termined to act, and as later confessions indicated, the 
outline of the plot was formed at the beginning of Novem-
ber 1600. The conspirators, headed by Essex and the Earl 
of Southampton, met at Dr~y House, where they decided to 
capture the Tower of London first, then the Court, and 
without harm to the Queen, to effect a change of govern-
ment and thus rid the Queen of evil advisors. For sup-
port, Essex's friends confidently assured him that he 
could count on the people of London, and at least twenty-
one of the twenty-four aldermen.35 
At the end of December Essex went to London, where 
33Handover, The Second Cecil, 205. 
34Ibid., 220. 
35Bowen, Lion and Throne, 133, 137. 
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his presence irrmiediatcly attracted the attention of the 
entire city. Throughout the month of January there were 
almost daily gatherings at his house, while preachers 
gave sermons on the power of superior magistrates to re-
strain even kings. Discontented officers, Puritans· and 
other malcontents also tbronged about his residence.36 
Apparently by early February the conspirators were ready, 
since on February 5, Essex's friends paid forty shillings 
to have the play Richard II performed at the Globe Thea-
ter in London.37 
Such obvious preparation could hardly be missed by 
Cecil, and on February ?, he sent word for Essex to report 
to the Council. Essex refused, telling Cecil that he was 
sick and confiding to his friends that he expected to be 
murdered. The next day Cecil sent a delegation, led by 
the Lord Keeper and the Lord Chief Justice, to Essex's 
house to take the Earl into custody. Essex immediately 
had them locked up, and with about two hundred followers 
went into the London streets to start the rebellion. The 
crowds were both wary and confused as the greatest lord 
in England rode through the streets calling them to arms 
and warning of plots by Raleigh and others to kill him.38 
Robert Cecil had been well prepared. The day after 
36Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 203, 205. 
37 . Bowen, Lion and Throne, 131. 
38Harrison, Elizabethan Journals 2 II, 210. 
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the revolt, he wrote: "If the Queen had not put herself in 
strength that morning and barricaded Charing Cross and 
other places of the back parts of Westminster, the resolu-
tion was to have been at the court by noon."39 As Essex 
passed through the streets, Robert Cecil's brother fol-
lowed as a herald, procl~iming Essex a traitor. 40 The Lord 
Mayor and the Lord Sheriff, whom Essex had thought might 
provide 1000 men, refused to aid him, while the troops of 
the Bishop of London fired on the rebels, killing three 
men, the only fatalities of the rebellion. 41 
With nowhere to go, Essex retreated back to his house, 
ci t_izens and followers alike using the opportunity to 
slink from his side. Finding his prisoners gone, Essex 
barricaded the house and awaited his fate. 42 It came in 
the person of Lord Admiral Howard, who arrived with a 
force of cavalry and called upon Es.sex and the conspira-
tors to surrender, promising that their grievances would 
be brought to the Queen. At this, a contemporary writes, 
"they seemed utterly to despair, Essex saying there was 
none near the Queen that would be suffered to make a true 
report of his action, or spea~ a good word for him. 1143 
39c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 547. 
40Handover, The Second Cecil, 237. 
41Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 210-13. 
42Ibid. 
43c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 550. 
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After more prompting, Essex came out, and the Lord Admiral 
took him away. The brief rebellion was over, undone, as 
one contemporary observed, by the "providence and celerity 
of the Secretary who foresaw before he was believed and 
showed great dexterity and courage in ministering sudden 
remedies. 1144 
The immediate concern of both Elizabeth and Robert 
Cecil was to discredit Essex with the people and to insure 
that no outside force would attempt to complicate the is-
sue. The next day, Elizabeth set the tone, when she ex-
plained to the French Ambassador that "a senseless ingrate 
had at last revealed what had long been in his mind. '.45 
On the same day, a proclamation drawn up by Robert Cecil 
was sent to the people of London which stated that the 
Earls of Essex, Southampton and Rutland had been discovered 
in treasons in Ireland with Tyrone, and also in England. 
Upon being discovered, the conspirators had imprisoned the 
Lord Keeper and the Lord Chief Justice and then, pretend-
ing that their lives were threatened, had attempted to 
lead a rebellion. The culprits now had been apprehended, 
and Her Majesty thanked Her, subjects for their loyalty. 46 
The charge of an Essex-Tyrone conspiracy was the main 
theme in the subsequent attempts to discredit Essex, since 
44Ibid., 555. 
45Williams, Elizabeth, 340. 
46c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 545. 
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an invasion by half-civilized Irishmen, whose savagery 
was well known to the masses through stories from return-
ing veterans, was a particularly frightening prospect. 
At Essex's trial, Sir Robert Cecil solemnly announced 
that Essex had planned to have Tyrone land with 8000 Irish 
barbarians and depose th~ Queen, after which all would be 
made "prey to Irish kerns. 1147 
Sir Robert Cecil, who must have had a superlative in-
telligence network, apparently was aware of Essex's previ-
ous intrigues with Mountjoy in Ireland, as well as with 
James VT in Scotland. Now, Cecil wrote a letter to Lord 
I1ountjoy to subtly inform the Viceroy that if he had any 
thoughts of returning to save Essex he would be backing a 
dead favorite. After informing Mountjoy of the details of 
the rebellion, Cecil concluded: "I shall only need to say 
that I think by the time my letters arrive, both he (Essex) 
and the Earl of Southampton with other
0
principles, shall 
have lost their heads. 1148 Cecil need not have troubled 
himself about Mountjoy; things were going too well in Ire-
land. As for James VI of Scotland, when he heard the news 
of Essex's failure, he realized that for all practical pup. 
poses, Cecil was the temporary ruler of England and imme-
diately sought to solidify relations with the Secretary. 49 
47Ibid., 554. 
48 C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 547. 
49stafford, James VI, 21?. 
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The trial, which began on February 19, 1601, was a 
mere formality, since the issue was never in doubt. Actu-
ally, in Tudor England, to be put on trial for treason 
was tantamount to a death sentence. From 1522 to 1589, 
many noblemen were brought to trial, yet only one, Sir 
Nicholas Throckmorton, managed to talk himself into an 
acquittal. Throckmorton's jury was immediately imprisoned, 
and eight who re.fused to retract their "not guilty" verdict 
were ruinously .fined.50 
The rules for procedure were somewhat lax and were 
definitely stacked against the accused. At Essex's tria,l, 
two eminent lawyers, Sir Edward Coke, who had both set up 
the trial and selected the jury, and Chief Justice Popham, 
who was the judge, gave testimony against Essex. The jury 
contained numerous persons of very doubtful objectivity,, 
such as Lord Admiral Howard and Lord Grey. However, the 
trial proceeded as a model of Elizabethan jurisprudence 
and the prosecutors, particularly Sir Edward Coke, presen• 
ted an unanswerable case. When the verdict was called ~or, 
each juryman rose and stated in monotonous succession: 
"Guilty, my Lord, of high treason, upon my honor. 11 51 
On February 25, 1601, Robert Devereaux, second Earl 
of Essex, ascended the scaffold to the executioner's block 
in the Tower of London courtyard, to suffer the penalty 
50Bowen, Lion and Throne, 142-43. 
5libid., 141, 143, 159. 
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for treason and rebcllioL. Of his principal antagonists, 
Sir Robert Cecil was nowhere to be seen, but Sir Walter 
Raleigh accompanied Essex to the very steps of the plat-
form, ostensibly to be in a position to reply to any final 
accusations Essex might hurl at him. Some said he came to 
feed his eyes with the sight of the Earl's blood.52 The 
Privy Council instructed the officials in charge of the 
execution to insure that Essex, in his final remarks, in 
no way attempted to discuss the particulars of his trial 
or to justify himself. Thus, the sentence was carried out 
with scrupulous attention to ancient custom, ending with 
the executioner lifting the severed head to the assembled 
notables and crying: "God save the Queen. 11 53 
After the execution, Robert Cecil still tried to 
destroy the image of Essex. Sir Francis Bacon was commis-
sioned to write a tract about the treason of the fallen 
earl,54 while preachers were ordered to condemn him from 
the pulpit. The gist of the condemnation was that Essex 
had plotted with Tyrone, had been reconciled to the Pope 
and the King of Spain, and had sought to place himself on 
the throne of England. But the populace knew that most of 
these outrageous charges had not been mentioned at the 
52camden, His~o~ie, 188. 
53Q.S.P. ~omestic, 1597-1601, 595-96. 
54Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 241. 
arraignment,55 and in resentment they spoke of Cecil as 
"Robin with the bloody heart" and "a Machiavelli with a 
crooked back. 11 56 
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Elizabeth, for all her outward imperturbability, was 
as grieved as the people at the death of Essex. The Queen 
slipped into a mental depression from which she never 
really emerged. Court observers wrote of how she suddenly 
cared little for food, wore the same garments for days on 
end, paced her privy chamber at all hours of the night, and 
generally displayed annoyance at all things.57 
In December 1602, Sir John Harrington, Elizabeth's 
godson, visited the Court and found Elizabeth "in most 
pitiable state. 11 Harrington, who had a reputation for his 
lively poetry, tried to cheer her up by reading some of 
his verses, but the Queen only replied: "When thou dost 
feel creeping time at thy gate, these fooleries will please 
thee less; I am past my relish for such ma t·ters. 11 58 During 
the course of their conversation, Elizabeth casually asked 
Harrington if he had ever seen Tyrone, whereupon Harring-
ton said 'that he had seen Tyrone when he served with the 
Earl of Essex. At this remark, she suddenly looked up 
55.Elizabeth M. Thomson, The Chamberlain Letters (New 
York, 1965), 18. 
56 \.Jilliams, 1~li zabeth, 342. 
57H . t 
.. arring on, Tiugae Antiguae, 317-20 • 
58Ibid., 323. 
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with "much color and grief in her countenance," and her 
eyes filled with tears.59 In this state of melancholia, 
Elizabeth spent her remaining days, and she died on March 
24, 1603. 
The fate of Ireland.after the departure of the Lord 
Lieutenant was similarly unhappy. Essex had made a great 
impression on the Irish in general, and Tyrone in particu-
lar. After the Lord Lieutenant had gone back to England, 
negotiations broke down, while reports kept coming in 
that the rebels would surrender only to the Earl of Es-
sex. 60 Tyrone himself wrote that Essex was the only Eng-
lishman in whom he had confidence. 61 However, by Novem-
ber, Tyrone began to doubt whether Essex would come back, 
and in January 1600, the Irish leader b·egan his deprada-
tions anew. 62 
Sir Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, was asked to take 
command 0£ Essex's army in October 1599, shortly after 
the Earl had returned from Ireland. Lord Mountjoy at 
first refused out of loyalty to Essex, a feeling no doubt 
prompted in part by the fact that Mountjoy loved Essex's 
59Ibi~., 322. 
60Q_.S.P. Ireland 2 1599-l?OO, 201. 
61Ibid. , 240-41. 
62Ibid., 252. 
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favorite sister, Penelope. 63 In February 1600, apparently 
convinced that Essex's fortune was on a downward course, 
Mountjoy suddenly accepted command of the army. 
The new Lord Deputy arrived in Ireland at the end of 
the month and, with an army of 14,000 foot and 1200 horse, 
brought up to full strength by new drafts from the Queen, 64 
began his work with efficiency and dedication. His first 
task was to revise the victualing system. The old system 
of supplying the Army's needs directly from England had 
worked while the garrisons numbered only a few thousand; 
it was threatened when the garrisons rose from 4000 to 
7000 in 1595; and finally broke down altogether when Es-
sex's great army of 17,300 sought to sustain itself. 
Upon observing the disastrous effects on Essex's 
army, Lord Mountjoy implemented a ruthless version of the 
Netherlands system, whereby the householders in fortified 
towns were required to store one year's supply of corn, and 
if possible, butter, cheese and salt pork, which his army 
could use as it passed by the area. 65 Mountjoy's system, 
which he had three years to perfect, worked well for the 
English, although it resulted in the Irish countryside 
being scoured of footstuffs and left famine in the wake. 
The Privy Council gave additional support by changing 
63Handover, The Second Cecil, 200. 
64 Falls, Eliz.a beth's Irish War_§., 262. 
65c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 370. 
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th,e system of shipping victuals from England. Instead of 
allowing the merchants to turn over supplies to the "com-
missaries of victuals" at the Irish ports, the merchants 
were made utterly responsible for supplies, from initial 
procurement to final distribution to the army units. With-
out the ambiguities of responsibility which existed when 
the "commissaries of victuals" were involved in the dis-
tribution process, the Privy Council was able to control 
the system better and greatly reduce corruption. 66 
Acceptable strides were also made in reforming the 
problem of uniforms. Essex's troops had had their uni-
forms rot off their bodies, and had been otherwise unsuit-
ably dressed to conduct a campaign in the Irish climate 
and terrain. Essex had realized these deficiencies and 
had suggested in July 1599 that the troops be outfitted 
with Irish shoes and Irish mantles (large woolen coats) 
which were ideally suited for the climate. 67 No action 
was taken during Essex's lieutenancy, but in December 
1599, Irish apparel., notably shoes and mantles, was·au-
thorized for the army in Ireland. 68 As for the corruption 
in supplying uniforms which had plagued Essex, Mountjoy 
was ordered to investigate the matter and determine where 
66cruickshank, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 85. 
1 
67 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 93. 
68~.b· ~ 
.:L.2:.£. ' 109-12 • 
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the discrepancies la~. 69 Although :Mountjoy never deter-
mined the exact source of corruption, his investigation 
apparently had some deterrent effect, since difficulties 
about uniforms were only a minor problem in his army •. 
The overall effect of reform in disbursing victuals 
and uniforms was to upgr~de the health of :Mountjoy's army. 
Additionally, while Essex's soldiers died in the streets 
for want of appropriate medical care--despite Essex's 
personal efforts--a massive government effort was ordered 
for Mountjoy. In January 1600, Lord Buckhurst, the Trea~ 
surer, authorized money for the establishment of hospitals 
in every province.in Ireland.70 
The final area of reform concerned the rule that sol-
diers had to pay for their own gunpowder, even in battle. 
As early as August 1598, Sir Robert Cecil in a memorandum 
entitled "Some errors to be reformeQ. in the government of 
Ireland" had discussed with understanding the problem of 
ammunition--and, incidentally, the use of Irish mantles 
and shoes.71 However, while Essex brought the problem of. 
gunpowder to the attention of the Privy Council, it was 
not until after his campaign that corrective action was , , 
taken. 
The chief opponent against having the Crown pay a 
69Ibid., 442. 
?Oibid., 396. 
71c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-9~, 251-53. 
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gunpowder allowance was the Treasurer, Lord Buckhurst, who 
believed that if the soldiers did not pay for their own 
ammunition, they would not care how much they fired off, 
and how much of the Queen's resources were wasted. On 
January 16, 1600, Buckhurst reluctantly approved the new 
rule of having the Crown.pay for gunpowder used in battle, 
concluding, however, that the new system was "against all 
re€ison, equity, good order and justice. 11 72 Later in the 
year,, Mountjoy was authorized to issue gunpowder for train-
ing purposes as well as for active service,?3 while in 
1601, the government decided that the ordinary soldier 
should no longer be compelled to pay for weapons lost on 
the battlefield.74 
With a firm base of support at Dublin, and with the 
enthusiastic cooperation of the Privy Council, Mou_~tjoy 
systematically began the subjugation of Tyrone. A new 
series of mutually supporting garrisons were established 
across the southern Ulster border at 'Mount Norris, Armagh, 
the Blackwater fort, Breifne and Boyle abbey in Connaught~ 
Corn and food supplies were destroyed throughout the coun~ 
try, wherever they could not be protected. Finally, on May 
16, 1600, with the full coo¥eration of the English navy, 
4000 men, commanded by Sir Henry Docwra, and all their 
?2c "' ~ • u ....... Ireland, 1599-1600, 380 • 
?3Ibid. 
74 A.P.C. XXXII, 337. 
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supplies, were landed at Lough Foyle.75 
Lord Mountjoy was fortunate enough to have two out-
standing subordinates, Sir George Carew and Sir Arthur 
Chichester. Sir George Carew took the place of the dead 
Sir Thomas Norreys as President of Munster, and soon had 
the province well in han~. An astute politician, as well 
as an able soldier, Carew convinced an increasing number 
of Irish rebels not only to stop fighting against the 
English, but to join in the conflict against their former 
associates in order to bring the devastating war to a 
close.76 Sir Arthur Chichester, who would reach the pin-
nacle of his fame as Lord Deputy of Ireland under James I, 
commanded the forces operating out of Carrickfergus in 
Ulster. 
Mountjoy opened the assault on Ulster with a three-
pronged attack: Docwra moving in from Lough Foyle; Sir 
Arthur Chichester from Car~ickfergus; and Mountjoy's field 
army coming up through the Mowry Pass. To the horror of 
the Irish, Mountjoy continued these attacks throughout the 
winter of 1600-1601, a tactic which according to Fynes Mor-
rison, "brake their hearts" and threatened to summarily 
end the war.?? However, before Mountjoy could finish 
~.:'yrone, the long-awaited Spanish intervention took place. 
?5Rayes-McCoy, "Strategy and Tactics in Irish War-
fare," 269. 
76Falls, Elizabeth's Irish War_§_, 255. 
77Moryson, Itinerary, vol. 11, 270. 
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In October 1601, 4000 Spanish troops landed at Kin-
sa.le, on the southern coast of Munster, and Mountjoy had 
to take his entire field army, some 5000 men, to meet the 
threat. Tyrone likewise brought all the forces he could 
spare, over 6000 men, to Kinsale, where a climactic battle 
ensued. Mountjoy besieg~d the Spanish in Kinsale, while 
Tyrone in turn surrounded !1ountjoy, and in this configura-
tion, Tyrone elected to fight the one orthodox battle of 
his career on Christmas Day 1601. 
The Irish, attempting a night attack, became uncoor-
dinated in executing their complicated maneuver and the 
four sections of the Irish army were defeated in detail, 
while the Spanish never kept their promise to emerge from 
their fortifications to assist Tyrone.78 The Irish were 
sent reeling northwards, while Mountjoy forced the Span-
ish to surrender. The Lord Deputy and his subordinates, 
·Docwra and Chichester, pursued Tyrone ruthlessly for the 
rest of the winter. In May 1601, Sir Arthur Chichester, 
the most relentless of the pursuers, described his savage 
progress in a letter to Mountjoy: 
We have killed, burnt, and spoiled all along 
the Lough within four miles of Dungannon, from 
whence we returned hither yesterday ••• We spare 
none of what quality or ·sex soever, and it hath 
bred much terror in the people, who heard not a 
drUr:J. or saw not a fire there of long time. The 
last service was upon Patrick O'Quin, whose 
house .and town was burnt, wife, son, children, and 
people slain, himself (as is now reported to me) 
78 Hayes-McCoy, "Strategy and Tactics in Irish War-
fare," 269. 
dead of a hurt received in flying from his house, 
and other gentleman which received blows in fol-
lowing us in our return to the boat; and Tyrone 
himself lay within a mile of this place, but kept 
himself safe, sending 100 shot to know the matter, 
which he seemed to marvel at.79 
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Additionally, as Tyrone's allies gradually deserted 
the Irish leader they were used to fight the remaining 
rebels. The English attitude was expressed by Chichester 
who, upon hearing of a vicious battle between friendly 
and hostile Irish, commented: "It was good service on 
both sides; for never an honest man was slain. 1180 
Tyrone was doomed, but stubbornly held out for another 
murderous winter, by which time famine was in full fury. 
Fynes Moryson tells of corpses lying in Ulster roads, 
mouths stained green with the grass with which they had 
tried to sustain theselves; and of a band of old women 
who enticed children into their company and then killed 
them for food. 81 With this note of misery and degrada-
tion, Tyrone's rebellion, the great rebellion, ended. 
On Nary 30, 1603, Tyrone and his few remaining fol-
lowers, now reduced to fugitives in their own land, pro-
ceeded to the Blackwater fort and surrendered to Mount-
joy. 82 Ar' a final irony atrributable to the slowness of 
?9 C.S.P. Irela~nd, 1600-1601, 356. 
SOib:Ld., 333. 
81Moryson, Itinerar1, vol. 111, 170. 
82Falls, Elizabeth's Irii:;h \·/ars, 333. 
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communications, Tyrone had surrendered six days after 
Elizabeth had diedt without knowing that his former secret 
ally, James I of Scotland, had succeeded to the throne of 
England. 
CONCLUSION 
The campaign against the Earl of Tyrone was the most 
formidable undertaking of any English expeditionary force 
up to that time. If the army of Essex was the largest 
ever sent, so were the p~oblems of supply and maintenance 
the most difficult yet encountered. Success depended on 
whole-hearted backing from England. Even with complete 
c'ooperation, decision by military victory was a question-
able thing, as seen by the campaign of Essex's successor, 
Lord Mountjoy, who, being judged by many as a superior 
soldier to Essex, and who received all the support which 
ERsex <ltd not, still took three years to end the conflict. 
Essex had enemies in key positions at home, princi-
pally Sir Robert Cecil, who had much to lose by a quick 
and successfu1 campaign; and in the Earl's absence the 
sixty-six year old Queen relied on his most bitter enemy 
for guidance and advice. The incredible lack of support, 
I 
as manifested by nonavailability of shipping, failure to 
send draught horses, recall of Essex's subordinates, revo-
ca~ion of his permission to return, the lack of money, and 
the belittling and misrepresentations of his actions to 
the Ct,ueen all imply a conscious effort on the part of his 
enemies to insure his failure. In.those areas in which 
the Privy Council did cooperate, widespread corruption 
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added to Essex's problems and underrained his campaign. 
The lack of support dictated the strategy Essex had 
to employ. Instead of following the best possible cour-
ses of action, which he himself recognized.and recommen-
ded, circumstances forced him to choose alternative cour-
ses of action which were.potentially disastrous. The 
primitive state of communications also forced Essex to 
depend heavily on subordinates. Instead of assisting his 
effort, Essex's subordinates involved him in two crucial 
defeats, over which he had no control, but for which he 
·would be blamed. In spite of these formidable stumbling 
·blocks, Essex, by the force of his personality, succeeded 
in bringing about a truce which had all the possibilities 
of leading to a relatively inexpensive negotiated settle-
nie'nt. The negotiations were wrecked by not allowing Essex 
to return, the rebels being willing to deal only with him. 
To attribute the collapse of the Irish campaign of 
1599 to the Earl of Essex is to exhibit the same lack of 
under~tanding which Elizabeth reflected in her letters. 
In all major strategic decisions Essex chose the best 
possible alternatives. Instead, the failure of the cam-
paign should be attributed to a panoply of factors includ-
ing: the inherent difficulties of Irish warfare; corrup-
tion; and, particularly, to the uncooperative and hostile 
actions of those persons who actively sought the Earl's 
downfall. 
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APPENDIX A 
A?~ENDIX A: Letter of Oueen Elizabeth to the Earl of 
Essex, dated July 19, 1599. 
We have perceived by your letters to our Council, brought 
by Henry Carey, that you are arrived at Dublin after your journey into Munster; where, though it seemeth, by the 
words of your letter, that you had spent divers days in 
taking an account of all things that have passed since 
you left that place, yet have you in this dispatch given 
us small light either when, or in what order, you intend 
particularly to proceed to the northern action. Wherein, 
if you compare the time that is run on, and the excessive 
charges that is (sic) spent, with the effects of anything 
wrought by this voyage (howsoever we may remain satisfied 
with your own particular cares and travails of body and 
mind), yet you must needs think that we, that hav·e the 
eyes of foreign Princes upon our actions, and.have the 
hearts of people to comfort and cherish, who groan under 
the burden of continual levies and impositions, which are 
occasioned by these late actions, can little please our-
self hitherto with anything that has been effected. For 
what can be more true (if things be rightly examined) 
than that your two months' journey hath brought in never 
a capital rebel, against whom i.t had been worthy to JJ.ave 
adventured one thousand men. For of their two comi1lgs in, 
that were brought unto you by Ormonde (namely, Mountgar- . 
rett and Cahir), whereupon ensued the taking of Cab.ii' 
Castle, full well do we know that you would long since 
have scorned to have allowed it for any great matter in 
others, to have taken an Irish hold from a rabble of 
rogues, with such force as you had, and with the help of 
the cannon, ·which was always able in Ireland to make his 
passage where it pleased. And, therefore, more than that, 
you have now learned, upon our expenses, by knowledge of 
the country, that those things are true, which we have 
heretofore told you, if you would have believed us, how 
far different things would prove there from your expecta-
tion. '.!.'here is little public benefit made to us of any 
things happened in this action, which the President, with 
any convenient addition to his numbers by you, might not 
have effected, either now or hereafter, in a time more 
seasonable, when it should less have hindered the other 
enterprise, on which depends our greatest expectation. 
\/hereunto we will add this one thing, that doth more dis-
please us than any charge or expense that happens, which 
is, that it must be the Queen of England's fortune (who 
hath held down the greatest enemy she had), to make a 
base bush kern to be accounted so famous a rebel, as to 
be a person against whom so many thousands of foot and 
horse, besides the force of all the nobility of that 
kingdom, must be thought too little to be employed. For 
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we must now remember unto you, that our cousin of Ormonde, 
by his· own relation when you arrived, assured us that he 
had delivered you a charge of a kincdom, without either 
town maritime, or island, or hold, possessed by the trai-
tors. But we did ever think that Tyrone would please him-
self to see such a portion of our fair army, and led by 
the person of our general, to be harassed out and adven-
tured in encountering those· base rogues, who were no way 
strengthened by foreign armies, but only by such of his 
offal, as he was content to spare and let slip from him-
self; while he hath lived at his pleasure, hath spoiled 
all where our army should come, and preserved for himself 
what he thought necessary. Little do you know how he hath 
blazed in foreign parts the defeats of regiments, the death 
of Captains, and loss of men of quality in every corner; 
and how little he .seemeth to value their power, who use 
it so as it is likely to spend itself. It is, therefore, 
apparent that all places require not one and the selfsame 
knowledge, and that drafts and surprises would have found 
better successes than public and notorious marches; though, 
where the rebel attends you with greater forces, it is 
necessary that you carry our army in the form you use. 
But it doth sound hardly in the ears of the world, 
that in a time when there is a question to save a kingdom, 
and in a country where experience giveth so great advanta~ 
to all enterprises, regiments should be committed to young 
gentlemen that rather desire .,,to do well than know how to 
perform it. A matter wherein we must note that you have 
made both us and our Council so great strangers, as to 
, this day (but by reports) we knmv not who they be that 
spend our treasure and carry places of note in our army. 
Wherein you know we did by our instructions direct you as 
soon as you should be arrived, seeing you used your reasons 
why it could not be done so conveniently beforehand. 
These things we would pass over, but that we see your pen 
flatters you with phrases, that here you are defeated, 
that you are disgraced from hence in your friends' fortune, 
that poor Ireland suffers in you; still exclaiming against 
the effects of your own causes. For if it be not enough 
that you have all, and more than, that which was agreed 
on before you went, concerning public service, but that 
you must, by your voluntary actions there in particular 
things (which you know full well are contrary to our will 
and liking), raise an opinion that there is any person 
that dare displease us, either by experience of our for~er 
tolerations, or with a conceit to avoid blame by distinc-
tions; then must we not hide from you (how much soever we 
do esteem you, for thoGe good things which are in you), 
but that our honour hath dwelt too long with us, to leave 
that point now uncleared, that whosoever it be that you 
do clad with any honours or places wherein the world may 
read the least suspicion of neglect or contempt of our 
commandments, we will never make dainty to set on such 
shadows, as shall quickly eclipse nny of those lustres. 
And, therefore, although by your letter we found your 
purpose .to go northward, on which depends the main good 
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of our service, and which we expected long since should 
have been performed, yet because we do hear it bruited 
(besides the words of your letter, written with your own 
hand, which carries some such sense), that you who allege 
such weakness in our army by being travailed with you, 
and find so great and important affairs to digest at Dub-
lin, will yet engage yourself personally into Offaly 
(being our Lieutenant), when you have there so many infer-
iors able enough to victual a fort, or seek revenge of 
those that have lately prospered against our forces; and 
when we call to mind how far the sun hath run his course, 
what dependeth upon the timely plantation of our garri-
sons in the north, and how great a scandal it would be to 
our honour to leave that proud rebel unassailed, when we 
have, with so great an expectation cf our enemies, engaged 
ourself so far in the action, so as without that be done, 
all these former courses will prove like via navis in mari; 
besides that our power, which hitherto hath been dreaded 
by potent enemies, will now be even held contemptible 
amongst our rebels; we must now plainly charge you, accord-
ing to the duty you owe us, so to unite soundness of judg-
ment to the zeal you have to do us service, and with all 
speed to pass thither in such order, as the axe may be put 
to the root of that tree, which hath been the treasonable 
stock from whence so many poisoned plants and grafts have 
been derived. By which proceeding of yours, we may nei·cher 
have cause to repent our employment of yourself for omit-
ting those best opportunities to shorten the war, nor re-
ceive (in the eye of the world) imputation of too much 
weakness in ourself to begin a work without better fore-
sight. What would be the end of our excessive charge, the 
adventure of our people's lives, and the holding up of our 
own greatness, against a wretch whom we have raised from 
the dust, and who could never prosper, if the charges we 
have been put to were orderly employed? 
For the matter of Southampton, it is strange to us 
that his continuance or displacing should work so great an 
alteration, either in yourself (valuing our commandments 
as you ought), or in the disposition of our army, where 
all the Commanders cannot be ignorant that we not only 
not allowed of your desire for him, but did expressly for-
bid it; and being· such a one whose counsel can be of lit-
tle, and experience of less use; yea, such a one [as1, were 
he not lately fastened to yourself by an accident, ~erein, 
for our usage of yours, we deserve thanks, you would have 
used many of your old lively arguments against him for any 
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such ability or commandment; it is, therefore, strange to 
us that we (sic), knowing his worth by y0ur report, and 
your own disposition from ourself in that point, will dare 
thus to value your own pJ.easing in thinr;s unnecessary, 
and think by your private arguments to carry for your own 
glory a matter wherein our pleasure to the contrary is 
made notorious. And where you say fUrther that divers, 
or the most, of the voluntary gentlemen are so discour-
aged thereby, as they begin to desire passports, and pre-
pare to return, we cannot as yet be persuaded but that 
the love of our service,. and the duty which they owe us, 
have been as strong motives to these their travails and 
hazards as any affection to the Earl of Southampton, or 
any other. If it prove otherwise (which we will not so 
much wrong ourself as to suspect), we shall have the less 
cause, either to acknowledge or reward it. 
APPENDIX B 
APPENDIX B: Letter of Queen Elizabeth to ·the Earl of Essex, 
dated July 30, 1599. 
We have seen your letters written to our Council, by 
which we find many lacks represented; although, upon exam-
ination thereof, we find those things only wanting of that 
which was resolved, by those accidental causes which accom-
pany sea transportations. And yet we understand by our 
Council that, upon calling to account the inferior mini-
sters, to \-:hom those cares were left, that (sic) most of 
those proportions of victuals, which were certified from 
remote garrisons to the Comptrollers there to be unarrived 
in Ireland, have long since been shipped here in several 
ports, so as they do assure themselves that long before 
this time they are in their appointed places. But of 
these things, and of your demand of 2,000 Irish more to 
be in charge for this present servfce, with enlargement 
of our allowance for your concordatums, our Council shall 
deliver you our pleasure, it being our purpose only now 
to deliver you our conceit of the course already holden, 
and what is our f her determination. 
First, you know right well, when we yielded to this 
excessive charge, it was upon no other foundation than 
[that] to which yourself did ever advise us as much as 
anyi which was, to assail the Northern Traitor, and to 
plant garrisons in his country, it being ever your firm 
opinion, amongst others of our Council, to conclude that 
all that was done in other kind in Ireland, was but waste 
and consumption. 
If then you consider what month we are in, and what a 
charge we have been ever at, since the first hour of your 
arrival, even to the greatest proportion that was intended, 
when the general prosecution should be made, and what is 
done of effect in any other place (seeing every Province 
must require so great numbers as by your letters is set 
down), you may easily judge that it is far beyond our ex-
pectation to find you make new doubts of further proceed-
ing into Ulster, without further increase of numbers, when 
no cause can be conceived by us, that you should hold the 
traitor's strength at ·higher rBte than when you departed; 
except it be that by your unseasonable journey into Mun-
ster, and by the small effects thereof (in comparison of 
that we hoped this great charge should have effected), 
you have broken the heart of our best troops, and weakened 
your strength upon inferior rebels, and run out the glass 
of time which hardly can be recovered. li'or the present, 
therefore, we do hereby let you know, that the state of 
things standing as they do, and all tho circumstances 
weighed, both of our honour and of the state of that king-
dom, we must expect at your hands, without delay, the pass-
ing into the North, for accomplishment of those counsels 
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which were resolved on at your departure, to the intent 
that a:'i.l these six months' charges prove not fruitless, 
and all future attempts there as little successful; espe-
cially when these base rebels shall see their golden calf 
preserve himself without taint or loss, as safe as in his 
sanctuary, and our treasure, time, and honour, spent and 
engaged in other enterprises, which were always concluded 
to be of no difficulty, till the capital Rebel had been 
attempted. 
In which respect, because we know that on your con-
tinuance there doth now C.epend the order and conduct of 
this important affair, and by your return suddenly (till 
the northern action be tried), many and great confusions 
may follow our will and pleasure is, and so we do upon 
your duty command you, that, notwithstanding our former 
license provisionally given, whereby you have liberty to 
return, and constitute some temporary Governor in your 
absence, that you do now in no wise take that liberty, 
nor adventure to leave that State in any person's govern-· 
ment, but with our allowance first had of him, and our 
pleasure first known unto you what order you shall leave 
with him. After you shall have certified us to what form 
you have reduced things in the north; what hath been the 
success, and whom you and the Council could wish to leave 
with that charge behind, that being done, you shall with 
all speed receive our warrant, without which w~ clo cl.LEirge 
you (as you tender our pleasure) that you adventure not to 
come out of that kingdom, by virtue of any former license 
whatsoever. 
It seemed strange unto us that in none of your let-
ters we could find any advertisement of the arrival of 
the 2,000 last sent over, nor of your purpose to go into 
Offaly, when the messenger you sent did deliver both of 
them for certainty to divers that spake with him, which, 
we must tell you, we did disdain to do ourself (his qual-
ity and his own conditions considered), and though in his 
own presumption he desired it, as a matter which he pre-
tended you desired, yet we cannot believe that you would 
deliver any matter of importance to such a man's relation, 
whom both our city and court know and speak to be unfit 
to come into our presence. 
APPE:tillIX C 
APPENDIX C: Letter of Queen Elizabeth to the Earl of Essex, 
dated August 9, 1599 
The letter which we have read this day from you of 
that Council concerning your opinions for the northern 
action, doth rather deserve reproof than much answer; and 
therefore you shall hereby understand that when we examine 
all parts of your writings, and lay them together, we see 
nothing but insinuations to dissuade that which should be 
done in that point of greatest consequence, because we 
should not find the error of those former courtesies, 
which have made it now of greater difficulty. A matter 
which in you (whom we have held worthy to advise in the 
causes of that kingdom) might seem much more strange unto 
us than they do, if we could forget most of the examples 
of your proceedings in former times, which (sic) the late 
Deputies Russell and Fitzwilliams, even when~e preven-
tion, or rather absolute cure, of all the maladies in that 
kingdom was put into your hands. Of which if we had taken 
~traight account in Russell's time, the expense, the dan-
ger, and the dishonour succeeding, would not thus have 
multi~lied. But we do see bitter effects of our long 
sufferings, with which things we ·could as well in our own 
natural dispense as any Prince that liveth, because we 
presume that they proceed, not out of lack of duty, but 
of circumspection. Yet may not our kingdoms, our honour, 
and the lives of oui• subjects, both at home and abroad, 
be still dallied withall. God hath given us those upon 
other conditions, and whilst He vouchsafeth to continue 
us over them, we will not be accusable for anything within 
our power to perform. 
Is it not enough for you o.f that Council to have been 
the greatest causes of that corruption in matter of reli-
gion (whereof the contagion reigneth in that kingdom) by 
your :former suffering (nay, favouring) Popery, and the 
cause of many disasters to our people, by lack o.f discip-
line, order, and direction? but thEit you must, at the 
landing of our Lieutenant, who came with no other purpose 
but to do us service in the place of greatest peril, seek 
to divert his course, when our army was in greatest strength, 
by persuading so long a journey into :Munster, and leaving 
that prosecution (for which we have been only drawn on by 
you all to assent to send over so great forces), but that 
even now, on the 7th of August, we must receive new argu-
ments framed to keep an army out of the north, thereby to 
increase the rebels' pride, and frustrate one whole year's 
charges. Observe well what vrn have already wrj_tten, and 
a,pply your counsels to that which may shorten, and not 
prolong, the war, seeing never any o.f you was of other 
Ol)inion ~ than that all other courses were but consumptions, 
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except we went on with the northern prosecution. Do you 
forge·t that, within these seven days, you made a hot de-
mand of 2,000 men for this action, and now, before you have 
answer, send us tidings that this huge charge must leave 
Tyrone untouched? 'What would you have us believe, if we 
did not think you loyal, but that either some of you rthe 
Irish Councill cannot forget your old good wills to tnat 
Traitor, or e!se are insensible of all things, save your 
own particulars? For if these courses hitherto taken have 
well settled any of those Provinces, where your advices 
have carried our army (though contrary to the opinion of 
you, our Lieutenant, at your first arrival), then seeing 
this was also accounted your fittest time, what can be 
the reason of your stay? If, otherwise, it hath abated 
our strength, and given more means to the Traitor to for-
tify himself by all kinds of practice against our army, 
then must you confess, that these difficulties are not 
found, but made by yourselves. For we do know it, and must 
believe it, till we see the contrary proved, that whatso-
ever was appointed by us .for this service hath been more 
than fully completed. Lastly, for Lough Foyle, which still 
you ring in our ears, to be the place that would most annoy 
the rebel, we doubt not but to hear by the next that it is 
begun, and not in question. 
It remaineth now that we do return to your letter 
(our Lieutenant) such answer as is convenient, conoide1:ing 
the contents of the same, but also that you may know what 
we resolve. First, it appeareth that all that Council 
have united themselves to dissuade the northern journey, 
after they had joined with you seven days before in a re-
quest for greater numbers. Secondly, yourself express 
that you hold it nro bono augurio that we so much affect 
the journey, and that you do desire it, and resolve it, 
and yet demonstratively point at the danger in the conse-
quence, seeking thereby to shew intention to do that out 
of obedience, against which, in your ominous parenthesis, 
you make direct protestations. But herein we would have 
you know, that howsoever we do like obedience as the sac-
rifice which becometh all good subjects, yet such are, 
and shall be ever, the rules of our directions in things 
of this nature, as none that serveth us in that place you 
do, shall even win honour by obedience, where our country 
shall receive harm by our commandments. And where you 
describe unto us how strangely our Presidents of Munster 
and Connaught are mastered in those provinces without do-
ing anything upon the rebels; th;;i. t Off ally with 1, 500 
cannot save themselves; that the northern garrisons are 
able to do nothing with 8,000 men; that within two miles 
of Dublin there are daily stealths and incursions; if it 
grow out of negligence of our Governors, it were fit to 
know it; if otherwise, then we wish they had occupied 
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fewer numbers, seeing they ran no worse fortune before 
this great arriy arrived. And for the places which you 
have taken, we conceive you will leave no great numbers 
in them, seeing other provinces where they are seated 
receive no better fruits of their plantation, nor that we 
can hope of more success (by the Council's writing) than 
to be able to keep our towns, that were never lost, and 
some petty holds of small importance, with more than 
three parts of our army; it being decreed for the head of 
the rebellion (as it seems by them) that our forces shall 
not find the way this ye~r to behold them. What despair 
this will work in our subjects• minds, that had greater 
hopes; what pride it will raise in the rebels, that had . 
greater fears; and what dishonour it will do us in foreign 
parts; we had rather you had prevented, than we had noted. 
And surely when we fall in this calculation of the numbers 
you write of, howsoever you seem to apportion the numbers 
only of 4,750 foot and 340 horse for the journey of Ul-
ster, yet ought you to reckon the greatest part o.f the 
forces of Connaugh·t, as one of the portions always designed 
to correspond that service, to which if you shall add 
these 2,000, which we have granted you, with such extrac-
tions as upon better consideration you may draw both 
from divers places, that serve rather for protections of 
private men's countries and fortunes, than for the good 
of the public cause, besides what you ma;y ca.t.'"-'.Y out of 
the frontier northern garrisons, when you are so near his 
country; you may not reckon under ten or eleven thousand 
for that service. All which considered, although we will 
not particularly enjoin you to this way or that course of 
undertaking him, if the carriage of your own actions have 
changed the reason of some former counsels; yet have we 
thought it fit to make you see that out of your own let-
ters we may sufficiently gather the small success of your 
painful endeavours; wherein we confess our army hath lost 
no honour under your person; and that out of our letters 
you may collect some sufficient matter to prove that we 
command you no impossibilities. Which being all that at 
this time we think fit for this letter, we end. 
APPEl'IDIX D 
APPENDIX D: Letter of Queen Elizabeth to the Earl of Essex, 
dated September 14, 1599 
Having sufficiently declared unto you before this time 
how little the manner of your proceedings hath answered 
either our direction or the world's expectations, and find-
ing now by your letters by Cuff a course more strange, if 
strange may be, we are doubtful what to prescribe you at 
any time, or what to build upon your writing unto us in 
any thing. For we have clearly discerned of late, what 
you have ever to this hour possessed us with expectation 
(sic) that you would proceed as we have directed you; but 
y"Oil'r actions always shows (sic) the contrary, though car-
ried in such sort as we weresure to have no time to 
countermand them. Before your departure, no man's coun-
sel was held sound, which persuaded not presently the main 
prosecution in Ulster; all was nothin~ without that; and 
nothing was too much for that. This drew on the sudden 
transportation of so many thousands, to be carried over 
with you; and when you arrived, .we were charged with more 
than the list on which we resolved, by the number of 300 
horsemen above the thousand, which was assented to, which 
were only to be in pay during service in Ulster. We have 
been also put in charge ever since the first journey, the 
pretence of which voyage (as) appeared by your letters, 
was to do some present service in the interim, whiles that 
grew more commodious the main prosecution. For ·which pur-
pose you did importune with great earnestness that all 
manner of provisions might be hastened to Dublin against 
your return. Of this resolution to defer you going into 
Ulster you may well think that we would have made stay, 
if you had given us more time by warning; or if we could 
have imagined, by the contents of your own writing, that 
you would have spent nine weeks abroad, and your return 
when the third part of July was spent; and that you had 
u."'lderstood our mislike of your former course, and made 
your excuse of undertaking it only in respect of your 
conformity to the Council's opinions, with great protes-
tations of haste to the north. Then we received another 
letter ,of new reasons to suspend that journey yet awhile, 
and to draw the army into Offally, the fruit whereof at 
your home coming was nothing else but new relations of 
further miseries of our army and greater difficulties to 
perform the Ulster wars. Then followed from you and the 
Council a new demand of two thousan~ men, to which if we 
would assent, you would speedily undertake what we had so 
often comnanded. When that was granted, and your going 
onward, promised by divers letters, we received by this 
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bearer new fresh (sic) advertisement, that all you can 
do is to go to the frontiers, and that you have provided 
only twenty days victuals. In which kind of proceeding 
we must deal plain (sic) with you and that Council, that 
it were more proper f'Or them to leave troubling themselves 
with instructing us by what rules our power and their 
obedience are limited and bethink them of the courses that 
have been only derived from their counsel, and how to 
answer this part of theirs, to train us into a new expense 
for one end, and to employ it to another, to which we 
never would have assented, if we could. have suspected it 
should have been undertaken before we heard it was in 
action; and therefore we do wond~r how it can be answered, 
seeing your attempt is not in the capital traitor's coun-
try, that you have increased our listed.. But it is true 
and we have often said, that we were ever won to expense 
by little and little, and by protestation of great reso-
lutions in generalities, till they come to particular 
execution, of all which course whosoever shall examine 
any of the arguments used for excuse, shall find that 
your own proceedings beget the difficulties and that no 
just causes do breed the alterations of lack of numbers. 
If sickness of the army be the reason, why was there not 
the action undertaken when the army was in better state? 
If the spring were too soon, and the summer that followed 
otherwise spent, if the harvest th.at succeeded were so 
neglected as nothin3 hath been done, then surely we must 
conclude that none of the four quarters of the year will 
be in season for you and that Council to agree of Tyrone's 
prosecution, for which all our charge is intended. Fur-
ther, we require you to consider whether, we have not 
great cause to thin.le that your purpose is not to end the 
war, when yourself have often told us that all the petty 
undertakings in Leix, Munster and Connaue;ht, are but loss 
of time, consumption of treasure, and most of all (of) 
our people, until Tyrone himself be first beaten, on whom 
all the rest depend. Do not you see that if this course 
be in all parts by his sinister seconding all places where 
any attempts be offered, who do not see that if this 
course be continued, that it is like to spend us and our 
kingdom beyond all moderation, as well as the report of 
their success in all parts hath blemished our honour, 
encouraged others to no small presumption? We know you 
cannot so much fail in judgement as not to understand 
that all the world seeth how time is delayed, though you 
thirL"l{: thnt the allowance of thnt Council. 
qow often have you told us that others that preceded 
you had no judgment to end tbc war, who often resolved us 
(that) until Lough J?oyle and Ballyshannon were planted 
there could be no hope of doing service upon the capital 
rebels'? We must therefore let you know, as it cannot be 
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ignorance so it cannot be want .of means; for you had your 
asking, you had choice of times, you had power and author-
ity more ample than ever any had or ever shall have. It 
may well be judged with how little contentment we seek 
this and other errors. But how should that be hid which 
is so palpable? 
And therefore to leave that which is past, and that 
you may prepare to remedy matters of weight hereafter, 
rather than to fill, your papers with impertinent arguments, 
being in your general letters savouring still in many 
points of humours that cpncern the private of you, our 
Lord Lieutenant, we do tell you plainly, and you that 
our Council, that we wonder at your indiscretion to sub-
scribe to letters which concern our public service, when 
they are mixed with many matters private, and directed 
to our Council table, which is not wo:p:t to handle things 
of so small importance. 
To conclude, if you say that our army be in a list 
nineteen thousands, (and) that you have not, we answer 
then to you, our Treasurer, that we are evil served, and 
that there needs not so frequent demands of full pay. If 
you will say that the muster-master is to blame, we much 
muse then, why he is not punished. We say to you, our 
General, if we would .ex gure, proprio. ,judicari£, that i:i-11 
defects by muster, yea t ough never in so remote garri-
sons, have been affirmed to us to deser-..re to be imputed 
to the General. For the small proportion you say you 
carry with you of 3,500 foot, when lately we augmented you 
200 (sic; error for 2,000) more, it is past comprehension, 
excep'f""it be that you have left too great numbers in unne-
cessary garrisons, which do increase our charge, and dimin-
ish our army; which we command you to reform, especially 
since by your continual report of the state of every prov-
ince, you describe them all to be in worse condition than 
ever they were before you put foot in that kingdom. So 
that whosoever shall write the story of this year's action, 
must say that we were too great charge to hazard our king-
dom, and you have taken great pains to prepare for many 
purposes, which perish without undertaking. And therefore, 
because w_e see now, by your own word, that the hope is 
spent of this year's service upon Tyrone and O'Donnell, 
we do command you and our Council to fall jointly into 
present deliberation of the state which you have brought 
our kingdom unto, and that by the effect which this jour-
ney hath produced, and why these garrisons which you will 
plant so far within the land, in the Erenny and Monagham, 
as others we have v.Titten, shall have the same difficul-
ties. Secondly, we look to hear froc you and them jointly, 
how you think fit that the remain of this year shall be 
spent and employed, in what kind of war, and whose and 
with what numbers; which being done and sent hither in 
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writint; with all expedition, you shall then understand our 
pleasure in all thinr;s fit for your service: until which 
time we conmand you to be very careful to meot with all 
inconveniences that may rise in the kingdom, where the 
evil-affected will grow desperate, when they see the best 
of our defendinc; them. He have seen a writing, in manner 
of a catalogue full of challenges, that are impertinent, 
and of comparisons, that are needless, such as hath not 
been before this time presented to a State, except it be 
done more with a hope to terrify all men from censuring 
your proceedings. Had it not been enough to send us the 
testimony of the Council, but that you must call so many 
of those, that are of so slender judgement and none of our 
Council, to such a form of subscription? Surely, howso-
ever you may have warranted them, we doubted not but to 
let them know what belongs to us to you and them. And 
thus, expecting your answer, we end at our manner of Non-
such, the 14th of September, 1599. 
APPENDIX E 
AP:?BNDIX E: Letter of (1~ueen Elizabeth to the Ea.rl of Essex, 
dated September 17, 1599. 
Right trusty and well beloved cousin and chancellor, we 
greet you well. By the letter and the journal which we 
have received from you, we see a quick end made of a slow 
proceeding, for anything which our forces shall undertake 
in those quarters which you pretended to visit, and there-
fore doubt not but before this time you have ended the 
charge of the last two thousand which we have yielded for 
other purposes, and of the three hundred horse only des-
tined for the Ulster service. It remaineth therefore that 
we return you somewhat of our concept, upon this late acci-
dent of your interview with the rebels. 
We never doubted but that 'I'yrone whensoever he saw 
any force approach, either himself or any of his principal 
partisans, would instantly offer a parley, especially with 
our supreme Governor of that kingdom, having often done it 
to those who had but subaltern authority, always seeking 
these cessations with like words, like protestations, and 
upon such contingents, as we gather these will prove, by 
your advertisement of his purpose to go consult with O'Don-
nell. Herein, we must confess to you that we are doubtful 
lest the success will be suitable with your own opiniOLJ. 
heretofore, when the same rebels held like course with 
others that preceeded you. And therefore to come to some 
answer for the present, it appearcth to us by your journal, 
that you and the traitor spake together half an hou:- alone, 
and without anybody's hearing: wherein, ti1ough we trust 
you with our kingdom, are far from mistrusting with a 
traitor; yet, both for comeliness, example, and for our 
own discharge, we marvel you would carry it no better, 
especially when you have seemed in all things since your 
arrival to be so precise to have good testimony for your 
actions; as, whensoever there was anything to be done to 
which our com.mandment tied you, it; seomed sufficient war-
rant for you if your fellow councellors allowed better of 
other ways, though ·your own reason carried you to have 
pursued our directions against their opinions; to whose 
conduct if we had meant that Ireland (after all the calam-
ities in which they have wrapped it) should still have 
been abandoned, (to whose course never any could take 
more exceptions .than yourself), then was it very super-
fluous to have sent over such a personage as you are, who 
had deciphered so well the errors of their proceedings, 
being ::;till a hand with us and of our secretest council, 
as it had been one good rule for you amongst others, in 
most things to have varied from. their resolutions, espe-
cially when you had our opinion and your own to boot. 
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Furthermore, we cannot but muse that you should 
recite that circumstances of his being sometime uncovered, 
[Tyrone took his hat off to Essex at their meeting at the 
stream] as if that were much in a rebel, when our person 
is so represented, or that you can think that ever any 
parley (as you call it) was upon less terms of inequality 
. than this, when you came to him and he kept the depth of 
the brook between him and you; in which sort he proceeded 
not with other of our ministers, for he came over to them. 
So as never could any man observe greater form of great-
ness than he hath done, nor more to our dishonor, that a 
traitor must be so far from submission, as he must have a 
cessation granted because he may have time to advise whe-
ther he should go further or no with us. And thus much 
for form. For you have dealt so sparingly with us in sub-
stance, by advertising us only, at first, of the half 
hours conference alone, but not what passed on either 
side; by letting us also know you sent commissioners, 
without showing what they had in charge; as we cannot tell 
(but by divination) what to think may be the issue of 
their :proceeding. Only this \1e are sure of, (for we see 
it in effect). that you have prospered so ill for us by 
your warfare, as we cannot but be very jealous lest you 
should be as well overtaken by the treaty; - For either 
they did not ill that had the like meetings before you, or 
you have done ill to keep them company in their erro:r..·n; 
for no actions can more resemble others, that have been 
before condemned, then these proceedings of yours at this 
time with the rebels. For you must consider that as we 
sent you into Ireland, an extraordinary person, with an 
army exceeding any that ever Has pa.zred there by any prince 
for so long time out of this realm, and that you ever sup-
posed that we were forced to all this .by the weak proceed-
ings even in this point of the treaties and pacifications. 
So, if this parley shall not produce such a conclusion, 
as this i!;itolerable charge may receive present and large 
abatement, then hath the managing of our forces not only 
proved dishonorable and wasteful, but that which followeth 
is like to prove uerilous and contemptable. Consider then 
what is like to be the end, and what - vrill be fit to build 
on. To trust tbis traitor upon oath, is to trust a devil 
upon his religion. To trust him upon pledges is mere 
illusa:r"y, for wha.t piety is there among them that can tie 
them to rule of honesty for itself, who are only bound to 
their own sensualities, and respect only private utility. 
, And therefore, v-ki . a:tsoever order you shall take with him of 
la;yin~~ aside of arDj.es, banishini:; of strangers, recogni-
tion of superiority to us, or renouncing of rule over our 
rights, promising restitution of spoils, disclaiming from 
Oneilship, or any other such like conditions, which were 
tolerable before he was in his overc;rown pride, by his own 
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success against our power, which of former times was ter-
rible. to him: yet unless he yield to have garrisons plan-
ted in his own country to master him, to deliver O'Neil's 
sons, (whereof the detaining is most dishonorable), and to 
come over to us personally here, we shall doubt you do but 
piece up a hollow peace, and so the end prove worse than 
the beginning. And therefore, as we well approve your own 
voluntary profession, (wherein you assure us that you will 
conclude nothing till you have advertised us, and heard 
our pleasure), so do we absolutely command you to continue 
and perform that resolution. Allowi.ng well that you hear 
him what he proffers, draw him as high as you can, and 
advertise us what conditions you would advise us to afford 
him, and what he is like to receive: yet not to pass your 
word for his pardon, nor make any absolute contract for 
his conditions, till you do so particularly advertise us 
by writing, a.nd receive our pleasure hereafter for your 
further warrant and authority in that behalf. For what-
soever we do, ought to be well weighed in such a time, 
when the world will suspect that we are glad of anything 
out of weakness, or apt to pardon him out of mistrust of 
our power to take due revenge on him: considering that 
all which now is yielded to on our part succeedeth his 
victories a..~d our disasters. In our letters of the four-
teenth of this month to you and that Council, we have 
written those things that are .fit .fur thea tu answer· c::n1d 
understand: and therefore we will expect that t:b.ey can say 
to all the parts of that letter, with which our pleasure 
is that they be fully acquainted, as well as for your dis-
charge another time, if you vary from their opinions, 
(when we direct otherwise), as also because we would be 
glad to receive their answer as well as yours. 
Given u.nder .our signature, at Nonsuch, the 17th day 
of September, 1599, in the 4lst year of our reign. 
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